Saturday, July 29, 2006

Israel rejects a three-day cease-fire for humanitarian relief

Saturday, July 29, 2006
JERUSALEM (AP) Israel rejects a U.N. proposal of a temorary three-day cease-fire for humanitarian relief

A Right Way to Help Israel

Editorial
The New York Times
July 29, 2006

There is a difference between justified and smart. Israel’s airstrikes against Hezbollah targets are legitimate so long as Hezbollah wages war against Israel and operates outside the control of the Lebanese government. But the air campaign is now doing Israel more harm than good.

A better answer to the Hezbollah problem would be an immediate cease-fire, paving the way for an international force to patrol Lebanon’s southern border. That is what Britain’s prime minister, Tony Blair, was pushing for in Washington yesterday, and there were signs that President Bush may be finally coming around.

For more than two weeks, Mr. Bush has been playing for time, declining to join calls for an immediate cease-fire so that Israel can continue its military actions. Israel and the administration are right to argue that a cease-fire alone cannot provide a lasting solution. But if Washington is now prepared to exercise diplomatic leadership on behalf of Israel’s security, rather than simply run interference for Israel’s military operations, a cease-fire now could become the first step to a more lasting solution.

The glaring flaw in the administration’s logic is that there is no way that even weeks of Israeli airstrikes can eliminate more than a fraction of the 12,000 rockets Hezbollah is believed to have in Lebanon. And more weeks of television screens filled with Lebanese casualties, refugees and destruction would be a propaganda bonanza for the Hezbollahs and the Hamases, and a mounting political problem for the Arab world’s most moderate and pro-Western governments. Whatever a major Israeli ground offensive might achieve in military terms would have far too steep a political and diplomatic cost. Israel’s 18-year occupation of Lebanon brought no lasting gains, and few Israelis are eager for a repeat.

What is needed, as almost everyone now agrees, is a strong international force, including well-armed units from NATO countries, to move into southern Lebanon as quickly as possible. Its mission would be to disarm Hezbollah in accordance with U.N. resolutions, thereby reasserting the sovereignty of the Lebanese government and preventing further attacks against Israel. An immediate internationally imposed cease-fire would spare Lebanese civilians from further suffering.

Yesterday, there were some encouraging signs of movement in this direction, with Mr. Bush sending Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice back to the Middle East for the weekend and calling for a multinational force to be dispatched quickly. A United Nations meeting to discuss such a force has now been moved up to Monday.

The pressure for bringing in an international force should now be coming from American diplomacy, not Israeli airstrikes. If Washington is about to come off the diplomatic sidelines to which it has foolishly consigned itself for the past two weeks, it will discover a real opportunity to help Israel’s security, America’s international image and pro-Western Arab governments.

Friday, July 28, 2006

Tide of Arab Opinion Turns to Support for Hezbollah

By NEIL MacFARQUHAR
The New York Times
July 28, 2006

DAMASCUS, Syria, July 27 — At the onset of the Lebanese crisis, Arab governments, starting with Saudi Arabia, slammed Hezbollah for recklessly provoking a war, providing what the United States and Israel took as a wink and a nod to continue the fight.

Now, with hundreds of Lebanese dead and Hezbollah holding out against the vaunted Israeli military for more than two weeks, the tide of public opinion across the Arab world is surging behind the organization, transforming the Shiite group’s leader, Sheik Hassan Nasrallah, into a folk hero and forcing a change in official statements.

The Saudi royal family and King Abdullah II of Jordan, who were initially more worried about the rising power of Shiite Iran, Hezbollah’s main sponsor, are scrambling to distance themselves from Washington.

An outpouring of newspaper columns, cartoons, blogs and public poetry readings have showered praise on Hezbollah while attacking the United States and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice for trumpeting American plans for a “new Middle East” that they say has led only to violence and repression.

Even Al Qaeda, run by violent Sunni Muslim extremists normally hostile to all Shiites, has gotten into the act, with its deputy leader, Ayman al-Zawahri, releasing a taped message saying that through its fighting in Iraq, his organization was also trying to liberate Palestine.

Mouin Rabbani, a senior Middle East analyst in Amman, Jordan, with the International Crisis Group, said, “The Arab-Israeli conflict remains the most potent issue in this part of the world.”

Distinctive changes in tone are audible throughout the Sunni world. This week, President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt emphasized his attempts to arrange a cease-fire to protect all sects in Lebanon, while the Jordanian king announced that his country was dispatching medical teams “for the victims of Israeli aggression.” Both countries have peace treaties with Israel.

The Saudi royal court has issued a dire warning that its 2002 peace plan — offering Israel full recognition by all Arab states in exchange for returning to the borders that predated the 1967 Arab-Israeli war — could well perish.

“If the peace option is rejected due to the Israeli arrogance,” it said, “then only the war option remains, and no one knows the repercussions befalling the region, including wars and conflict that will spare no one, including those whose military power is now tempting them to play with fire.”

The Saudis were putting the West on notice that they would not exert pressure on anyone in the Arab world until Washington did something to halt the destruction of Lebanon, Saudi commentators said.

American officials say that while the Arab leaders need to take a harder line publicly for domestic political reasons, what matters more is what they tell the United States in private, which the Americans still see as a wink and a nod.

There are evident concerns among Arab governments that a victory for Hezbollah — and it has already achieved something of a victory by holding out this long — would further nourish the Islamist tide engulfing the region and challenge their authority. Hence their first priority is to cool simmering public opinion.

But perhaps not since President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt made his emotional outpourings about Arab unity in the 1960’s, before the Arab defeat in the 1967 war, has the public been so electrified by a confrontation with Israel, played out repeatedly on satellite television stations with horrific images from Lebanon of wounded children and distraught women fleeing their homes.

Egypt’s opposition press has had a field day comparing Sheik Nasrallah to Nasser, while demonstrators waved pictures of both.

An editorial in the weekly Al Dustur by Ibrahim Issa, who faces a lengthy jail sentence for his previous criticism of President Mubarak, compared current Arab leaders to the medieval princes who let the Crusaders chip away at Muslim lands until they controlled them all.

After attending an intellectual rally in Cairo for Lebanon, the Egyptian poet Ahmed Fouad Negm wrote a column describing how he had watched a companion buy 20 posters of Sheik Nasrallah.

“People are praying for him as they walk in the street, because we were made to feel oppressed, weak and handicapped,” Mr. Negm said in an interview. “I asked the man who sweeps the street under my building what he thought, and he said: ‘Uncle Ahmed, he has awakened the dead man inside me! May God make him triumphant!’ ”

In Lebanon, Rasha Salti, a freelance writer, summarized the sense that Sheik Nasrallah differed from other Arab leaders.

“Since the war broke out, Hassan Nasrallah has displayed a persona, and public behavior also, to the exact opposite of Arab heads of states,” she wrote in an e-mail message posted on many blogs.

In comparison, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s brief visit to the region sparked widespread criticism of her cold demeanor and her choice of words, particularly a statement that the bloodshed represented the birth pangs of a “new Middle East.” That catchphrase was much used by Shimon Peres, the veteran Israeli leader who was a principal negotiator of the 1993 Oslo Accords, which ultimately failed to lead to the Palestinian state they envisaged.

A cartoon by Emad Hajjaj in Jordan labeled “The New Middle East” showed an Israeli tank sitting on a broken apartment house in the shape of the Arab world.

Fawaz al-Trabalsi, a columnist in the Lebanese daily As Safir, suggested that the real new thing in the Middle East was the ability of one group to challenge Israeli militarily.

Perhaps nothing underscored Hezbollah’s rising stock more than the sudden appearance of a tape from the Qaeda leadership attempting to grab some of the limelight.

Al Jazeera satellite television broadcast a tape from Mr. Zawahri (za-WAH-ri). Large panels behind him showed a picture of the exploding World Trade Center as well as portraits of two Egyptian Qaeda members, Muhammad Atef, a Qaeda commander who was killed by an American airstrike in Afghanistan, and Mohamed Atta, the lead hijacker on Sept. 11, 2001. He described the two as fighters for the Palestinians.

Mr. Zawahri tried to argue that the fight against American forces in Iraq paralleled what Hezbollah was doing, though he did not mention the organization by name.

“It is an advantage that Iraq is near Palestine,” he said. “Muslims should support its holy warriors until an Islamic emirate dedicated to jihad is established there, which could then transfer the jihad to the borders of Palestine.”

Mr. Zawahri also adopted some of the language of Hezbollah and Shiite Muslims in general. That was rather ironic, since previously in Iraq, Al Qaeda has labeled Shiites Muslim as infidels and claimed responsibility for some of the bloodier assaults on Shiite neighborhoods there.

But by taking on Israel, Hezbollah had instantly eclipsed Al Qaeda, analysts said. “Everyone will be asking, ‘Where is Al Qaeda now?’ ” said Adel al-Toraifi, a Saudi columnist and expert on Sunni extremists.

Mr. Rabbani of the International Crisis Group said Hezbollah’s ability to withstand the Israeli assault and to continue to lob missiles well into Israel exposed the weaknesses of Arab governments with far greater resources than Hezbollah.

“Public opinion says that if they are getting more on the battlefield than you are at the negotiating table, and you have so many more means at your disposal, then what the hell are you doing?” Mr. Rabbani said. “In comparison with the small embattled guerrilla movement, the Arab states seem to be standing idly by twiddling their thumbs.”

Thursday, July 27, 2006

Q&A on Hostilities Between Israel and Hezbollah

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
Updated July 26, 2006

(Beirut, July 26, 2006) – Since July 12, when Hezbollah launched an attack on Israeli positions killing eight Israeli soldiers and capturing two, there have been consistent and intense hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah in which civilians in Lebanon and Israel have overwhelmingly been the victims.

The following questions and answers set out some of the legal rules governing the various actions taken by Israel and Hezbollah to date in this recent conflict. Human Rights Watch sets out these rules before it has been able to conclude its on-the-ground investigation. The purpose is to provide analytic guidance for those who are examining the fighting, as well as for the parties to the conflict and those with the capacity to influence them.

This Q & A addresses only the rules of international humanitarian law, known as jus in bello, which govern the way each party to the armed conflict must conduct itself in the course of the hostilities. It does not address whether Hezbollah was justified in attacking Israel, whether Israel was justified in attacking Lebanon for the conduct of Hezbollah, or other matters concerning the legitimacy of resorting to war. In accordance with its institutional mandate, Human Rights Watch maintains a position of strict neutrality on these issues of jus ad bellum, because we find it the best way to promote our primary goal of encouraging both sides in the course of the conflict to respect international humanitarian law.

What international humanitarian law applies to the current conflict between Israel and Hezbollah?
What is Hezbollah’s status in relation to the conflict?
Was Hezbollah's capture of Israeli soldiers lawful?
Which targets are Israel and Hezbollah entitled to attack under international humanitarian law?
Is Hezbollah’s firing of rockets into Israel lawful under international humanitarian law?
Does international humanitarian law permit Israel to bomb the Beirut airport?
Is Israel entitled to target Lebanese infrastructure such as roads, bridges and power stations?
Is Israel entitled to use military force against the Lebanese population to encourage it to press its government to stop Hezbollah’s attacks and rescue Israel’s soldiers?
Is Israel entitled to bomb the Hezbollah leader’s house and office?
Can Israel attack neighborhoods that house Hezbollah leaders or offices? And what are Hezbollah’s obligations regarding the use of civilian areas for military activities?
Can Israel attack Hezbollah radio and television stations?
The IDF have dropped leaflets in parts of Lebanon warning residents to evacuate – is this an appropriate precaution?
Is Israel’s blockade of Lebanon legitimate?
If the targets are legitimate military objects, is the use of cluster munitions or warheads with ball bearings lawful?
What is meant by “collective punishment” of the civilian population?
What are the parties’ obligations to agencies seeking to provide humanitarian assistance?
Are attacks on humanitarian convoys unlawful?

What international humanitarian law applies to the current conflict between Israel and Hezbollah?

The current armed conflict between Hezbollah and Israel is governed by international treaty as well as the rules of customary international humanitarian law. The treaty, specifically, Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, to which Israel is a party, sets forth minimum standards for all parties to a conflict between a state party such as Israel and a non-state party such as Hezbollah. The customary rules are based on established state practice, and bind all parties to an armed conflict, whether state actors or non-state armed groups.

International humanitarian law is designed mainly to protect civilians and other noncombatants from the hazards of armed conflict. Among the customary rules, parties that engage in hostilities must distinguish at all times between combatants and noncombatants. As discussed below, warring parties are required to take all feasible precautions to minimize harm to civilians and civilian objects and to refrain from attacks that would disproportionately harm the civilian population or fail to discriminate between combatants and civilians.

Common Article 3 provides a number of fundamental protections for noncombatants, which include those who are no longer taking part in hostilities, such as captured combatants, and those who have surrendered or are unable to fight because of wounds or illness. The article prohibits violence against these noncombatants – particularly murder, cruel treatment and torture – as well as outrages against their personal dignity and degrading or humiliating treatment. It also prohibits the taking of hostages and “the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions” if basic judicial guarantees have not been observed.

Israel has asserted on several occasions since hostilities began on July 12 that it considers itself to be responding to the actions of the sovereign state of Lebanon, not just to those of Hezbollah. If Israel considers itself to be at war with another sovereign state – that is, if it considers itself involved in an interstate conflict – then it must accept being bound by the full scope of the Geneva Conventions with their far more extensive rules, not simply those of Common Article 3. To the extent that Lebanese forces were to join the hostilities, they, too, would be bound by the full Geneva Conventions, to which Lebanon is also a party. However, this Q & A limits itself to the more focused requirements of customary law and Common Article 3, since they have greatest relevance to the conflict as it so far has been waged.

What is Hezbollah’s status in relation to the conflict?

Hezbollah is an organized political Islamist group based in Lebanon, with a military arm and a civilian arm, and is represented in the Lebanese parliament and government. As such a group, and as a party to the conflict with Israel, it is bound to conduct hostilities in compliance with customary international humanitarian law and Common Article 3, which as stated above applies to conflicts that are not interstate but between a state and a non-state actor. As is explicitly stated in Common Article 3, and made clear by the commentaries of the International Committee of the Red Cross, the application of the provisions of Common Article 3, as well as customary international law, to Hezbollah does not affect its legal status.

Was Hezbollah's capture of Israeli soldiers lawful?

The targeting and capture of enemy soldiers is allowed under international humanitarian law. However, captured combatants must in all circumstances be treated humanely.

Hezbollah leader Hassan Nassrallah has stated that the captured soldiers will be used to negotiate the release of Palestinian, Lebanese and other Arab prisoners from Israel. The use of captives who are no longer involved in the conflict for this purpose constitutes hostage-taking. Hostage-taking as part of an armed conflict is strictly forbidden under international law, by both Common Article 3 and customary international law, and is a war crime.

Which targets are Israel and Hezbollah entitled to attack under international humanitarian law?

Two fundamental tenets of international humanitarian law are those of “civilian immunity” and the principle of “distinction.” They impose a duty to distinguish at all times in the conduct of hostilities between combatants and civilians, and to target only the former. It is forbidden in any circumstance to direct attacks against civilians; indeed, as noted, to do so intentionally amounts to a war crime.

It is also generally forbidden to direct attacks against what are called “civilian objects,” such as homes and apartments, places of worship, hospitals, schools or cultural monuments, unless they are being used for military purposes. Military objects that are legitimately subject to attack are those that make an “effective” contribution to military action and whose destruction, capture or neutralization offers a “definite military advantage.” Where there is doubt about the nature of an object, it must be presumed to be civilian.

The mere fact that an object has civilian uses does not necessarily render it immune from attack. It, too, can be targeted if it makes an “effective” contribution to the enemy’s military activities and its destruction, capture or neutralization offers a “definite military advantage” to the attacking side in the circumstances ruling at the time. However, such “dual use” objects might also be protected by the principle of proportionality, described below.

Even when a target is serving a military purpose, precautions must always be taken to protect civilians.

Is Hezbollah’s firing of rockets into Israel lawful under international humanitarian law?

As a party to the armed conflict, Hezbollah has a legal duty to protect the life, health and safety of civilians and other noncombatants. The targeting of military installations and other military objectives is permitted, but Hezbollah must take all feasible precautions to avoid civilian harm and is prohibited from targeting civilians, launching indiscriminate attacks, or attacking military objects if the anticipated harm to civilians and other noncombatants will be disproportionate to the expected military advantage. Hezbollah’s commanders must choose the means of attack that can be directed at military targets and will minimize incidental harm to civilians. If the weapons used are so inaccurate that they cannot be directed at military targets without imposing a substantial risk of civilian harm, then they should not be deployed. Deliberately attacking civilians is in all circumstances prohibited and a war crime.

While Human Rights Watch has not yet conducted a field examination to determine whether any of these attacks aimed to target a military object, preliminary information suggests that rockets fired by Hezbollah may be so inaccurate as to be incapable of being targeted, but are rather used to target a generalized area. As Human Rights Watch said in a 1997 report on Lebanon and Israel, “Katyushas are inaccurate weapons with an indiscriminate effect when fired into areas where civilians are concentrated. The use of such weapons in this manner is a blatant violation of international humanitarian law.” That is, their use in civilian areas violates the prohibition on indiscriminate attacks and would be a war crime. Customary international law prohibits such bombardment near or in any area containing a concentration of civilians, even if there are believed to be military objectives in the area.

Does international humanitarian law permit Israel to bomb the Beirut airport?

Airports in certain circumstances may be dual-use targets, in that they might be used both for military purposes, such as military re-supply, and to provide transport and provisions for the civilian population. However, as a primarily civilian object, the Beirut airport can become a military objective only if it is in fact providing an “effective” contribution to the enemy’s military activities and its destruction or neutralization provides “a definite military advantage.” Its status as a legitimate military objective would exist only for such time as it meets the foregoing criteria. International humanitarian law requires everything feasible to be done to verify that targets are in fact military objectives. Even if they are, the impact on civilians must be carefully weighed under the principle of proportionality against the military advantage served; all ways of minimizing the impact on civilians must be considered; and attacks should not be undertaken if the civilian harm outweighs the definite military advantage, or if a similar military advantage could be secured with less civilian harm.

According to an Israel Defense Forces (IDF) statement, the justification for targeting the Beirut airport is that it “constitutes a station for the transport of arms and infrastructure used by Hezbollah” and as such “represents a serious threat.” It has also been suggested that the airport could be used to transport the captured Israeli soldiers out of the area. However, these justifications are at best debatable. Israel has not claimed that the transport of arms was current or under way. It is thus unclear why Israel could not have waited to see whether such supply operations actually began and only then targeted either particular flights or, if necessary, the airport at that time. Instead, Israel has attacked Beirut airport on a number of occasions, without any publicly available evidence that it has been used for any recent transport of arms or troops. As for the possible use of the airport to transport the captured Israeli soldiers out of Lebanon, the military advantage of destroying the airport is negligible in comparison with the civilian cost, given the many alternative routes out of Lebanon along its long border with Syria. On the other hand, the civilian cost of targeting the airport is high, since it impedes the ability of civilians in Lebanon to escape the fighting or those who remain to receive provisions.

The real, unstated reason for Israel’s attack on the airport may be precisely to impose a cost on Lebanese civilians to encourage them to press their government to rein in Hezbollah. Leaving aside the question of whether the Lebanese government is militarily capable of reining in Hezbollah, it is illegal under international humanitarian law, as noted below, to use military force to squeeze the civilian population, to enhance its suffering or to undermine its morale, regardless of the ultimate purpose. Under these circumstances, the attack on the Beirut airport does not appear to have been legitimate under the standards of international humanitarian law.

Is Israel entitled to target Lebanese infrastructure such as roads, bridges and power stations?

Like airports, roads and bridges may be dual-use targets if actually used for military purposes. Even then, the same rule applies, requiring the parties to the conflict to weigh carefully the impact on civilians against the military advantage served; they must consider all ways of minimizing the impact on civilians; and they should not undertake attacks if the civilian harm outweighs the definite military advantage. Human Rights Watch has not yet done the field research that would enable an assessment of the legitimacy of Israeli attacks on Lebanese roads and bridges, but among the factors to be considered are whether the destruction of particular roads or bridges serve in fact to impede military transport in light of readily alternative routes – that is, whether the infrastructure attacked is making an “effective” contribution to Hezbollah’s military action and its destruction offers a “definite military advantage” – or whether its destruction seems aimed more at inconveniencing the civilian population and even preventing it from fleeing the fighting and seeking safety.

As for electrical facilities supplying the civilian population, they almost never are legitimate military targets. On the one hand, they might be considered dual-use targets, given that both civilians and armies use electricity. On the other hand, the harm to civilians is often enormous, affecting refrigeration, sanitation, hospitals and other necessities of modern life; in urban society, electricity is arguably “indispensable to the survival of the civilian population,” meaning that it can be attacked only in extremely narrow circumstances. Meanwhile, the military effect of targeting electrical facilities serving the civilian population often can be achieved in more focused ways, such as by attacking military facilities themselves or the portion of an electrical grid directly serving a military facility. Although final judgment must await a more detailed on-the-ground investigation, Israel faces a very high burden to justify these attacks.

Is Israel entitled to use military force against the Lebanese population to encourage it to press its government to stop Hezbollah’s attacks and rescue Israel’s soldiers?

Lawful attacks are only those where the targets by their “nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action,” and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers “a definite military advantage.” As noted, attacks directed at civilian morale do not meet this test, since civilians, by definition, are not contributing to military action. Indeed, attacks on civilian morale are inimical to the very purpose of international humanitarian law – the protection of civilians. Military attacks on civilian morale undoubtedly can exert pressure on a government to pursue a particular course of action, but under international humanitarian law that is an inappropriate use of military force. Indeed, the logic of attacking civilian morale opens the door to deliberately attacking civilians and civilian objects themselves – in short, to terrorism. In addition, international humanitarian law explicitly prohibits attacks of which the primary purpose is to intimidate or instill terror in the civilian population.

International humanitarian law would not prohibit attacks on Lebanese government military forces as a way of pressing the government to rein in Hezbollah, but in making that point, Human Rights Watch takes no position on whether the Lebanese government is capable of reining in Hezbollah or whether it would be an appropriate use of force under jus ad bellum standards to target the Lebanese government.

Is Israel entitled to bomb the Hezbollah leader’s house and office?

International law allows the targeting of military commanders in the course of armed conflict, provided that such attacks otherwise comply with the laws that protect civilians. Normally, political leaders, as civilians, would not be legitimate targets of attack. The only exception to this rule is if their role, as commander of troops, or their direct participation in military hostilities renders them effectively combatants. Civilians lose their protected status when they are engaged in hostilities.

According to the International Committee of the Red Cross, direct participation in hostilities means “acts of war which by their nature and purpose are likely to cause actual harm to the personnel and equipment of enemy armed forces,” and includes acts of defense. Thus, Hezbollah political leaders who are effectively commanding belligerent forces would be legitimate targets. This conclusion does not apply to all Hezbollah leaders, and in particular to those who could not be said to hold such command responsibilities or to be directly participating in hostilities.

In principle, it is permitted to target the location where a combatant resides or works. However, as with any attack on an otherwise legitimate military target, the attacking force must refrain from attack if it would disproportionately harm the civilian population or be launched in a way that fails to discriminate between combatants and civilians.

Can Israel attack neighborhoods that house Hezbollah leaders or offices? And what are Hezbollah’s obligations regarding the use of civilian areas for military activities?

Where the targeting of a combatant takes place in an urban area, all parties must be aware of their obligations to protect the civilian population, as the bombing of urban areas significantly increases the risks to the civilian population. International humanitarian law obliges all belligerents to avoid harm to civilians or civilian objects.

The defending party – in the case of Beirut, Hezbollah – must take all necessary precautions to protect civilians against the dangers resulting from armed hostilities, and must never use the presence of civilians to shield themselves from attack. That requires positioning its military assets, troops and commanders as much as possible outside of populated areas. The use of human shields is a war crime.

In calculating the legality of an attack on premises where a Hezbollah combatant is present, Israel must take into account the risk to civilians. It is not relieved from this obligation on the grounds that it considers Hezbollah responsible for having located legitimate military targets within or near populated areas, or that Hezbollah may be using the civilian population as a shield. Even in situations of Hezbollah’s illegal location of military targets, or shielding, Israel must refrain from launching any attack that may be expected to cause excessive civilian loss in comparison to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. That is, a violation by Hezbollah in this regard does not justify Israeli forces ignoring the civilian consequences of a planned attack. The intentional launch of an attack in an area without regard to the civilian consequences or in the knowledge that the harm to civilians would be disproportionately high compared to any definite military benefit to be achieved would be a serious violation of international humanitarian law, and a war crime.

In any event, the presence of a Hezbollah commander or military facility in a populated area never justifies attacking the area as such rather than the particular military target. It is a prohibited indiscriminate attack, and a war crime, to treat an entire area as a military target instead of attacking the particular military facilities or personnel within that area.

Can Israel attack Hezbollah radio and television stations?

Military attacks on broadcast facilities used for military communications are legitimate under international humanitarian law, but such attacks on civilian television or radio stations are prohibited if they are designed primarily to undermine civilian morale or to psychologically harass the civilian population. Civilian television and radio stations are legitimate targets only if they meet the criteria for a legitimate military objective; that is, if they are used in a way that makes an “effective contribution to military action” and their destruction in the circumstances ruling at the time offers “a definite military advantage.” Specifically, Hezbollah-operated civilian broadcast facilities could become military targets if, for example, they are used to send military messages or otherwise concretely to advance Hezbollah’s armed campaign against Israel. However, civilian broadcasting facilities are not rendered legitimate military targets simply because they spout pro-Hezbollah or anti-Israel propaganda. For the same reason that it is unlawful to attack civilian morale, it is unlawful to attack facilities that merely shape civilian opinion; neither directly contributes to military operations. That Lebanese civilian opinion might influence how the Lebanese government responds to Hezbollah is not a sufficiently direct contribution to military action to render the media used to influence that opinion a legitimate military target. Rather, broadcasts should be met with competing broadcasts, propaganda with propaganda.

Should stations become legitimate military objectives because of their use to transmit military communications, the principle of proportionality in attack must still be respected. This means that Israeli military planners and commanders should verify at all times that the risks to the civilian population in undertaking any such attack do not outweigh the anticipated military benefit. Special precautions should be taken in relation to buildings located in urban areas. Advance warning of an attack must be given whenever possible.

The IDF have dropped leaflets in parts of Lebanon warning residents to evacuate – is this an appropriate precaution?

International humanitarian law requires that if there is any risk to civilians in an attack, an effective warning be given where “circumstances permit.” Leaflet drops are one way to provide that warning. However, in some cases the IDF are reported to have dropped leaflets giving residents only two hours to evacuate. It is unclear how long Israel waited after the expiration of this two-hour period to launch an attack in these areas. Whether this length of notice is effective is a matter for factual evaluation from the ground, which Human Rights Watch is not yet in a position to undertake. An assessment will have to take into account the difficulties in movement caused by Israel’s bombing of some transportation infrastructure such as bridges. In any event, the giving of such warnings does not absolve the attacking party, in this case Israel, from its obligations not to target civilian objects and not to carry out attacks that fail to discriminate between combatants and civilians, or that would have a disproportionate impact on civilians.

Examples of other precautions that parties should take to minimize civilian casualties include selecting a time of day for attack when the fewest civilians would be expected in the area; attacking a legitimate military target that is mobile when it is away from civilian areas; selecting weaponry and a method of attack that, if it misses its intended target, is least likely to harm nearby civilians; and refraining altogether from an attack even against a legitimate military target if the anticipated civilian harm will be disproportionately high – that is, “an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”

Is Israel’s blockade of Lebanon legitimate?

Israel has targeted the country's only international airport, imposed a naval blockade, attacked ports, and bombed road links out of the country. Blockades as a tool of war are legitimate under international humanitarian law; however, their imposition is still subject to the principle of military necessity and proportionality.

First, the blockade must not have as its primary purpose to intimidate, harass or starve the civilian population. Such actions are proscribed by international humanitarian law, which prohibits armed forces from deliberately causing the civilian population to suffer hunger, particularly by depriving it of its sources of food or supplies.

Second, insofar as Israel attempts to justify the blockade on the grounds of restricting the re-supply of the Hezbollah military, that legitimate purpose must be weighed against the costs to the civilian population. Those costs can also shift over time, as shortages of necessities intensify. Even if a blockade were assumed lawful at the outset, it could become unlawful if mounting civilian costs became too high and outweighed the direct military advantage. In those circumstances – for example, if food or medical supplies ran low – Israel would be obliged to permit free passage of material that is essential for civilians and to protect humanitarian personnel delivering those supplies.

If the targets are legitimate military objects, is the use of cluster munitions or warheads with ball bearings lawful?

In the conflict to date, there is evidence that Israel has used cluster munitions in populated areas in Lebanon and that Hezbollah has launched rockets toward Haifa that contained thousands of metal ball bearings. Human Rights Watch is of the view that neither weapon should be used in or near civilian areas as a matter of international law, because the wide blast effects of these weapons cannot be directed at military targets without imposing a substantial risk of civilian harm and the weapons cannot distinguish between military targets and civilians.

Cluster munitions are weapons, delivered from the air or ground, that disperse dozens, and often hundreds, of submunitions (often called “grenades” in surface-delivered weapons and “bomblets” in air-delivered weapons) over a large area, thereby increasing the radius of destructive effect over a target. There is no specific international prohibition on the use of cluster munitions (unlike, for example, blinding lasers or chemical weapons). However, because the “bomblets” released by cluster bombs have a wide dispersal pattern, they cannot be targeted precisely. As a result, they are not capable of discriminating between military and civilian objects when used in or near populated areas. In addition, cluster bomblets have a high initial failure rate – the munitions used by Israel in Lebanon have a dud rate of 14 percent – which results in numerous explosive “duds” scattered about the landscape; these pose similar risks to civilians as antipersonnel landmines.

Like cluster munitions, the use of rocket heads filled with metal ball bearings cannot be targeted precisely and are indiscriminate weapons when used in populated areas. Their use in rockets fired into populated areas appears intended to maximize harm to civilians.

What is meant by “collective punishment” of the civilian population?

International humanitarian law prohibits the punishment of any person for an offense other than one that he or she has personally committed. Collective punishment is a term used in international humanitarian law to describe any form of punitive sanctions and harassment, not limited to judicial penalties, but including sanctions of “any sort, administrative, by police action or otherwise,” that are imposed on targeted groups of persons for actions that they themselves did not personally commit. The imposition of collective punishment is a war crime. Whether an attack or measure could amount to collective punishment depends on several factors, including the target of the measure and its punitive impact, but of particular relevance is the intent behind a particular measure. If the intention was to punish, purely or primarily as a result of an act committed by third parties, then the attack is likely to have been collective punishment.

What are the parties’ obligations to agencies seeking to provide humanitarian assistance?

Israel’s military operations in Lebanon have displaced hundreds of thousands of Lebanese and cut off many others from access to food, medical care and other necessities. Humanitarian agencies have had difficulty reaching the populations in need because of the ongoing Israeli bombing campaigns, including air attacks targeting border passages, roadways and vehicles. At the time of writing, no secure safe passage for humanitarian convoys had been successfully guaranteed, in particular so that humanitarian convoys can reach wounded persons or evacuate civilians from areas of active conflict.

Under international humanitarian law, parties to a conflict must allow and facilitate the rapid and unimpeded passage of impartially distributed humanitarian aid to the population in need. The belligerent parties must consent to allowing relief operations to take place, and may not refuse such consent on arbitrary grounds. They can take steps to control the content and delivery of humanitarian aid, such as to ensure that consignments do not include weapons. However, deliberately impeding relief supplies is prohibited, and doing so as part of an effort to starve civilians is a war crime.

Additionally, international humanitarian law requires that belligerent parties ensure the freedom of movement of humanitarian relief personnel essential to the exercise of their functions. This can be restricted only temporarily for reasons of imperative military necessity.

Are attacks on humanitarian convoys unlawful?

Israeli air strikes have hit humanitarian aid vehicles, such as a July 18 attack that hit a convoy of the Red Crescent Society of the United Arab Emirates, destroying a vehicle carrying medicines, vegetable oil, sugar and rice, and killing the driver, and an attack on July 23, which hit two clearly marked Red Cross ambulances in the village of Qana. Human Rights Watch researchers also report the hitting of a civil defense building in Tyre, on July 16, as well as three neighboring eight- to 10-story apartment buildings that, according to residents, were mostly occupied by teachers and doctors from the nearby hospital. Twenty-one people are believed to have been killed in the airstrike, and more than 50 wounded.

International humanitarian law requires parties to a conflict to respect and protect humanitarian aid personnel, objects used for relief operations and civil defense personnel as well as civil defense buildings. Attacks intentionally directed at humanitarian personnel or properties are considered war crimes.

Poll Shows Skepticism in U.S. Over Peace in Mideast

By JIM RUTENBERG and MEGAN C. THEE
The New York Times
July 27, 2006

Americans are overwhelmingly pessimistic about the state of affairs in the Middle East, with majorities doubtful there will ever be peace between Israel and its neighbors, or that American troops will be able to leave Iraq anytime soon, according to the latest New York Times/CBS News poll.

A majority said the war between Israel and Hezbollah will lead to a wider war. And while almost half of those polled approved of President Bush’s handling of the crisis, a majority said they preferred the United States leave it to others to resolve.

Over all, the poll found a strong isolationist streak in a nation clearly rattled by more than four years of war, underscoring the challenge for Mr. Bush as he tries to maintain public support for his effort to stabilize Iraq and spread democracy through the Middle East.

The concerns expressed over the direction of foreign policy also highlight some of the pitfalls facing Republicans as they head toward the November elections with national security front and center.

A majority of respondents, 56 percent, said they supported a timetable for a reduction in United States forces in Iraq, a question the two parties have been sparring over, with the White House and most Republicans in Congress taking the position that setting a timetable would send the wrong message. More than half of that group said they supported a withdrawal even if it meant Iraq would fall into the hands of insurgents.

Americans support the idea of putting an international peacekeeping force on the border between Israel and Lebanon to calm tensions there, the poll found, but most do not want United States troops to be a part of it.

By a wide margin, the poll found, Americans did not believe the United States should take the lead in solving international conflicts in general, with 59 percent saying it should not, and 31 percent saying it should. That is a significant shift from a CBS News poll in September 2002 — one year after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks — when the public was far more evenly split on the issue.

Yet, in the latest poll, 47 percent gave Mr. Bush good marks for handling the situation in Israel, with 27 percent disapproving and 26 percent saying they did not know. That was the highest registration of approval for the president in any of the poll’s performance measures.

Mr. Bush has experienced a slight increase in his overall job approval rating since the last New York Times/CBS News poll, in May, indicating that the steady erosion in his support over the last year has leveled off and even improved by a few percentage points. Thirty-six percent of those surveyed said they approved of the way he was doing his job, up from 31 percent in May.

But with 55 percent saying they disapproved of his performance, the numbers remain far below the comfort zone for a sitting president during a tough midterm election season. In what could be another warning sign for incumbents, more than twice as many people believe the country is heading in the wrong direction than believe it is heading in the right direction. Only 35 percent of respondents said they approved of Mr. Bush’s handling of foreign policy in general, though that was up from the 27 percent in May, and a majority expressed doubt about whether the president had the respect of foreign leaders.

Support for the president’s staunch backing of Israel goes only so far: 39 percent indicated they approved of it, but 40 percent said the United States should avoid saying anything at all about the conflict (Only 7 percent said the United States should criticize Israel, though many respondents cast blame for the conflict on both sides).

The poll was based on telephone interviews conducted July 21 through July 25 with 1,127 adults. It has a margin of sampling error of plus or minus three percentage points. The poll was taken as the war between Israel and Hezbollah raged, and during a particularly bloody period in Baghdad, events that have received heavy television news coverage.

In a common refrain among respondents regarding the Israel-Hezbollah war, Sharon Schierloh, 62, a retired factory worker from Ottawa, Ohio, said: “Let the Israelis take care of the problems in their area. We need to stay out of that because our troops are spread too thin.” She spoke in a follow-up interview after participating in the poll.

If Mr. Bush and the Republicans could not find much good news in the poll, they could at least pinpoint some signs of abatement in what had been a decidedly downward trend for them, starting with Mr. Bush’s slightly improved approval ratings.

Congressional Republicans are facing what seems to be one of the worst environments for a majority party since 1994 — when they swept control of both chambers from the Democrats — and, following the general rule, the president’s fortunes could heavily affect theirs.

Forty-three percent of those surveyed said they had a favorable opinion of the Republican Party, up from 37 percent in May. But when asked their view of how Congress was handling its job as a whole — a question whose answer tends to reflect prospects for incumbents — 28 percent said they approved, up from 23 percent in May. But 58 percent said they disapproved.

Democrats fared better, with 52 percent of those polled saying they had a positive view of the party and 41 percent saying they had a negative one. And 45 percent of registered voters polled said they would vote for the Democrat running in their district this fall as opposed to the 35 percent who favored the Republican.

Democrats also seemed to have public support on several major issues. Their push for a higher minimum wage has wide public support, according to the poll. Over all, 85 percent of respondents supported a Democratic proposal raising the minimum wage over the next two years to $7.25 an hour from $5.15 an hour, including majorities of Republicans and independents. House moderates who support a raise in the minimum wage are prevailing upon more conservative House leaders — who have been opposed to one — to allow a vote on the issue.

And 59 percent of those polled said they approved of medical research using embryonic stem cells. Mr. Bush used his veto power for the first time in his presidency last week to reject a Congressional bill expanding federal financing for such research. Democrats received higher marks on handling the economy, while Republicans received higher marks on handling terrorism. And more respondents approve of the president’s handling of terrorism than disapprove, a change from the last Times/CBS poll when opinion was split.

But there was agreement that perceptions about war and peace could have major resonance in the fall. More than twice as many respondents — 63 percent versus 30 percent — said the Iraq war had not been worth the American lives and dollars lost. Only a quarter of respondents said they thought the American presence in Iraq had been a stabilizing force in the region, with 41 percent saying it had made the Middle East less stable.

But respondents were essentially split over whether the invasion was the right thing to do.

Wednesday, July 26, 2006

Independent (UK) Cover July 21,2006

In Lebanon's Crisis, a Chance for U.S. to Broaden the Stakes

By Robin Wright
The Washington Post
Wednesday, July 26, 2006; A12

ROME, July 25 -- In trying to negotiate an end to the latest Middle East conflict, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice appears to see the solution through a broader prism that redefines its stakes. The real issues, U.S. officials say, are not simply the hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah but far wider questions of Lebanon's sovereignty and what the administration sees as an existential battle between forces aligned for and against democracy in the region.

And in that sense, say diplomats traveling with Rice, the administration sees opportunity in the turmoil.

"If this Lebanon emerges stronger from this crisis, then the enemies of peace and stability in the area will be dealt a big defeat. In many ways, for the region, Lebanon is a polyglot country that represents the hopes of many," C. David Welch, assistant secretary of state for Near East affairs, told reporters traveling with Rice from Jerusalem to Rome.

"The new Middle East is not going to be built every single day with a big victory in one place or another," he added. "It's got to be done with a steady effort. This is an opportunity now in the midst of this crisis to see freedom strengthened in Lebanon. And I expect that that can occur if we get the responsible voices prevailing over the irresponsible ones."

The Rice delegation also hinted that it was exploring actions against outside governments subverting Lebanon's sovereignty, Welch said. The United States strongly believes that Iran in particular facilitated and encouraged the July 12 Hezbollah cross-border raid that seized two Israeli soldiers and sparked the crisis. The administration also holds Syria responsible for abetting the radical Shiite Muslim group.

"There are also other measures that also might be taken that could deal with those countries who don't have the same sense of responsibility about the future of Lebanon," Welch said.

Officials traveling with Rice say their broader perspective is the basis for the framework the secretary of state is now trying to broker with Lebanon, Israel, the Arab world and other players.

The administration is using these loftier causes to try to shift the focus from Israel's punishing and controversial bombardment of Lebanon to the question of freedom for the region. "It is time for a new Middle East," Rice said in Jerusalem.

In Rome, Rice met with U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora and European Union foreign affairs chief Javier Solana ahead of an international conference on Lebanon Wednesday.

A broad agreement about regional democracy may be a long way off, U.S. officials say. "We go out there, and we have some ideas about how to work this," Welch told reporters. "In some cases we want to put those ideas forward, in others we want to test them. In some cases we're trying others' ideas and vice versa."

Despite obstacles in forming an international force more effective than the U.N. observers deployed in southern Lebanon since 1978, U.S. officials say it will happen.

"You will hear about the impossibility of deploying an international force almost until the day it is deployed," said a senior administration official who spoke on condition of anonymity. U.S. officials say the biggest issue may be whether the new force would deploy before or after the disarming of Hezbollah, which has vowed not to give up its weapons. The force is "not going to shoot their way in," the official said.

Tuesday, July 25, 2006

It's Disproportionate. . .

By Eugene Robinson
The Washington Post
Tuesday, July 25, 2006; A15

Just my luck. I go away on vacation and it happens to be the week when George W. Bush's strategic view of the current world situation is revealed: Russia big. China big, too. World leaders boring. Lady world leaders need neck rub. Terrorism bad. Elections good (when the right people get elected). Israel good. Time to go home yet?

I felt better when I thought the Decider didn't have a worldview, just a set of instincts about freedom and democracy. But even if you set aside the president's embarrassing open-mike performance at the Group of Eight summit, which is hard to do, events of the past week show that this administration actually thinks it knows what it's doing. Bush and his folks haven't just blundered around and created this dangerous mess, they've done it on purpose. And they intend to make it worse.

Bush's endorsement of the violence that Israel is inflicting on Lebanon -- a sustained bombing campaign that has killed hundreds of civilians and can only be seen as collective punishment -- is truly astonishing. Of course Israel has the right to defend itself against Hezbollah's rocket attacks. But how can this utterly disproportionate, seemingly indiscriminate carnage be anything but counterproductive?

Destroying the Beirut airport, blasting communications towers into oblivion and cleansing southern Lebanon of its civilian population are not measures the world will see as an attack on Hezbollah terrorists. The Israeli campaign is so intense and widespread that it is creating more terrorists than it kills. Proportionate military action might have enhanced Israel's security, but video footage of grandmothers weeping amid the rubble of their homes and bloodied children lying in hospital beds won't make Israel more secure. Hezbollah's stature in the Arab world is growing, and its patrons in Damascus and Tehran must be smugly satisfied.

The role of any American president and secretary of state should have been to move quickly to bring hostilities to an end. Instead, Bush all but egged the Israelis on, and Condoleezza Rice went so far as to reject the idea of a cease-fire. Belatedly, she has flown to the region with no real credibility as an honest broker. Her words of concern about the "humanitarian crisis" in Lebanon ring hollow.

But this administration doesn't want to be an honest broker in the Middle East. Bush and Rice have staked their Middle East policy on a single incontrovertible idea -- that terrorism is bad -- and it has led them to the mistaken notion that Israel can achieve long-term security by creating a kind of scorched-earth buffer zone in southern Lebanon.

It's hard to imagine a more unpromising course of action. Even Rice (who is an expert on Russia, not the Middle East) and Bush (who knows that Russia and China are big) must recall that a full-fledged military occupation of southern Lebanon didn't work, which should lead them to question whether a few weeks of bombing will do the trick. Even the Israelis, who boasted at first that they were out to destroy Hezbollah, now speak only of severely weakening the enemy and are leaving the door open to some sort of international force on the border.

Perhaps that will be the resolution. Perhaps Israel will get its buffer zone and Hezbollah rockets will stop falling on Haifa for the time being. But ultimately Israel will be less secure, and so will the rest of us.

Bush, Rice et al. refuse to see that their crusade against terrorism can never be won by military action alone, because a victory in the war of arms can also be a defeat in the war of ideas. Lebanon was moving -- imperfectly but unmistakably -- toward becoming the kind of society we paint as a model for the Arab world, a secular democracy with a modernizing economy. Now billions of dollars' worth of infrastructure are in ruins and the country's most promising industry, tourism, has effectively been obliterated. It will be some time before Beirut is anyone's first choice for a holiday of sun and fun.

Hezbollah started this with its rockets, but the unrestrained Israeli response threatens to make an iconic hero of Hezbollah leader Hasan Nasrallah. Hezbollah's new prominence enhances Iranian influence in the region, which creates problems for pro-Western governments in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Iraq, meanwhile, is in the midst of a brutal civil war, and American troops are bogged down in a long-term occupation. This is winning a war on terrorism?

The next time you hear someone praise the simplicity of George W. Bush's worldview, keep in mind that what you don't know can indeed hurt you.

50 Percent Of U.S. Says Iraq Had WMDs

Poll finds 'surprising' shift in view
By Jennifer Harper
Washington Times
July 25, 2006

Half of Americans now say Iraq had weapons of mass destruction when the United States invaded the country in 2003 -- up from 36 percent last year, a Harris poll finds. Pollsters deemed the increase both "substantial" and "surprising" in light of persistent press reports to the contrary in recent years.

The survey did not speculate on what caused the shift in opinion, which supports President Bush's original rationale for going to war. Respondents were questioned in early July after the release of a Defense Department intelligence report that revealed coalition forces recovered 500 aging chemical weapons containing mustard or sarin gas nerve agents in Iraq.

"Filled and unfilled pre-Gulf War chemical munitions are assessed to still exist," said Sen. Rick Santorum, Pennsylvania Republican, during a June 21 press conference detailing the newly declassified information.

Rep. Peter Hoekstra, chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, who shared the podium, said, "Iraq was not a WMD-free zone."

In recent weeks, the Michigan Republican has recommended that more material confiscated since the invasion be declassified and made public, including a 1998 standing order to Iraqi officials to hide or destroy weapons and thus evade inspectors from the United Nations.

Meanwhile, the Harris poll offered some positive feedback on Iraq. Seventy-two percent of respondents said the Iraqi people are better off now than under Saddam Hussein's regime -- a figure similar to that of 2004, when it stood at 76 percent. In addition, 64 percent say Saddam had "strong links" with al Qaeda, up from 62 percent in October 2004. Fifty-five percent said that "history will give the U.S. credit for bringing freedom and democracy to Iraq."

And although the response is tepid, American confidence in the Iraqis has improved: 37 percent said Iraq would succeed in creating a stable democracy, up five points since November.

Americans remain in touch with the realities of Iraq: 61 percent said the conflict has motivated more Islamic terrorists to attack the U.S. -- a number that has remained virtually unchanged since 2004.

An additional 41 percent say the war has reduced the threat of another major terrorist attack in the United States, a sentiment also unchanged in the past two years.

The financial burden of the war may be less keenly felt. The poll found that 56 percent said spending "huge amounts" for ongoing military efforts in Iraq means less funds are available to protect Americans at home. The figure was 62 percent last year, but 51 percent in 2004.

Has the war earned respect for the U.S. overseas? Sixty-eight percent said "no," the same as last year. The figure stood at 62 percent in 2004.

The poll of 1,020 adults was conducted July 5 to 11 and has a margin of error of three percentage points.

An eye on Iraq

American opinions on the Iraq war have become more positive in some categories during the last couple of years, according to a Harris Poll of 1,020 adults conducted July 5 to 11.

50 percent say that weapons of mass destruction were present in Iraq at the time of the U.S. invasion, up from 36 percent in February 2005 and 38 percent in October 2004.

64 percent say Saddam Hussein had "strong links" with al Qaeda; the figure was 62 percent in October 2004.

72 percent say the Iraqis are better off now than under Saddam's regime.

55 percent say that history will give the U.S. credit for bringing freedom and democracy to Iraq.

37 percent say the Iraqis can develop a stable government on their own, up from 32 percent in November.

61 percent say the war in Iraq has motivated more Islamic terrorists to attack the U.S.; the figure was 60 percent in April 2004.

56 percent say that the cost of the war has meant less money to protect Americans against another terrorist attack; the figure was 62 percent in April 2005 and 51 percent in April 2004.

Source: Harris Polls

Our Corner Of Iraq

By Peter W. Galbraith
New York Times
July 25, 2006

WHAT is the mission of the United States military in Iraq now that the insurgency has escalated into a full-blown civil war? According to the Bush administration, it is to support a national unity government that includes all Iraq’s major communities: the Shiites, Sunni Arabs and Kurds. O.K., but this raises another question: What does the Iraqi government govern?

In the southern half of Iraq, Shiite religious parties and clerics have created theocracies policed by militias that number well over 100,000 men. In Basra, three religious parties control — and sometimes fight over — the thousands of barrels of oil diverted each day from legal exports into smuggling. To the extent that the central government has authority in the south, it is because some of the same Shiite parties that dominate the government also control the south.

Kurdistan in the north is effectively independent. The Iraqi Army is barred from the region, the Iraqi flag prohibited, and central government ministries are not present. The Kurdish people voted nearly unanimously for independence in an informal referendum in January 2005.

And in the Sunni center of the nation and Baghdad, the government has virtually no control beyond the American-protected Green Zone. The Mahdi Army, a radical Shiite militia, controls the capital’s Shiite neighborhoods, while Qaeda offshoots and former Baathists are increasingly taking over the Sunni districts.

While the Bush administration professes a commitment to Iraq’s unity, it has no intention of undertaking the major effort required to put the country together again. During the formal occupation of Iraq in 2003 and 2004, the American-led coalition allowed Shiite militias to mushroom and clerics to impose Islamic rule in the south, in some places with a severity reminiscent of Afghanistan’s Taliban.

To disarm militias and dismantle undemocratic local governments now would bring the United States into direct conflict with Iraq’s Shiites, who are nearly three times as numerous as the Sunni Arabs and possess vastly more powerful militias and military forces.

There are no significant coalition troops in Kurdistan, which is secure and increasingly prosperous. Arab Iraqis have largely accepted Kurdistan’s de facto separation from Iraq, and so has the Bush administration.

In the Sunni center, our current strategy involves handing off combat duties to the Iraqi Army. Mostly, it is Shiite battalions that fight in the Sunni Arab areas, as the Sunni units are not reliable. Thus what the Bush administration portrays as “Iraqi” security forces is seen by the local Sunni population as a hostile force loyal to a Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad, installed by the American invaders and closely aligned with the traditional enemy, Iran. The more we “Iraqize” the fight in the Sunni heartland, the more we strengthen the insurgents.

Because it is Iraq’s most mixed city, Baghdad is the front line of Iraq’s Sunni-Shiite civil war. It is a tragedy for its people, most of whom do not share the sectarian hatred behind the killing. Iraqi forces cannot end the civil war because many of them are partisans of one side, and none are trusted by both communities.

For the United States to contain the civil war, we would have to deploy more troops and accept a casualty rate many times the current level as our forces changed their mission from a support role to intensive police duties. The American people would not support such an expanded mission, and the Bush administration has no desire to undertake it.

The administration, then, must match its goals in Iraq to the resources it is prepared to deploy. Since it cannot unify Iraq or stop the civil war, it should work with the regions that have emerged. Where no purpose is served by a continuing military presence — in the Shiite south and in Baghdad — America and its allies should withdraw.

As an alternative to using Shiite and American troops to fight the insurgency in Iraq’s Sunni center, the administration should encourage the formation of several provinces into a Sunni Arab region with its own army, as allowed by Iraq’s Constitution. Then the Pentagon should pull its troops from this Sunni territory and allow the new leaders to establish their authority without being seen as collaborators.

Seeing as we cannot maintain the peace in Iraq, we have but one overriding interest there today — to keep Al Qaeda from creating a base from which it can plot attacks on the United States. Thus we need to have troops nearby prepared to re-engage in case the Sunni Arabs prove unable to provide for their own security against the foreign jihadists.

This would be best accomplished by placing a small “over the horizon” force in Kurdistan. Iraqi Kurdistan is among the most pro-American societies in the world and its government would welcome our military presence, not the least because it would help protect Kurds from Arab Iraqis who resent their close cooperation with the United States during the 2003 war. American soldiers on the ground might also ease the escalating tension between the Iraqi Kurds and Turkey, which is threatening to send its troops across the border in search of Turkish Kurd terrorists using Iraq as a haven.

From Kurdistan, the American military could readily move back into any Sunni Arab area where Al Qaeda or its allies established a presence. The Kurdish peshmerga, Iraq’s only reliable indigenous military force, would gladly assist their American allies with intelligence and in combat. And by shifting troops to what is still nominally Iraqi territory, the Bush administration would be able to claim it had not “cut and run” and would also avoid the political complications — in United States and in Iraq — that would arise if it were to withdraw totally and then have to send American troops back into Iraq.

Yes, a United States withdrawal from the Shiite and Sunni Arab regions of Iraq would leave behind sectarian conflict and militia rule. But staying with the current force and mission will produce the same result. Continuing a military strategy where the ends far exceed the means is a formula for war without end.

Peter W. Galbraith, a former United States ambassador to Croatia, is the author of “The End of Iraq: How American Incompetence Created a War Without End.”

Monday, July 24, 2006

Saudi Arabia Military Expanded In Response To Iran

By Andrew Hammond, Reuters News Agency
Washington Times
July 24, 2006

RIYADH, Saudi Arabia -- Saudi Arabia is expanding its military arsenal to counter what it sees as Iran's growing influence in a region convulsed by violence.

Analysts and diplomats say Israel's bombardment of Lebanon after Syrian and Iranian-backed Hizbollah guerrillas kidnapped two soldiers has added to predominantly Sunni Saudi Arabia's alarm at Shi'ite powerhouse Iran's policies in the Middle East.

"There is now an understanding that Iran has to be countered," a Saudi adviser told Reuters, speaking on condition of anonymity. "There is going to be a huge strategic spending on defence, based on a new defence doctrine."

In the past year, Saudi officials have spoken publicly against Iranian influence in Shi'ite governed Iraq and the possibility of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. After Israel bombarded Lebanon, U.S. ally Saudi Arabia blamed Shi'ite Hizbollah for the blitz that has so far killed more than 300 people and ravaged the infrastructure.

"Iran has been a lot more aggressive (over last year) ... it was made the Saudis sit up in a way they haven't for a good 10 years," said a Western diplomat in Riyadh. "Who in the long term is their main strategic threat? They see it as Iran."

Saudi Arabia wields global political clout partly because it is the world's top oil exporter, and over the past week it has spent billions of dollars on military equipment.

Washington saidThursday it had approved the sale of 24 UH-60L Black Hawk helicopters, radios, armoured vehicles and other military equipment worth more than $6 billion.

France and Saudi Arabia also signed a defence cooperation agreement on Friday, with a French government source saying a deal was close on helicopters and tanker aircraft.

Riyadh is set to buy up to 72 Eurofighter Typhoon jets in a deal with Britain that could cost more than $10 billion.

According to defense analyst Jane's Information Group, tight public finances held up military expansion plans in the 1990s. But a spectacular rise in world oil prices has since turned Saudi fortunes around.

"The relatively small Royal Saudi Land Forces are thinly spread to cope with potential threats on a number of fronts. Saudi Arabia has far smaller ground forces than those of Iran," Jane's said in a report last month, estimating the army at 70,000 men and elite National Guard at 77,000.

The government wants to raise total troop numbers by some 25 percent, and the National Guard is to acquire its own air force, the adviser said. No conscription is planned.

Iran has emerged as a major Saudi concern since nationalist President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad took office last year.

"Iran is invading the Arab world and burning everything in its path," columnist Mshari Al-Zaydi wrote in Saudi daily Asharq al-Awsat this week. "With the Arabs standing idly by, Iran seeks to impose its control over the region."

Bush Team At Odds Over Dealing With Syria

By Stephen J. Hedges, Washington Bureau
Chicago Tribune
July 23, 2006

WASHINGTON -- In a presidency that prides itself on a simple, unified foreign policy message, the Bush administration has stumbled through five years of rare internal dissent over its relations with Syria, a Middle East wild card that has played the spoiler to U.S. efforts in Iraq and now is openly enabling Hezbollah in a fight against Israel.

That lack of consistency in dealing with Syria has been dramatically underscored by the escalation of violence between Israel and Hezbollah, some Middle East analysts say, and it points to an erosion of diplomatic influence with Syria.

"This is really demonstrating the fact that they've been emboldened," David Schenker, a former Pentagon Middle East aide, said of Syria. "They think they've dodged a bullet."

Schenker, now a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, is one of a number of former Pentagon officials who used their posts to press the case for taking a tougher line against Syria. In policy meetings with the White House and State Department, those Pentagon aides pushed for sanctions and measures to enlist U.S. allies in Europe in an effort to apply trade pressure to change Syria's behavior.

In public, the Pentagon view was pushed repeatedly by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, especially after the U.S. invaded Iraq. In a series of statements, Rumsfeld accused Syria of a variety of misdeeds, from providing Iraqi forces with night-vision technology to opening the Syria-Iraq border to foreign Muslim extremists who were entering Iraq to join the anti-American insurgency.

"We consider such trafficking as hostile acts," Rumsfeld said during a March 2003 Pentagon media briefing, "and will hold the Syrian government accountable for such shipments."

During most of that period, though, the administration followed a diplomatic approach led by Flynt Leverett, a former CIA analyst who until last year was the top Syrian expert within Bush's National Security Council. Leverett declined to return phone calls.

The administration, chiefly through the State Department, engaged Syria and its president, Bashar Assad. The dialogue eventually included a trip by then-Secretary of State Colin Powell to Damascus in 2002, as well as other trips by U.S. diplomats and intelligence officials.

`The golden days'

Initial signs were encouraging. Syria cooperated with the administration after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, sharing intelligence on terrorist cells and taking part in meetings with U.S. intelligence officers.

"These were the golden days, the best possible days," said Imad Moustapha, Syria's ambassador to the U.S. "Our security agencies were dealing directly with each other against what President Bush himself called the first priority, the fight against terrorism."

But while Sept. 11 was a rallying point, the U.S. invasion of Iraq had the opposite effect.

"We thought this will bring only more problems to us than it will solve," Moustapha said. "From that, relations spiraled down. But then our cooperation on terrorist groups continued, despite the problems with Iraq."

Schenker, among others, said Syria's actions have worked against stability in Iraq. The Pentagon has accused Syria of harboring Iraqi insurgents and fugitives and moving slowly on a pledge to better police the Syria-Iraq border.

"Their behavior was unhelpful at best," Schenker said.

In 2003, Bush signed the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act, a measure to impose economic sanctions against Syria. But the real-world impact of the act may be marginal. Syria trades far more with Europe than the U.S., and business with European countries appears to be expanding, not shrinking.

In January 2005, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage traveled to Damascus and asked, according to Moustapha, for Syrian cooperation in the capture of Sabawi Ibrahim al-Hassan, a half brother of Saddam Hussein.

While accounts of al-Hassan's capture vary--Moustapha said he was handed over to the U.S. by Syria, while media accounts at the time state that al-Hassan was deported from Syria to Iraq and then arrested--there's no question that he was detained.

A downward spiral

But after that, Moustapha said, matters with Washington only grew worse, despite a pledge by the Bush administration that Syria's cooperation in the capture of al-Hassan would bring more cooperation, not less. Instead, he said, the administration's anti-Syrian rhetoric grew stronger.

"For us, that was the last straw," he said. "We severed all cooperation with the United States."

At about the same time, on Feb. 14, 2005, former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri was killed in a car bomb blast in Beirut. The U.S. withdrew its ambassador from Syria shortly after Hariri's death.

The assassination fueled pressure in Lebanon and in the United Nations for Syria to withdraw its military forces from Lebanon. But months after the last Syrian soldier left, the military's absence does not seem to have reduced Syria's influence over events there.

Supplies to Hezbollah, which in some respects is more powerful than ever, continue to arrive from Damascus.

Sunday, July 23, 2006

15 Shiite Gunmen Die In Battle With U.S. Troops

By Associated Press
July 23, 2006

BAGHDAD, Iraq -- U.S. troops clashed with Shiite militiamen south of Baghdad on Saturday in a three-hour gunbattle in which 15 gunmen and an Iraqi soldier were killed, U.S. officials and Iraqis said.

Dozens were wounded in the firefight in Musayyib, about 40 miles south of Baghdad. It appeared the battle was part of a systematic campaign against the militia of radical Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, blamed for much of the sectarian violence sweeping the country.

Sheik Jalil al-Nouri, an aide to al-Sadr, said U.S. troops attacked the cleric's local office in Musayyib and killed 14 of his followers. A U.S. statement said 15 gunmen and one Iraqi soldier were killed but made no mention of the Mahdi militia.

According to the U.S. account, the firefight began when gunmen attacked a U.S.-Iraqi patrol with rocket-propelled grenades and small-arms fire near a Shiite mosque.

A U.S. helicopter destroyed a fuel truck believed rigged with explosives as it approached an American position, the statement said. Gunmen repeatedly attacked the U.S. and Iraqi force, the U.S. statement said.

After about three hours of fighting, an Iraqi SWAT team entered a Shiite mosque from which the gunmen were firing and the clashes died down, the statement said.

Going From Bad To Worse

By Joseph L. Galloway
Miami Herald
July 23, 2006

The world's attention is focused this week on the renewed fighting in Gaza and Lebanon, but let's not take our eyes off the situation in Iraq, which is going from bad to worse.

Does anyone in the administration still want to quibble over what definition of the ''civil war'' applies to the bloody mess in Iraq when the United Nations is reporting that during the month of June sectarian violence killed an average of more than 100 Iraqis a day?

What would they prefer to call it when a single car bomber last week drove into the heart of Shiite rebel cleric Moqtada al-Sadr's hometown of Kufa and, after assembling a large crowd of Shias looking for jobs, set off his bomb and killed 53 and injured more than 105?

The U.N. report says that the number of violent deaths of Iraqis this year rose 77 percent from January's 1,778 to June's 3,149. The total number of civilian dead for the first half of 2006, the United Nations estimates, is 14,338.

What this says, put simply, is that the Sunni vs. Shia communal slaughter is rapidly accelerating, and that nothing the U.S. forces or the fledgling Iraqi government has done or is doing is making the least bit of difference.

What is also says is that our best hope for an orderly withdrawal of American and coalition forces from Iraq is going awry. The Iraqi army and police forces -- remember that as they stand up we will stand down -- are turning out to be more of a problem than a solution.

Both army and police are made up almost entirely of Shia and Kurds, and various militias of both have infiltrated the ranks, especially of the police. Some of them have not merely facilitated but participated in the revenge slaughter of Sunnis.

This is a biblical land, and it's Old Testament in the extreme: An eye for an eye is only a beginning.

We've paid close attention to the American casualties in this 3 ½-year-old war but avoided trying to come up with any precise tally of the growing Iraqi civilian casualties. The numbers killed have ranged from President Bush's estimate of 30,000 a few months back to a more recent guess of 50,000 or more.

What's happening now, as McClatchy Newspapers' Tom Lasseter reports from Baghdad, is no longer the ''trembling on the brink of civil war'' of months gone by, but the real thing. If you don't believe it, ask Sunnis and Shia in Baghdad who are no longer safe in their own homes and shops or on the streets or riding a bus. Ask the thousands of Iraqi refugees who've been forced to flee mixed neighborhoods in towns and cities where they'd lived in peace with those who believed differently.

Of what use is a democratic government that cannot secure the most basic of human rights -- the right to life, the right to be secure in your own home? Of what use is an American force that toppled a bloody dictator but has left many Iraqis worse off than they were before?

The daily sectarian blood bath makes it harder and harder for even the most Pollyanna-ish to believe that Iraq somehow is going to emerge as a unified, secular, democratic nation where Sunni and Shia and Kurds and Turkomen work together to build a future.

It makes an American president's declarations that we'll somehow achieve victory in Iraq if we only stay the course ring ever more empty.

Who gets to define victory? The Iraqis or us? At some point, both sides may be willing to define victory -- or at least relief -- as our departure from that sad and bloody land. If so, let's hope that we at least have learned some useful lessons from an investment of 2,500 American lives and $400 billion or more of our taxpayers' money:

*''To jaw, jaw-jaw is always better than to war-war.'' (Thanks, Sir Winston Churchill)

*There is never a time when some way cannot be found to avoid drawing the sword. (Thanks, Gen. Ulysses S. Grant)

*Never go to war assuming that everything will turn out right, because no battle plan survives first contact with the enemy.

*Avoid going to war in a place where you have little or no understanding of the people, culture and history. (See Sun Tzu, fourth century BCE.)

*Be prepared to be at least as adaptive in your tactics as your enemy is in his.

*War may be too important to be left to the generals, but it sure can't be left to politicians who have no experience of it.

Joseph L. Galloway is former senior military correspondent for Knight Ridder Newspapers.