Beyond Baghdad

By Richard G. Lugar
The Washington Post
Tuesday, January 30, 2007; A17

Since President Bush announced that he would send more American troops to Iraq, the debate on Iraq policy has reached new levels of stridency. Opponents of the war have rallied against what they see as an unjustified escalation, while the administration has dismissed opposition as defeatism. Vice President Cheney went so far as to say a withdrawal would show that Americans "don't have the stomach for the fight."

Military action in Iraq, however, defies orthodox notions of victory and defeat. We are not in Iraq to defend territory or even to destroy an enemy. Rather, we are pursuing the amorphous task of coaxing out of the Iraqi people and government political decisions that will result in a democratic, pluralistic society that is conducive to regional stability.

While the emergence of such a government and society is still worth pursuing, we must recognize that it is an optimal goal. It should not be the focal point of our Middle East policy or the sole measure of success in Iraq.

We need to recast the geo-strategic reference points of our Iraq policy. Some commentators have compared the Bush plan to a "Hail Mary" pass in football -- a desperate heave deep down the field by a losing team at the end of the game. Actually, a far better analogy for the Bush plan is a draw play on third down with 20 yards to go in the first quarter. The play does have a chance of working if everything goes perfectly, but it is more likely to gain a few yards and set up a punt on the next down, after which the game can be continued under more favorable circumstances.

The president's plan is an early episode in a much broader Middle East realignment that began with our invasion of Iraq and that may not end for years. Nations throughout the Middle East are scrambling to find their footing as regional power balances shift in unpredictable ways.

At the center of this realignment is Iran, which is perceived to have emerged from our Iraq intervention as the big winner. We paved the way for a Shiite government in Iraq that is much friendlier to Iran than was Saddam Hussein. Bolstered by high oil revenue, Iran has meddled in Iraq, rigidly pursued a nuclear capability, and funded Hezbollah and Hamas.

But the pendulum of Middle East politics may be swinging back against Iranian assertiveness. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, the Gulf states and others have become increasingly alarmed by Iran's behavior and by widening regional sectarian divisions. Because of this dynamic, U.S. bargaining power in the Middle East is growing. Moderate Arab states understand that the United States is an indispensable counterweight to Iran.

This opens up opportunities for solidifying our broader strategic objectives, and it offers a backup option in Iraq. Even as the president's Baghdad strategy goes forward, we need to plan for a potent redeployment of U.S. forces in the region to defend oil assets, target terrorist enclaves, deter adventurism by Iran and provide a buffer against regional sectarian conflict. In the best case, we could supplement bases in the Middle East with troops stationed outside urban areas in Iraq. Such a redeployment would allow us to continue training Iraqi troops and delivering economic assistance, but it would not require us to interpose ourselves between Iraqi sectarian factions.

The secretary of state's recent trip to the Middle East and the dispatch of an additional aircraft carrier to the Persian Gulf showed that the administration understands the gravity of what is happening in the region. The United States should make clear to our Arab friends that they have a role in promoting reconciliation within Iraq, preventing oil price spikes, splitting Syria from Iran and demonstrating a more united front against terrorism.

The administration must avoid becoming so quixotic in its attempt to achieve the optimal outcome in Iraq that it fails to adjust to shifts in the region or political realities within Iraq. Although any administration would be reluctant to talk about a Plan B when its primary plan is still in motion, the president and Congress must reach a consensus on how to protect our broader strategic interests regardless of what happens in those Baghdad neighborhoods or on the floor of the Senate. Otherwise, the fatigue and frustration with our Iraq policy that is manifest in the resolutions of disapproval before the Senate could lead not just to the rejection of the Bush plan but also to the abandonment of the tools and relationships we need to defend our vital interests in the Middle East.

The writer, a Republican from Indiana, is the ranking minority member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Soldiers of Heaven

AP
Mon Jan 29, 2007


Arrested militants sit blindfolded after clashes at Zarqa, 20 kilometers (12 miles) northeast of Najaf, Iraq, Monday Jan. 29, 2007. Iraqi officials claimed Monday that at least 200 militants were killed in a fierce battle between U.S.-backed Iraqi troops and a religious cult called the Jund al-Samaa, or Soldiers of Heaven, allegedly plotting to kill pilgrims at a major Shiite Muslim religious festival Muharram. (AP Photo)

Parting Ways In Iraq

By David Brooks
New York Times
January 28, 2007

During the summer of 1995, Edward Joseph was serving as a U.N. peacekeeper in Bosnia. He was asked to help Muslim women and children flee from an area near Srebrenica, where 7,000 Muslims had already been slaughtered by Serb forces.

It was a controversial mission. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees refused to participate, believing the evacuation would just complete the ethnic cleansing. But the high commissioner didn’t see the crowds of Muslim women shrieking in terror as Serb jeeps rolled by. Joseph did. It might seem high-minded to preach ethnic reconciliation from afar, Joseph now says, but in a civil war, when you can’t protect people, it’s immoral to leave them to be killed.

Gradually, leaders on all sides of the Bosnian fight came to see it was in their interest to separate their peoples. And once the ethnic groups were given sanctuary, it became possible to negotiate a peace that was imperfect, but which was better than the reverberating splashes of blood.

Today, many of the people active in Bosnia believe they have a model that could help stabilize Iraq. They acknowledge the many differences between the two places, but Iraq, they note, is a disintegrating nation. Ethnic cleansing is dividing Baghdad, millions are moving, thousands are dying and the future looks horrific.

The best answer, then, is soft partition: create a central government with a few key powers; reinforce strong regional governments; separate the sectarian groups as much as possible.

In practice, that means, first, modifying the Iraqi Constitution.

As Joe Biden points out, the Constitution already goes a long way toward decentralizing power. It gives the provinces the power to have their own security services, to send ambassadors to foreign countries, to join together to form regions. Decentralization is not an American imposition, it’s an Iraqi idea.

But, he adds, so far the Constitution doesn’t yet have legislation that would do things like equitably share oil and gas revenue. The Sunnis will never be content with a strip of sand unless they’re constitutionally guaranteed 20 percent of the nation’s wealth.

The second step is getting implicit consent from all sects that separation and federalism are in their interest. The Shiites would have to accept that there never will be a stable Iraq if the Sunnis are reduced to helot status. The Kurds would have to accept that peace and stability are worth territorial compromise in Kirkuk. The Sunnis would have to accept that they’re never going to run Iraq again, and having a strong Sunni region is better than living under a Shiite jackboot.

As Les Gelb says, unless the thirst for vengeance has driven the leaders in Iraq beyond the realm of reason, it should be possible to persuade them to see where their best interests lie.

The third step in a soft partition would be the relocation of peoples. This would mean using U.S. or Iraqi troops to shepherd people who want to flee toward areas where they feel safe. It would mean providing humanitarian assistance so they can get back on their feet.

As Edward Joseph and Michael O’Hanlon note, in this kind of operation, timing is everything. Move people in a certain neighborhood too early, and militias could perceive a vacuum and accelerate the violence. Move too late and you could be moving corpses.

The fourth step is getting Iraq’s neighbors to buy into the arrangement. Presumably neither Iran nor Saudi Arabia really relishes complete chaos in Iraq and a proxy war with each other after the U.S. withdraws. The Turks would have to be reassured that this plan means no independent Kurdistan will ever come into being.

The most serious objection to soft partition is that the Sunni and Shiite populations are too intermingled in Baghdad and elsewhere to really separate. This objection, sadly, becomes less of a problem every day. But it would still be necessary to maintain peacekeepers in the mixed neighborhoods, be open to creative sovereignty structures, and hope that the detoxification of the situation nationally might reduce violence where diverse groups touch.

In short, logic, circumstances and politics are leading inexorably toward soft partition. The Bush administration has been slow to recognize its virtues because it is too dependent on the Green Zone Iraqis. The Iraqis talk about national unity but their behavior suggests they want decentralization. Sooner or later, everybody will settle on this sensible policy, having exhausted all the alternatives.

Saving Lebanon

Editorial
The New York Times
January 28, 2007

It is good that international donors have pledged $7.6 billion to help rebuild Lebanon after last summer’s devastating Israeli air strikes. The democratically elected government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora needs all the help it can get. Clashes between Shiite supporters of Hezbollah and the government’s mainly Sunni supporters threaten to overwhelm Mr. Siniora’s fragile coalition.

If not contained, they could even reignite Lebanon’s catastrophic civil war. Lebanon’s fundamental problem is the archaic and unfair political system that divides the country’s top offices among rival and distrustful religious communities. Lebanon’s large and impoverished Shiite minority, long a major loser in this system, has been increasingly radicalized — straight into the arms of Hezbollah.

Hezbollah has a political party in Parliament, political gangsters on Beirut’s streets and a heavily armed militia whose attacks on Israel provoked last summer’s destruction. Hezbollah also has close links to Iran, which supplies its weapons and cash, and Syria, which provides safe passage for those weapons and more. Any plan for stabilizing Lebanon has to face up to this dynamic. That’s why the Bush administration needs to drop its stubborn resistance to diplomacy with Syria — and try to coax Damascus away from both Iran and Hezbollah.

Washington must make clear that Lebanon’s sovereignty is not negotiable. Nor will there be any bargaining over the United Nations investigation into the 2005 assassination of the former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri — and Syria’s all but certain complicity. When treated as an important regional actor, Syria has at times responded constructively. It has always responded destructively to isolation. Engaging Syria may not work. But ignoring it all but guarantees that even $7.6 billion in aid will not be enough to stabilize Lebanon.