Saturday, June 03, 2006

No wrongdoing by American troops



AP - Fri Jun 2, 2006

In this Wednesday, March 15, 2006 file photo, relatives mourn near the bodies of children, reportedly killed in a U.S. raid, as they arrive in a hospital in Tikrit, 130 kilometers (80 miles) north of Baghdad in Iraq. Residents in the village of Ishaqi said 11 people, including at least five children, were killed in a March 15 U.S. raid on the Sunni-dominated area, whilst the American military confirmed the attack but said only four people died - a man, two women and a child, saying later that the incident was under investigation. (AP Photo/Bassim Daham)

The U.S. military said Saturday (Jun 3, 2006)it found no wrongdoing by American troops accused of intentionally killing civilians during a March 15 raid in Ishaqi, about 50 miles north of Baghdad. As many as 13 Iraqis were killed.

Give the Defense Department an F

A report to Congress on the state of Iraq is inaccurate and misleading. Americans deserve the truth.
By Anthony H. Cordesman
ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN is a defense and intelligence expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. He is the author of "The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics and Military Lessons
Los Angeles Times
June 3, 2006

IF THE UNITED STATES is to win in Iraq, it needs an honest and objective picture of what is happening there. The media and outside experts can provide pieces of this picture, but only the U.S. government has the resources and access to information to offer a comprehensive overview.

But the quarterly report to Congress issued May 30 by the Department of Defense, "Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq," like the weekly reports the State Department issues on Iraq, is profoundly flawed. It does more than simply spin the situation to provide false assurances to lawmakers and the public. It makes basic analytical and statistical mistakes, fails to define key terms, provides undefined and unverifiable survey information and deals with key issues by omission. It deserves an overall grade of F.

The report provides a fundamentally false picture of the political situation in Iraq and of the difficulties ahead. It does not prepare Congress or the American people for the years of effort that will be needed even under "best-case" conditions nor for the risk of far more serious forms of civil conflict. Some of its political reporting is simply incompetent. For example, the report repeatedly states that 77% of the Iraqi population voted in the December 2005 election. Given that the CIA estimates that almost 40% of the population is 14 or younger, there is no conceivable way that 77% of the population could have voted. The report says 12.2 million voters turned out. The CIA estimates Iraq's population is 26.8 million. This means roughly 46% of the population voted.

The far more serious problem, however, is the spin the report puts on the entire Iraqi political process. Political participation surely rose. But that wasn't because of acceptance of the new government or an embrace of a democratic political process; it reflected a steady sharpening of sectarian divisions, as Sunnis tried to make up for their decision to boycott earlier elections.

The report touts a "true unity government with broad-based buy-in from major electoral lists and all of Iraq's communities." But its own data tell a different story. The one largely secular party won only 9% of parliament. The sectarian Shiite party, the United Iraqi Alliance, got 47%. The equally sectarian Sunni Iraqi Accordance Front got 16%, and the Kurdish Coalition got 19%. That hardly adds up to "unity."

The five-month delay in forming a government after the elections, the failure to appoint ministers of defense or interior and the fact that former Prime Minister Ibrahim Jafari relinquished his post only after strong pressure from the United States and from Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani are signs that progress is likely to be slow in the future as well. Sectarian conflict has become almost as serious a threat as the insurgency.

It is scarcely reassuring to be told by the Defense Department that the February attack on the Golden Mosque in Samarra marked a defeat for the insurgents and Islamic extremists because it did not instantly lead to all-out civil war. It is hard to think of a worse definition of victory.

THE ECONOMIC section of the report contains useful data and reflects some real progress in the Iraqi financial sector. However, its analysis is flawed to the point of being actively misleading. No meaningful assessment is provided of the successes and failures of the U.S. aid effort, and no mention is made of the massive corruption and mismanagement of U.S. aid discovered by the special inspector general for Iraqi reconstruction.

Nor is there meaningful analysis of oil developments, budget and revenue problems or future needs for aid. More than $30 billion in U.S. funds and nearly $35 billion in Iraqi money is involved, yet there is a serious risk that the Bush administration will do more than omit the inspector general's report. In fact, some State Department officials and Republicans in Congress are trying to put the inspector general out of business.

The report's handling of the key issue of Iraqi unemployment is symptomatic of the victory of spin over content. The report quotes vague national figures of 18% unemployment and states that other estimates range between 25% and 40%. By saying that unemployment and poverty "remain concerns" but that there are "substantial difficulties in measuring them accurately," it glosses over one of the most destabilizing aspects of Iraq. It ignores the failure of the aid program to create real jobs, especially for young men in areas of high crime and insurgency. Unemployment is not a casual macroeconomic factoid; it is central to bringing stability and security and to defeating the insurgency.

The Defense Department's reporting on the Iraqi police forces simply cannot be trusted. Death squads rampage in police uniforms, but there is only passing mention of staff problems, corruption, sectarian tensions or horrific prison abuses. There is no meaningful analysis of problems so severe that the U.S. has called for a "year of the police" and Iraq's new prime minister, Nouri Maliki, is considering reorganizing the entire force.

The United States is making real progress in some aspects of building the Iraqi regular military. Yet there is still a tendency to promise too much, too soon, to understate the risk and the threat, and to disguise the fact that the U.S. must be ready to support Iraq at least through 2008 and probably through 2010.

The U.S. cannot afford to repeat the mistakes it made in Vietnam. Among them was dangerous self-delusion. The strategy President Bush is pursuing in Iraq is high risk. If it is to have any chance of success, it will require bipartisan persistence and sustained American effort. This requires trust, and trust cannot be built without integrity. That means credible reporting.

The American people and Congress need an honest portrayal of what is happening, not half-truths by omission and spin.

A Man of the People's Needs and Wants

Ahmadinejad Praised in Iran as a Caring Leader
By Karl Vick
Washington Post Foreign Service
Saturday, June 3, 2006; A01

ARAK, Iran -- The ordinary Iranians who poured into the local soccer stadium to hear President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad one day last month arrived carrying high hopes and handwritten letters. They left with just the hopes. The letters were collected in oversize cardboard boxes, then hoisted into the postal van Ahmadinejad has taken to parking prominently when he barnstorms the provinces, in an audacious campaign to make every Iranian's wish come true.

"I asked for a proper house," Vaziolla Rezaei, 57, said of the appeal he addressed to His Excellency the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran. "And I also told him about my financial situation."

"I mainly wrote about my husband's lack of work," said Kobra Hedyatti, 30. "And also about our poor house and how far the children have to walk to school."

"I actually wrote him two letters," said Reza Karimi, 41. "One was about the problems we have in this neighborhood. The other was about my problems.

"Of course," Karimi added with a wave of the hand, "I do not expect him to answer me individually. But I believe he would at least solve the problem of the neighborhood.

"I believe if he really could, he would help us."

That belief, far more than anything Ahmadinejad has said about nuclear power or the Holocaust, defines Iran's energetic president for the people who elected him almost a year ago, as well as the legions he appears to have won over since taking office in August. If his image in the West is that of a banty radical dangerously out of touch with reality -- "a psychopath of the worst kind," in the words of Israel's prime minister -- the prevailing impression in Iran is precisely the opposite.

Here, ordinary people marvel at how their president comes across as someone in touch, as populist candidate turned caring incumbent. In speeches, 17-hour workdays and biweekly trips like the one that brought him here to Central Province, Ahmadinejad showcases a relentless preoccupation with the health, housing and, most of all, money problems that may barely register on the global agenda but represent the most clear and present danger for most in this nation of 70 million.

"It's good to have a very kind person near you, caring about your problems," said Akram Rashidi, 34, at the counter of a stationery store where the run on envelopes outpaced the supply of change. "The important thing is that the president and important people are caring about the people."

Ahmadinejad's ardent professions of solidarity with workaday Iranians defined his dark-horse campaign a year ago. But once in office, he took retail politics to a whole new level. The visit to Arak in mid-May was his 13th trip to the provinces, each time dragging along his cabinet in the name of bringing the government to the people.

"He made a lot of promises," said Aynollah Bagheri, 30, in nearby Khomein, one of eight towns the president hit in two days. "I can't remember them all."

The pledges -- of higher wages, housing loans, recreational centers, car factories -- already are stacked to a precarious height. And he's only halfway through Iran's 30 provinces.

"He's in a perpetual campaign, and he's doing pretty well," said an Iranian political analyst who asked not to be identified because his employer had not authorized him to speak. "But there'll come a time pretty soon when he'll have to pay a second visit to these provinces.

"We are in the stage of hope and demands. If he's successful, he'll turn these demands into results. If he doesn't, there may come a point where complaints turn into anger."

For the time being, Ahmadinejad's image at home stands in stark counterpoint to his notoriety elsewhere. Scrappy and bellicose to the West, his presidency has distinguished itself inside Iran by an almost total absence of pain.

Iran remains Iran, of course. Controls on the press are firmer than ever, and the April arrest of Ramin Jahanbegloo, a philosopher without a strong reputation for political activism, has both mystified and unsettled elements of Tehran's professional class.

But Ahmadinejad's government has delivered none of the widely predicted crackdowns on social behavior. Iranians remain free to drink, party and generally do as they please behind closed doors. In public, young couples can still canoodle lightly on the street, and young women stretch the definition of "Islamic dress" with form-fitting outerwear.

In fact, the hard-line president last month stunned conservatives and liberals alike by ordering the national stadium opened to female soccer fans, an egalitarian gesture that was thwarted when clerics appealed directly to Iran's unelected supreme leader.

But Ahmadinejad's primary focus is the ordinary people normally paid little notice by the country's insular, elitist political culture except at election time.

Ahmadinejad addresses them personally. "I love you too," he told the cheering crowd in Arak. But the only part of the speech heard in the world beyond Iran was what he said about Europe's emerging offer of incentives if Iran abandoned uranium enrichment: "walnuts for gold."

In the audience, Rezaei barely noticed that part.

"The main emphasis of his speech is that he's going to raise up the people who have been deprived of a good life," said Rezaei, who makes his living ambling along the sidewalks of Arak, one hand on a clarinet that plays a flowing, upbeat tune, the other on a crutch. "His main point is he's going to bring a balance between people who have a lot of money and the poor. He's going to give them opportunity. This was the point people loved very much."

The response has been overwhelming in more ways than one. When Ahmadinejad offered Iranians low-interest loans for housing, his office prepared for 30,000 applications. It received 2 million. Other new programs offer loans to newlyweds, farmers, villagers and small businesses.

"Each day we get between 130 and 150 requests," said Hamed Alizadeh at the walk-up window at an office in Tehran, set up around the corner from the modest townhome that symbolized Ahmadinejad's personal integrity during the campaign.

Labeled "President's Public Relations Office," the window receives hand-delivered letters from 8 to 5:30 six days a week. Alizadeh, part of a constituent service staff of 200, runs a highlighter over each essential passage, fills out a form for the relevant ministry, then hands the citizen a phone number to call after 10 days.

The requests can be amusing, he said: One woman wanted the president to find her a husband. But seven in 10 ask for money. The president's visit to Iran's poorest province, Sistan and Baluchistan, brought 200,000 letters alone.

"Everybody is saying he will actually solve the problems, so I've come all this way," said Ashraf Samadi, 47, who borrowed $320 from neighbors for the 16-hour bus ride to Tehran to deliver her letter in person. She wanted funds for a son's failing kidney and a daughter's wedding.

"Is there any chance of seeing the president himself?" she asked.

For a politician, the consequences of disappointing such achingly personal hopes could be catastrophic. But Ahmadinejad's government has been cushioned by the flood of revenue from oil exports at $70 a barrel, a price that in part reflects markets made nervous by his belligerent remarks on nuclear power and Israel.

To many Iranians, the tough talk is simply that. Among a population with both the pride of the Persian empire and a long history of defensive wars, Ahmadinejad's defiance is regarded as welcome and routine. "These kinds of words have to be used," said Azar Mahdavi, 20, behind the counter of a children's boutique. "You have to show that you're a strong man."

Some citizens even resent attention to any issue beyond themselves. One placard in Arak read: "A better life is our undeniable right" -- a pointed play on the government's constant pro-nuclear slogan. Union members at a May Day rally chanted, "Forget about Palestine. What about us?"

"People have high expectations," said Rashidi, at the stationery shop. Her look was introspective as she told of accompanying her sister to see Ahmadinejad when he was still Tehran's mayor, to appeal a zoning issue. There was no result, but what she remembered, years later, was having his attention.

In Khomein, Zabihollah Sarlak asked Ahmadinejad to see that his mentally disabled son is looked after if he should die. "He promised everybody, but he also said it'll take some time," said Sarlak, 50. "He said if you buy a kilo of meat at the market and take it home and cook it, it takes time.

"But he'll do what he says."

Friday, June 02, 2006

Insurgency Out, Anarchy In

By Thomas L. Friedman
New York Times
June 2, 2006

President Bush has told us that the question of whether to withdraw from Iraq is one that his successor will have to deal with — not him. I don't think so. Mr. Bush is not going to have that luxury of passing Iraq along. You see, the insurgency in Iraq is in its "last throes" — just like Dick Cheney said. Unfortunately, it's being replaced by anarchy in many neighborhoods — not democracy. And I don't believe the American people will put up with two and half more years of babysitting anarchy instead of midwifing democracy.

The report that U.S. marines were involved in a massacre of Iraqis in Haditha — which the Pentagon needs to clarify fast — is a tragic reminder that a foreign occupation by U.S. forces can't go on for years. Most U.S. soldiers in Iraq have done heroic work, but occupations that drag on inevitably lead to Hadithas.

Right now we are paying for all the Bush team's missteps in Iraq: allowing looting after the fall of Baghdad, disbanding the Iraqi Army without an alternative security force or enough U.S. troops in place, fostering a culture of torture at Abu Ghraib and then letting the politics in Iraq drift for months without any outcome.

All of this created a security vacuum that has allowed a rogue's gallery of sectarian militias, death squads, gangs and Al Qaeda operatives to mushroom in Basra, Baghdad and the Sunni Triangle. The end result: while the mainstream Iraqi Sunnis have now joined the government, in a major way, this has not brought more stability. Because between the sectarian militias now murdering each other's civilians, tit for tat, and Al Qaeda just blowing up Iraqi civilians randomly, the new government can't get going. Too many Iraqis are paralyzed by fear.

Indeed, there has been a subtle but important change in the violence in Iraq. The main enemy in many places is no longer the Sunni insurgency. It is anarchy. Mini-wars of all against all. As the BBC reported Wednesday from Basra: Prime Minister Nuri Maliki "has declared a monthlong state of emergency in Basra, which has been plagued by sectarian clashes, anarchy and factional rivalry." That's what happens in a security vacuum.

Once this kind of militia madness takes root, it's very hard to uproot. U.S. troops can't do it, because it would require searching homes, neighborhood by neighborhood. Only a cohesive Iraqi national army could do that. And that can only be the product of a real national unity government, in which all parties feel they have a fair share of the pie and are committed to investing in an Iraqi army — not their own militia.

And such a national unity government can only be the product of Iraq's leaders deciding whether they love their kids more than they hate each other. That is the most important question Iraqis must answer. It can't be avoided any longer. That being the case, it is time for America to starting talking "deadlines." Too many Iraqi factions think they can just keep wrestling each other for small advantage while the country burns, but the U.S. Army provides a floor of security that prevents total chaos. The Iraqi parties need to know that we are not going to be played this way forever. Only an Iraq that can come together and make a fist can crush this militia culture.

Salvaging Iraq is still hugely important — for itself and for the region, which is facing two big trends. One is a population explosion, producing millions of young people looking for work. And the other is a huge explosion of windfall oil profits. Today, many autocratic Arab regimes are using these oil profits just to buy off their population explosions — in the form of government jobs and subsidized food and fuel — not to educate and empower their youth for the 21st century. But when the price of oil falls, and it will eventually, and these populations continue to rise, we will see destabilizing social explosions throughout the Arab world. It would be very helpful to have a different model in place in Iraq before that happens.

But the hour is late and the enemy is unique. We are not losing Iraq to the Iraqi Vietcong — traditional nationalists. Iraq has a freely elected nationalist government. No, we are losing in Iraq to sectarian theocrats, Islamo-fascists and local and regional tyrants, who have only one thing in common: the belief that America and its Iraqi allies must fail, that neither modernity nor democracy must be allowed to take root in Iraq.

It will be a global tragedy if they succeed, but it is hard to fight an enemy whose only concern is that you lose, not what happens after. It is impossible, though, without Iraqi leaders who can make a fist. We can't keep asking Americans to sacrifice their children for people who hate each other more than they love their own children.

Thursday, June 01, 2006

Iran: Gulf War III?

Attacking the Islamic Republic would mean steep costs and uncertain victory.
by Charles V. Peña
The American Conservative
June 5, 2006 Issue

If gas breaking the $3/gallon barrier could dominate the evening news and send Congress into a frenzy, imagine Americans’ horror if oil, now $75/barrel, suddenly tops $200. Neither our political will nor our wallets are prepared, but a few stalled SUVs may be the least of our concerns if the U.S. makes good on its threats against Iran.

On April 10, President Bush drew his line in the sand: “We do not want the Iranians to have a nuclear weapon, the capacity to make a nuclear weapon or the knowledge about how to make a nuclear weapon.” The next day, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad declared that his country had “joined countries with nuclear technology” by successfully enriching uranium. Now Iran maintains that its nuclear ambitions are peaceful, but many analysts believe the real purpose is to build nuclear weapons—which the White House says it will not allow.

President Bush insists that he wants to resolve the situation diplomatically, but his recent pronouncements sound eerily like the run-up to the Iraq War, and his ultimatums have significantly narrowed the range of options. According to New Yorker columnist Seymour Hersh, “The Bush Administration, while publicly advocating diplomacy in order to stop Iran from pursuing a nuclear weapon, has increased clandestine activities inside Iran and intensified planning for a possible major air attack.”

The blueprint for a pre-emptive strike against Iran’s nuclear program is based on Israel’s strike against Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor in June 1981. But this would not be Osirak redux. Unlike Osirak, attacking Iran’s nuclear program would require striking multiple targets. The three main targets would likely be Bushehr, which is a complex of light-water reactors where spent fuel rods could be diverted to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons; the previously secret Natanz nuclear facility, believed to be used for uranium enrichment that could be used for nuclear weapons; and Arak, which is the site of two planned heavy-water reactors that could produce plutonium for nuclear weapons. But a decapitating strike against Iran’s nuclear program would involve more than just three targets. According to GlobalSecurity.org, “there are perhaps two dozen suspected nuclear facilities in Iran.”

In a war game run for The Atlantic in the fall of 2004, retired Air Force Col. Sam Gardiner identified 14 locations for Iran’s nuclear-related facilities but developed a pre-emptive strike target list of 125 nuclear, chemical, and biological facilities with approximately 300 aim points—20 of which would require penetrating weapons or bunker busters. The main cause of all the additional aim points is the need to suppress Iran’s air defenses, including advanced Russian S-300 and S-400 surface-to-air missiles.

In addition to more aim points that must be attacked, Iran’s air capabilities mean that a successful strike would require several days to degrade air defenses sufficiently before the primary targets could be hit. (It is important to remember that one of the reasons U.S. air power was so successful at the outset of Operation Iraqi Freedom and could operate with relative impunity was that Iraq’s air defenses had been rendered virtually ineffective by 10 years of no-fly-zone enforcement.)

Certainly the United States military is capable of conducting a complex large-scale air strike against Iran using aircraft armed with precision weapons or cruise missiles. Assuming all the weapons hit their intended targets, the success of such a military operation would rest on three factors:

• All known targets comprise the full extent of Iran’s nuclear program and there are no secret facilities

• Minimal collateral damage

• No retaliation by the regime in Tehran

Recalling pre-Iraq War predictions about the United States being hailed as a liberator while Iraqis embraced democracy, how likely is this outcome? The odds aren’t good.

A covert reactor would be a difficult undertaking for the Iranians but cannot be ruled out. A secret uranium-enrichment facility is a more likely possibility. After all, it was two years before the Natanz facility was revealed and then only because it was disclosed by the National Council of the Resistance of Iran, not because it was discovered by U.S. intelligence. We also know that many of Iran’s nuclear facilities, like the Tehran research reactor, are located in urban areas, so civilian casualties are almost a certainty. If the U.S. resorts to tactical nuclear weapons, as Hersh suggests it might—and President Bush has said that option has not been taken off the table—a Defense Department-sponsored report by the National Academy of Sciences stated that they could “kill up to a million people or more if used in heavily populated areas.” Finally, it is hard to imagine that any government would sit idly by after being bombed on a relatively massive scale: 300 aim points would require at least two weapons each for reliability and to assure a high probability of kill.

If Iran’s ballistic missile sites were not taken out in the initial strike, Tehran would have some 500 Shehab ballistic missiles at its disposal for retaliation. The shorter-range Shehab-1 and -2 missiles, variants of the Russian Scud missile, are capable of reaching U.S. targets in the Gulf, including Iraq, where some 130,000 American soldiers are currently stationed. The longer range Shehab-3 missile, based on the North Korean Nodong missile, could reach Israel—and Iran has made clear that this will be an early target: “We have announced that wherever America does something evil, the first place that we target will be Israel,” Revolutionary Guards Commander Mohammad-Ebrahim Dehqani said last week. Like the V-2 missiles used by Germany against Britain during World War II, the Shehab missiles would be most effective against civilian populations rather than military targets due to their relative inaccuracy. How well U.S. forces in the Gulf region and the Israelis could withstand an onslaught of Iranian Shehab missiles would depend on the effectiveness of U.S. Patriot and Israeli Arrow missile-defense systems. To date, the Patriot has not lived up to its expectations against Iraqi Scud missiles. On paper, the Arrow has better performance than Patriot PAC-3—greater speed and higher altitude—but it has not proved itself in combat. Moreover, relying on missile-defense systems to blunt Iranian retaliation fails to account for the possibility that Iran’s Shehab missiles could be armed with chemical warheads.

Iran could also retaliate by sowing further chaos in already unstable Iraq. In a February 2006 threat assessment presented to the Senate Select Committee On Intelligence, National Intelligence Director John Negroponte stated, “Iran provides guidance and training to select Iraqi Shia political groups and weapons and training to Shia militant groups to enable anti-Coalition attacks. Tehran has been responsible for at least some of the increasing lethality of anti-Coalition attacks by providing Shia militants with the capability to build IEDs [improvised explosive devices] with explosively formed projectiles.” But we have yet to feel their full fury. He added, “Tehran’s intentions to inflict pain on the United States in Iraq have been constrained by its caution to avoid giving Washington an excuse to attack it.” If the United States attacked Iran, Tehran is prepared to step up its activities in Iraq, including covertly deploying elements of its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

And Iranian retaliation need not be limited to military action. Iranian oil production is fourth in the world and second to Saudi Arabia in the Gulf—nearly 4 million barrels a day. (Iran’s oil reserves are third largest in the world after Saudi Arabia and Canada.) While withholding oil from the market to inflict economic damage on the United States would not be economically rational since the Iranians would lose their main source of revenue, it cannot be ruled out. The Iranians could also disrupt the global oil supply from the Persian Gulf either by mining the Straits of Hormuz or sinking tankers to block the straits, which can only be transited via two one-mile-wide channels. According to the Department of Energy, roughly 20 percent of the world’s oil passes through the Straits of Hormuz and closure “would require use of longer alternate routes (if available) at increased transportation costs.” If Iranians shut down the straits, the price of oil will skyrocket—with shock waves felt throughout the global economy.

More chilling is the possibility that the Iranians would feel unrestrained about resorting to terrorism—their best bet against America’s military might. According to recent State Department Country Reports on Terrorism, “Iran remained the most active state sponsor of terrorism” by providing support to Hezbollah and Palestinian terrorist groups such as Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command. Hezbollah was responsible for the 1983 bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut that killed 241 people and the 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia that killed 19 U.S. solders, but it has not targeted Americans subsequently. The al-Qaeda terror threat is already grave—and would be much worse if now constrained Hezbollah were unleashed. Former CIA Director George Tenet called Hezbollah “an organization with capability and worldwide presence … [al-Qaeda’s] equal, if not a far more capable organization.” And former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage said, “Hezbollah may be the ‘A-team’ of terrorists and maybe al-Qaeda’s actually the B-team.” Set aside which is more lethal and consider a scenario where the two organizations overcome Sunni-Shi’ite divisions to form a tactical alliance against a common enemy: the United States.

Beyond direct retaliation, there are also the ripple effects of unintended consequences—and there are always unintended consequences. After Afghanistan and Iraq, attacking Iran would likely be viewed by many in the Muslim world as confirmation that the U.S. is waging a war against Islam, a tipping point that would incline many to sympathize and side with the radicals. Not only would we earn the hostility of youthful Iranian reformers in whom the U.S. has previously put faith, but we could ignite destabilizing violence in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, and Indonesia. Add precarious Afghanistan and nuclear-armed Pakistan, governments we can ill afford to unsettle, and we stand to accomplish exactly what bin Laden wants but is unable to achieve on his own.

The ripples could reach far beyond Muslim countries. Our European allies host large immigrant Muslim populations—over 4 million in France, over 3 million in Germany, and over 1 million in the United Kingdom—that are susceptible to radicalization, as demonstrated by the July 2005 terrorist attacks on the London tube system. A U.S. attack on Iran could unleash a wave of terrorist reprisal throughout Europe.

Another consideration is how Muslims in the Balkans might react. With few exceptions, almost all al-Qaeda and radical Islamic terrorists have been of Arab origin. Thus the tendency has been to equate “Muslim” with “Arab” in creating a profile of potential al-Qaeda terrorists. But Muslims from the Balkans are anything but Arab, and if al-Qaeda could successfully recruit Muslims from the local Balkan population, the war on terrorism would be thrown a dangerous curveball.

There is also the risk of radicalizing America’s Muslim population. While the vast majority do not support bin Laden’s terrorism, they are not unsympathetic to his arguments about U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East and Muslim world—particularly U.S. support for oppressive and autocratic governments in the countries they left behind. Bin Laden has tapped some core issues that many Muslims can agree with him about in principle, even if they do not condone the killing of innocents. But if American Muslims begin to believe that the United States has embarked on a war against Islam and their home countries, even if they consider America to be their home, how long can they be expected not to defend their religious and cultural roots?

Ultimately, it is impossible to predict the outcome of a U.S. attack against Iran’s nuclear program. None of the above scenarios—and they are not exhaustive—are mutually exclusive. Russia and China, powerful states with heavy financial investments in Iran, have consistently registered their opposition to a military solution regarding Iran; indeed they oppose Washington’s push for economic sanctions. A U.S. military strike against Iran would engage their interests in ways difficult to calculate. The ominous analogy pointed to by Washington commentator Steve Clemons deserves sober consideration: “This mess is looking increasingly like 1914—when nations fell into war because of ego, attitude, poorly thought strategies regarding basic strategic interests, and miscalculation.”

It is precisely because of this unpredictability that all of the outcomes must be carefully weighed. However big the potential payoff, the risks must be assessed, for Iran is not sanction-battered, diplomatically isolated Iraq, and the United States can ill afford another Operation Wishful Thinking.

One of the fundamental problems in war-gaming is the tendency to view the game as chess, where moves can be anticipated and so-called branch-and-block strategies employed to thwart the various combinations of moves by the enemy. But chess is the wrong analogy. As Iraq has clearly demonstrated, a kaleidoscope metaphor is more appropriate—moving one piece results in all the other pieces shifting into a new pattern that sets in motion a series of uncontrollable events.

Why, then, would the Bush administration be willing to roll the dice with military action against Iran? The answer lies in the new National Security Strategy issued on March 16:

As important as are these nuclear issues, the United States has broader concerns regarding Iran. The Iranian regime sponsors terrorism; threatens Israel; seeks to thwart Middle East peace; disrupts democracy in Iraq; and denies the aspirations of its people for freedom. The nuclear issue and our other concerns can ultimately be resolved only if the Iranian regime makes the strategic decision to change these policies, open up its political system, and afford freedom to its people. This is the ultimate goal of U.S. policy.

This gives the game away: administration strategists understand that if the United States bombs Iran’s nuclear facilities, the Iranians will likely retaliate using terrorism against American targets, which would then become justification to invade Iran for regime change. But far from spurring the democratic transition of the Bush administration’s fantasies, this will galvanize the Islamic world against us—in addition to rocking the global economy, endangering our allies, and costing untold Iranian and American lives. The alternative—if diplomatic efforts prove unsuccessful—might be a price worth paying. Although the Iranians may eventually acquire a few nuclear weapons, they will not be able to ignore the reality of vastly superior American and Israeli arsenals. Deterrence could then begin its work, as it did with the Soviet Union and China once and with North Korea now.

Charles V. Peña is a senior fellow with the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, senior fellow with George Washington University’s Homeland Security Policy Institute, adviser on the Straus Military Reform Project, MSNBC analyst, and author of Winning the Un-War: A New Strategy for the War on Terrorism.

The U.S. should move its embassy to Jerusalem…now

By Daniel Freedman
National Review
May 31, 2006

It’s a shame that a hopeless shrug was all that President Bush gave Prime Minister Olmert during his recent visit to Washington. It could have been so different. Prime Minister Sharon’s successor came to the capital with his “convergence plan”—unilaterally withdrawing from parts of the Jewish State because, he explains, with the terrorist group Hamas in power, Israel has no peace partner. The Bush administration, meantime, recognizes that Israel has no peace partner, but at the same time the president is also committed to the Middle East quartet’s “Road Map” and officially can’t endorse any unilateral move that is likely to “pre-judge” a final settlement—hence the hopeless shrug. Some see the shrug as good news—it means the Bush administration won’t block Olmert’s plan. But the real shame is that President Bush once again passed up on an action that would not only move the peace process forward, but would also reduce the likelihood of a future Hamas reelection. And, to top it all off, all President Bush has to do is comply with American law.

That action is moving the American embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem—as required by the 1995 Jerusalem Embassy Act. Passed by the Senate 93 to 5, and the House 347 to 37, the act made it “the official policy of the United States” that Jerusalem be recognized as Israel’s capital and accordingly America’s embassy be moved there. The act mandated withholding funds from the State Department if the embassy was not moved. But the act also gave the president a six-month waiver over the withholding of funds if he deemed it necessary for national security. President Clinton repeatedly used the six-month waiver, as has President Bush. So while it remains American law that the embassy should be moved, because of the use of the presidential waiver the State department hasn’t had funds withheld.

The excuses given for the use of the waiver, courtesy of the Arabists at the State department, are that moving the embassy will destabilize peace negotiations and anger the other Arab states. Today those excuses are weaker than ever. It’s hard to imagine how negotiations could be destabilized further. There are none. The Palestinian Arabs are now represented by terrorists committed to Israel’s destruction. What’s the worst that could happen if the embassy is moved? Hamas will reiterate for the hundred and first time that they want to wipe out the Jewish state? And what will those Arab states—the likes of Saudi Arabia and Syria—do? Will they still refuse to recognize Israel? More importantly why should other states, and undemocratic states at that, determine where America places its embassy in one of its closest allies? Israel is the only country in the world where the American president blocks the placing of America’s embassy in the nation’s capital.

Moreover, not moving the embassy is actually a barrier to peace. Not moving the embassy leaves the Palestinians Arabs with the hope that one day, as Hamas promises, Jerusalem will be theirs. But this is a false hope. The status of Jerusalem is non-negotiable to the Jewish people. King David's oath, "If I forget thee, O'Jerusalem, let my right hand turn lame," recited by Jews to this day, was made 700 years before the advent of Christianity and 1,200 years before Islam. But not only was Jerusalem the center of the ancient Jewish state, it’s also the center of the modern state: The parliament, the Supreme Court, and the central bank are all there. Leaving the Palestinian Arabs with any hope that one day they’ll be given Jerusalem is leaving them with a false dream. But by not moving the embassy, the American government is signaling that the dream isn’t so false. If the Jews are denied sovereignty over their capital city, even by their closest ally, it’s sending the message that everything is still to play for.
And so while Hamas’s agenda seems extreme to most, the Palestinian Arab people see America legitimizing part of Hamas’s agenda—one reason for their electoral success.

Leaving the Palestinian Arabs with false hope is why previous peace plans failed. Oslo and other grand plans were based on the premise that the big divisive issues—Jerusalem, refugees, final borders—could be dealt with at the end. The architects thought leaving aside the big issues till the end would create enough good will in between to deal with them at the end. But what happened was that the Palestinian Arabs were left with the false hope that they’d get all their demands—and every day this false hope only gets stronger—and so the peace process collapsed.

President Bush is doing a disservice to both the Jewish people and the Palestinian Arabs by blocking the embassy move. It’s an insult to the Jewish people by refusing to recognize the capital of the Jewish state and implies that her legitimacy is an open question. And it’s harmful to the Palestinian Arabs because it leaves them with a false hope and helps Hamas’s election chances. It’s a disservice to both because it makes peace all that less realistic. Supporters of the Jewish state thought President Bush understood this when he promised on May 22, 2000, that “... as soon as I take office, I will begin the process of moving the United States ambassador to the city Israel has chosen as its capital.” The president has broken that promise every six months since taking office, and, unsurprisingly, peace looks more distant than ever. It’s time for a new policy, or rather implementing an old policy and keeping an old promise.

—Daniel Freedman is online editor of the New York Sun.

Tearing Iraq Apart

By Thomas X. Hammes
New York Times
June 1, 2006

Oxford, England -- The White House is right to insist that our postwar goal is a unified Iraq, as opposed to one divided along ethno-religious lines. So why is the administration taking so many actions that make holding the country together virtually impossible?

In January, President Bush diverted nearly half the money allocated to reconstruction in Iraq to other needs, including security. Given that our current strategy is nicknamed "Clear-Hold-Build," where does that leave us? Clear-Hold-Hope? Mr. Bush's decision sent a terrible signal to the Iraqis about our resolve. It is even less understandable since the expense of the critical reconstruction program is a small fraction of our annual cost in Iraq.

Next, the administration deeply cut financing for democratization efforts, many of them undertaken by nongovernmental groups. The proposed budget for fiscal 2007 asks for a paltry $63 million. This token sum — in a war that costs some $200 million a day — may simply reflect a belief that the security situation prevents such efforts from being effective. But democratization has always been one of the administration's cherished goals, and cutting spending there sends the wrong message.

The latest administration budget also recommends cutting overall Army and Marine troop strength. If Mr. Bush and his advisers are really committed to sustained support for the "long war" in Iraq, how do they reconcile that with cutting the budgets for the most engaged forces?

President Bush and his aides have also repeatedly hinted at significant troop reductions in Iraq this year — perhaps to as low as 100,000 from the current 130,000. This is despite the growing violence in Baghdad and the fact that our military leaders in Iraq have consistently said that we can withdraw troops safely only if conditions improve. The administration may simply be talking fewer troops to reassure the electorate before midterms. Unfortunately, American voters are not the only audience. What do the Iraqis think?

The administration has long stated that the so-called Provincial Reconstruction Teams — groups of 100 or so political, economic, legal and civil-military relations specialists who help distribute aid and advise regional Iraqi officials, which have had success in Afghanistan — are critical to our strategy in Iraq. Yet The Washington Post reported in mid-April that only 4 of the proposed 16 teams had even been inaugurated.

In addition, the Army staffs and units in Iraq, even those training Iraqi security forces, continue to be undermanned. Meanwhile, former colleagues outside the war zone — in the Joint Forces Command, the European Command and the Pacific Command — tell me their commands remain at full strength. It seems the Pentagon does not consider the Iraq war important enough to shift from its peacetime manning models.

Last, the administration has repeatedly said efficient and law-abiding Iraqi security forces are central to our strategy, yet has failed to provide them with more than minimal equipment. Three years after the fall of Saddam Hussein, most Iraq troops are still using open-backed trucks and unarmored S.U.V.'s.

Let's face it: this laundry list of inaction on the part of the Bush administration leaves a prudent Iraqi with no practical choice but to prepare for a United States withdrawal long before the Iraqi central government and security forces are capable of running the nation. For most Iraqis — Arab or Kurd, Sunni or Shiite — this will mean looking to religious and ethnic militias, criminal gangs and Islamist insurgents for protection. This, in turn, greatly increases the chance of civil war.

The militias are already looking ahead: some are carving out safe areas they will use as bases in the coming war by driving Iraqis of other ethnic and religious groups out of mixed neighborhoods and villages. Iraqi government officials estimated that more than 100,000 families have already fled their homes. This falling back on militias and preparing for internecine conflict is not a new phenomenon. It is exactly what we saw in Afghanistan nearly two decades ago. Once the Afghans believed the Soviet troops were finally pulling out, the various insurgent groups stopped fighting the invaders and began positioning for a multisided civil war. That conflict, of course, lasted until the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001.

The Bush administration, despite all its missteps since the fall of the Baathists, has clung to one correct idea: that an intact Iraq is a better outcome than a splintered one. To keep it unified, however, the White House must commit to long timelines and to providing the money necessary for both the military and reconstruction efforts. The alternative is for Mr. Bush to change his mind and tell the American and Iraqi people that we must start planning for a peaceful division.

In any case, the uncertainty resulting from trying to have it both ways will result in the worst possible outcome: open civil war.

Thomas X. Hammes, a retired Marine colonel, is the author of "The Sling and the Stone: On Warfare in the 21st Century."

Jaw-Jaw Before War-War?

By Robert D. Blackwill
Wall Street Journal
June 1, 2006

The Bush administration's announcement that it will join the EU-3 negotiations with Iran -- if Tehran suspends, verifiably, its enrichment and reprocessing activities -- will be seen as good news by many. With this new initiative, the American-led attempt to stop diplomatically Iran's nuclear weapons program will likely last for at least several more months. Perhaps Iran will eventually accede, either because of the threat or imposition of sanctions against it, or in the face of the united will of the international community.

We may hope the outcome is peaceful. But how probable is it? Vegas might give 3-1 odds against -- or longer. The Europeans have tried for two years to find a compromise with Tehran, without progress. Despite nearly unanimous condemnation by the international community, the regime appears determined to acquire nuclear weapons capability, and to replace the U.S. as the dominant power in the Persian Gulf area.

The essential problem here is not administration policy, the shape of the table, or who is sitting around it. Iran's nuclear policies are causing this crisis and Tehran has been left in no doubt about how to end it -- stop trying to create a nuclear arsenal. Nevertheless, if negotiations with Tehran fail, the case against using U.S. military force to set back Iran's nuclear weapons program is impressive.

Iran would retaliate strongly in Iraq, in Afghanistan and perhaps against the U.S. homeland. The effect in the Muslim world could be volcanic. Terror against America would increase. Islam could be further radicalized. Oil prices would skyrocket with damaging effects on the international economy, even if Iran did not interrupt its supply. The people of Iran would probably fall in behind the mullahs.

Global public opinion would further shift against the U.S. The Bush administration's resulting prolonged fixation on Iran could facilitate the rise of Chinese power and give North Korea more room to maneuver. Moreover, how accurate would U.S. intelligence and targeting information be? For what period would an air campaign have to last to be effective? If Iran subsequently began rebuilding its nuclear infrastructure, how long would it be before the U.S. might have to attack again?

For many, these arguments rule out military force. Former National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski has argued that, "if undertaken without the sanction of the U.N. Security Council either alone by the U.S. or in complicity with Israel, it would stamp the perpetrator(s) as an international outlaw(s)." Since it is difficult to imagine any circumstance in which the Security Council would endorse U.S. military action against Iran, this would seem to take the military option off the table for the likes of Mr. Brzezinski.

If diplomacy does not succeed, he suggests a policy of deterrence, which, he explains, "has worked in U.S.-Soviet relations, in U.S.-Chinese relations, and in Indo-Pak relations." But deterrence in the situations he mentions was focused on avoiding nuclear use. It did not prevent Pakistan from conducting more than a decade of cross-border terrorism in the course of which 40,000 innocent Indians were murdered. Would nuclear deterrence weaken Iran's ambition to become the hegemonic state in the Persian Gulf region? Would it end Iran's state support for international terrorist organizations? Would it lessen this Iranian regime's oft-repeated objective to eradicate Israel?

In fact, it would likely be the U.S. that would be deterred once Tehran acquired nuclear weapons capability and threatened U.S. national interests. Many argued a decade ago against military action against North Korea's nuclear facilities. Negotiate, they insisted. The PDRK presently produces probably several nuclear weapons a year. Who's sorry now? Henry Kissinger reminds us that bureaucrats and experts instinctively favor delay, equivocation, negotiation and the status quo, "because short of an unambiguous catastrophe the status quo has the advantage of familiarity and it is never possible to prove that another course would yield superior results."

The use of American military force against Iran's nuclear infrastructure would obviously carry great risk. But acquiescing in an Iranian nuclear weapons capability would be deeply dangerous for the U.S. and likeminded democracies for decades to come. It would be regarded by the entire world, friend and foe alike, as a strategic defeat for the U.S., and produce a major shift toward Iran in the balance of power in the Greater Middle East.

Iran would be emboldened to further endanger American vital national interests world-wide. Terrorist organizations everywhere would be given a major lift, some through direct support from Tehran. Israel's very existence would be called into question. And the nonproliferation regime could be dramatically, perhaps fatally, undermined. If Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and other Muslim states followed the Iranian nuclear example, for how long could a nuclear war in be avoided in this violent part of the world? John McCain sums it up: "In the end, there is only one thing worse than military action, and that is a nuclear-armed Iran."

Given the extraordinary stakes involved, ignoring the military option and hoping that we will somehow be rescued by sanctions, new negotiating mechanisms, or the Iranian mullahs is a serious mistake. We should instead follow Nehru's advice: "Risks and deadlocks when they occur at least have this advantage, that they force us to think." The distinguished French strategist Thérèse Delpech has been doing precisely that and warns, "The Iranian nuclear programme is progressing more rapidly than anticipated . . . and Tehran shows it has learned from Pyongyang that brinksmanship brings rewards." We may not have years to debate these historic policy choices. We should do so now before the gathering storm with Iran arrives with full force.

Mr. Blackwill, president of Barbour Griffith & Rogers International (a Republican lobbying and consulting firm), was U.S. ambassador to India from 2001-2003, deputy national security adviser for strategic planning and presidential envoy to Iraq in 2003-2004.

Wednesday, May 31, 2006

Countless My Lai Massacres in Iraq

By Dahr Jamail
truthout
05/30/06

The media feeding frenzy around what has been referred to as "Iraq's My Lai" has become frenetic. Focus on US Marines slaughtering at least 20 civilians in Haditha last November is reminiscent of the media spasm around the "scandal" of Abu Ghraib during April and May 2004.

Yet just like Abu Ghraib, while the media spotlight shines squarely on the Haditha massacre, countless atrocities continue daily, conveniently out of the awareness of the general public. Torture did not stop simply because the media finally decided, albeit in horribly belated fashion, to cover the story, and the daily slaughter of Iraqi civilians by US forces and US-backed Iraqi "security" forces had not stopped either.

Earlier this month, I received a news release from Iraq, which read, "On Saturday, May 13th, 2006, at 10:00 p.m., US Forces accompanied by the Iraqi National Guard attacked the houses of Iraqi people in the Al-Latifya district south of Baghdad by an intensive helicopter shelling. This led the families to flee to the Al-Mazar and water canals to protect themselves from the fierce shelling. Then seven helicopters landed to pursue the families who fled … and killed them. The number of victims amounted to more than 25 martyrs. US forces detained another six persons including two women named Israa Ahmed Hasan and Widad Ahmed Hasan, and a child named Huda Hitham Mohammed Hasan, whose father was killed during the shelling."

The report from the Iraqi NGO called The Monitoring Net of Human Rights in Iraq (MHRI) continued, "The forces didn't stop at this limit. They held an attack on May 15th, 2006, supported also by the Iraqi National Guards. They also attacked the families' houses, and arrested a number of them while others fled. US snipers then used the homes to target more Iraqis. The reason for this crime was due to the downing of a helicopter in an area close to where the forces held their attack."

The US military preferred to report the incident as an offensive where they killed 41 "insurgents," a line effectively parroted by much of the media.

On that same day, MHRI also reported that in the Yarmouk district of Baghdad, US forces raided the home of Essam Fitian al-Rawi. Al-Rawi was killed along with his son Ahmed; then the soldiers reportedly removed the two bodies along with Al-Rawi's nephew, who was detained.

Similarly, in the city of Samara on May 5, MHRI reported, "American soldiers entered the house of Mr. Zidan Khalif Al-Heed after an attack upon American soldiers was launched nearby the house. American soldiers entered this home and killed the family, including the father, mother and daughter who is in the 6th grade, along with their son, who was suffering from mental and physical disabilities."

This same group, MHRI, also estimated that between 4,000 and 6,000 Iraqi civilians were killed during the November 2004 US assault on Fallujah. Numbers which make those from the Haditha massacre pale in comparison.

Instead of reporting incidents such as these, mainstream outlets are referring to the Haditha slaughter as one of a few cases that "present the most serious challenge to US handling of the Iraq war since the Abu Ghraib prison scandal."

Marc Garlasco, of Human Rights Watch, told reporters recently, "What happened at Haditha appears to be outright murder. The Haditha massacre will go down as Iraq's My Lai."

Then there is the daily reality of sectarian and ethnic cleansing in Iraq, which is being carried out by US-backed Iraqi "security" forces. A recent example of this was provided by a representative of the Voice of Freedom Association for Human Rights, another Iraqi NGO which logs ongoing atrocities resulting from the US occupation.

"The representative … visited Fursan Village (Bani Zaid) with the Iraqi Red Crescent Al-Madayin Branch. The village of 60 houses, inhabited by Sunni families, was attacked on February 27, 2006, by groups of men wearing black clothes and driving cars from the Ministry of Interior. Most of the villagers escaped, but eight were caught and immediately executed. One of them was the Imam of the village mosque, Abu Aisha, and another was a 10-year-old boy, Adnan Madab. They were executed inside the room where they were hiding. Many animals (sheep, cows and dogs) were shot by the armed men also. The village mosque and most of the houses were destroyed and burnt."

The representative had obtained the information when four men who had fled the scene of the massacre returned to provide the details. The other survivors had all left to seek refuge in Baghdad. "The survivors who returned to give the details guided the representative and the Red Crescent personnel to where the bodies had been buried. They [the bodies] were of men, women and one of the village babies."

The director of MHRI, Muhamad T. Al-Deraji, said of this incident, "This situation is a simple part of a larger problem that is orchestrated by the government … the delay in protecting more villagers from this will only increase the number of tragedies."

Arun Gupta, an investigative journalist and editor with the New York Indypendent newspaper of the New York Independent Media Center, has written extensively about US-backed militias and death squads in Iraq. He is also the former editor at the Guardian weekly in New York and writes frequently for Z Magazine and Left Turn.

"The fact is, while I think the militias have, to a degree, spiraled out of US control, it's the US who trains, arms, funds, and supplies all the police and military forces, and gives them critical logistical support," he told me this week. "For instance, there were reports at the beginning of the year that a US army unit caught a "death squad" operating inside the Iraqi Highway Patrol. There were the usual claims that the US has nothing to do with them. It's all a big lie. The American reporters are lazy. If they did just a little digging, there is loads of material out there showing how the US set up the highway patrol, established a special training academy just for them, equipped them, armed them, built all their bases, etc. It's all in government documents, so it's irrefutable. But then they tell the media we have nothing to do with them and they don't even fact check it. In any case, I think the story is significant only insofar as it shows how the US tries to cover up its involvement."

Once again, like Abu Ghraib, a few US soldiers are being investigated about what occurred in Haditha. The "few bad apples" scenario is being repeated in order to obscure the fact that Iraqis are being slaughtered every single day. The "shoot first ask questions later" policy, which has been in effect from nearly the beginning in Iraq, creates trigger-happy American soldiers and US-backed Iraqi death squads who have no respect for the lives of the Iraqi people. Yet, rather than high-ranking members of the Bush administration who give the orders, including Bush himself, being tried for the war crimes they are most certainly guilty of, we have the ceremonial "public hanging" of a few lowly soldiers for their crimes committed on the ground.

In an interview with CNN on May 29th concerning the Haditha massacre, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Peter Pace commented, "It's going to be a couple more weeks before those investigations are complete, and we should not prejudge the outcome. But we should, in fact, as leaders take on the responsibility to get out and talk to our troops and make sure that they understand that what 99.9 percent of them are doing, which is fighting with honor and courage, is exactly what we expect of them."

This is the same Peter Pace who when asked how things were going in Iraq by Tim Russert on Meet the Press this past March 5th said, "I'd say they're going well. I wouldn't put a great big smiley face on it, but I would say they're going very, very well from everything you look at …"

Things are not "going very, very well" in Iraq. There have been countless My Lai massacres, and we cannot blame 0.1% of the soldiers on the ground in Iraq for killing as many as a quarter of a million Iraqis, when it is the policies of the Bush administration that generated the failed occupation to begin with.

Dahr Jamail is an independent journalist who spent over 8 months reporting from occupied Iraq. He presented evidence of US war crimes in Iraq at the International Commission of Inquiry on Crimes Against Humanity Committed by the Bush Administration in New York City in January 2006. He writes regularly for TruthOut, Inter Press Service, Asia Times and TomDispatch, and maintains his own web site, dahrjamailiraq.com.

Strategic Victimhood in Sudan

By Alan J. Kuperman
Op-Ed Contributor
The New York Times
May 31, 2006

THOUSANDS of Americans who wear green wristbands and demand military intervention to stop Sudan's Arab government from perpetrating genocide against black tribes in Darfur must be perplexed by recent developments.

Without such intervention, Sudan's government last month agreed to a peace accord pledging to disarm Arab janjaweed militias and resettle displaced civilians. By contrast, Darfur's black rebels, who are touted by the wristband crowd as freedom fighters, rejected the deal because it did not give them full regional control. Put simply, the rebels were willing to let genocide continue against their own people rather than compromise their demand for power.

International mediators were shamefaced. They had presented the plan as take it or leave it, to compel Khartoum's acceptance. But now the ostensible representatives of the victims were balking. Embarrassed American officials were forced to ask Sudan for further concessions beyond the ultimatum that it had already accepted.

Fortunately, Khartoum again acquiesced. But two of Darfur's three main rebel groups still rejected peace. Frustrated American negotiators accentuated the positive — the strongest rebel group did sign — and expressed hope that the dissenters would soon join.

But that hope was crushed last week when the rebels viciously turned on each other. As this newspaper reported, "The rebels have unleashed a tide of violence against the very civilians they once joined forces to protect."

Seemingly bizarre, this rejection of peace by factions claiming to seek it is actually revelatory. It helps explain why violence originally broke out in Darfur, how the Save Darfur movement unintentionally poured fuel on the fire, and what can be done to stanch genocidal violence in Sudan and elsewhere.

Darfur was never the simplistic morality tale purveyed by the news media and humanitarian organizations. The region's blacks, painted as long-suffering victims, actually were the oppressors less than two decades ago — denying Arab nomads access to grazing areas essential to their survival. Violence was initiated not by Arab militias but by the black rebels who in 2003 attacked police and military installations. The most extreme Islamists are not in the government but in a faction of the rebels sponsored by former Deputy Prime Minister Hassan al-Turabi, after he was expelled from the regime. Cease-fires often have been violated first by the rebels, not the government, which has pledged repeatedly to admit international peacekeepers if the rebels halt their attacks.

This reality has been obscured by Sudan's criminally irresponsible reaction to the rebellion: arming militias to carry out a scorched-earth counterinsurgency. These Arab forces, who already resented the black tribes over past land disputes and recent attacks, were only too happy to rape and pillage any village suspected of supporting the rebels.

In light of janjaweed atrocities, it is natural to romanticize the other side as freedom fighters. But Darfur's rebels do not deserve that title. They took up arms not to stop genocide — which erupted only after they rebelled — but to gain tribal domination.

The strongest faction, representing the minority Zaghawa tribe, signed the sweetened peace deal in hopes of legitimizing its claim to control Darfur. But that claim is vehemently opposed by rebels representing the larger Fur tribe. Such internecine disputes only recently hit the headlines, but the rebels have long wasted resources fighting each other rather than protecting their people.

Advocates of intervention play down rebel responsibility because it is easier to build support for stopping genocide than for becoming entangled in yet another messy civil war. But their persistent calls for intervention have actually worsened the violence.

The rebels, much weaker than the government, would logically have sued for peace long ago. Because of the Save Darfur movement, however, the rebels believe that the longer they provoke genocidal retaliation, the more the West will pressure Sudan to hand them control of the region. Sadly, this message was reinforced when the rebels' initial rejection of peace last month was rewarded by American officials' extracting further concessions from Khartoum.

The key to rescuing Darfur is to reverse these perverse incentives. Spoiler rebels should be told that the game is over, and that further resistance will no longer be rewarded but punished by the loss of posts reserved for them in the peace agreement.

Ultimately, if the rebels refuse, military force will be required to defeat them. But this is no job for United Nations peacekeepers. Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia show that even the United States military cannot stamp out Islamic rebels on their home turf; second-rate international troops would stand even less chance.

Rather, we should let Sudan's army handle any recalcitrant rebels, on condition that it eschew war crimes. This option will be distasteful to many, but Sudan has signed a peace treaty, so it deserves the right to defend its sovereignty against rebels who refuse to, so long as it observes the treaty and the laws of war.

Indeed, to avoid further catastrophes like Darfur, the United States should announce a policy of never intervening to help provocative rebels, diplomatically or militarily, so long as opposing armies avoid excessive retaliation. This would encourage restraint on both sides. Instead we should redirect intervention resources to support "people power" movements that pursue change peacefully, as they have done successfully over the past two decades in the Philippines, Indonesia, Serbia and elsewhere.

America, born in revolution, has a soft spot for rebels who claim to be freedom fighters, including those in Darfur. But to reduce genocidal violence, we must withhold support for the cynical provocations of militants who bear little resemblance to our founders.

Alan J. Kuperman, an assistant professor of public affairs at the University of Texas, is an editor of "Gambling on Humanitarian Intervention: Moral Hazard, Rebellion and Civil War."

Tuesday, May 30, 2006

In the Village of Nowhere, a Fate Soon Sealed

Wall to Enclose Palestinians Inside Jewish State
By Scott Wilson
Washington Post Foreign Service
Tuesday, May 30, 2006; A01

NUAMAN, West Bank -- For generations, first in caves hollowed from hillsides, then shepherds' tents and simple stone houses, the Shawarwa and Darawi families thrived here amid pine windbreaks, olive orchards and flocks of sheep. On a hill of their own, they worked, married and raised children.

Jamal Darawi was born here in a weathered house in June 1967, the same month Israel triumphed in the Middle East war. In the conflict, Israel's army seized East Jerusalem and the West Bank from Jordan. Soon, the Israeli government drew a larger municipal boundary around Jerusalem, annexing the lands to the Jewish state, including Darawi's home.

But Israel did not take the people of Nuaman. An Israeli military census right after the war registered families here as West Bank residents, even though their village fell inside Jerusalem's new borders. As a result, the Israeli government has never offered them the right to live in the city, apply for Israeli citizenship or vote in Jerusalem, rights given to Palestinians in other annexed neighborhoods.

For many, it was a distant problem, and as the years passed on Nuaman's single street, the residents did little about it. But now their lives in the village are threatened. Israel's separation barrier is rising along the eastern edge of the village, sealing them inside the Jewish state.

In the valley below Darawi's home, backhoes are preparing the way for the tall fence, which traces a chalky stripe across the far hillside. Soon, the 200 people will be cut off from the Palestinian territories where Israel says they live, enclosed within a state where they have no right to be. This is the village of nowhere.

"All of our life has been changed," said Darawi, 38, a farmer, father and political activist. "The purpose of what is being done here now is to empty this place of its people."

This solitary village on a windswept plateau between Bethlehem and Jerusalem captures in microcosm the accelerating dislocation of Palestinian communities along the Israeli separation barrier now dividing the land with chain link and concrete. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert says the 456-mile barrier will roughly define the final eastern border of Israel.

The 1993 Oslo accords began a process of separation between Israel and the Palestinians and established a semiautonomous Palestinian government in the occupied territories. But the Palestinian uprising that began in 2000, including suicide bomb attacks on Israeli civilians, led Israel to build a towering barrier to keep Palestinians out. The course of the wall, drawn by Israel, is now also separating thousands of Palestinians from their property and from each other.

The Israeli government says the barrier -- in some places a 26-foot-high concrete wall -- runs along a course designed to protect Israel from Palestinian attacks, which have dropped dramatically since construction began. Only a quarter of the barrier follows the pre-1967 borders. Along the rest, it cuts into land Palestinians envision as part of their future state, according to the United Nations.

Approximately one-third of the barrier's route has been challenged in court by Palestinians and Israeli civil rights groups on the grounds that it is based more on annexing Palestinian land than safeguarding Israeli citizens.

As it skirts the edge of this village, the nearly complete barrier is a 10-foot-high chain-link fence with electronic sensors and an 82-foot-wide military buffer running along each side. Construction of the fence, along with a new road for Jewish settlers commuting to Jerusalem and a crossing terminal, has consumed acres of valley and hillside once used by families here for agriculture.

In Jerusalem, the barrier has cast a shadow across the daily lives of thousands of Palestinians. Once complete, it will leave roughly 140,000 Palestinians with Jerusalem residency rights on the West Bank side, forcing them to pass through Israeli-controlled checkpoints along the wall to reach jobs, families and classrooms in the city. Another 110,000 will remain on Israel's side of the barrier with equally uncertain access to the West Bank.

Idyllic and isolated by layers of hills, Nuaman is a mix of two dozen aging stone houses and grander homes of a younger generation, clustered along the one-lane road that dips toward the valley below. Tilled plots of vegetables, olive trees and lemon groves line the back yards, and on weekends they fill with parents and children helping with harvests. Stands of cypress surround small graveyards on the hillside above and in the valley below.

This village lies close enough to Jerusalem's Old City that some of its men travel by foot to the al-Aqsa mosque each Friday to pray. On nearby hillsides, topped with minarets and watchtowers, camels graze in the twilight shadows cast by apartment towers in the Jewish settlement of Har Homa. The fence draws tighter each day.

"This village," said Labib Habib, a lawyer representing the residents, "will not survive."

'The Original Owners'

In sandals, Darawi negotiated the rocky hillside beneath his house one recent afternoon holding the hand of his 5-year-old daughter, Yara. The slope bloomed with wildflowers and spring wheat under his feet.

The landmarks on the hillside, he said during the walking tour, tell the story of his family's claim to the land.

Darawi is tall and broad, round around the middle with thick hands and a smile that rarely appears unless his three children are nearby. His hair recedes in a black widow's peak, and his bristly mustache is streaked with gray.

In silence, he made his way to an opening in the hillside, ducking into a cavern with rough walls blackened by a thousand cooking fires. The outlines of an animal pen appeared in one corner. Across its length sat the stone oven where his grandmother baked bread as recently as three decades ago.

"We are the original owners of this land," Darawi said, emerging from the cavern and ascending toward a stone house with shuttered windows and grassy tufts sprouting from the roof. A stone above the door, etched with a crescent moon and Arabic script, says the house belongs to Suleiman Darawi, Jamal's grandfather. It was built, according to a date on the stone, in 1963.

Darawi grew up walking to schools in East Jerusalem. He participated in demonstrations protesting Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon and marking the anniversary of the 1967 war. He attended university in the territories and in Jordan, receiving his undergraduate degree in 1987. That December, a Palestinian uprising against the Israeli occupation broke out and his plans to work in a medical laboratory suddenly changed. He joined the ranks of the Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine, a radical nationalist movement with a Marxist orientation. At 21, Darawi began his first of four stints in Israeli prisons, held without charge, he said, for participating in the uprising.

After the 1993 accords, he joined the newly established Palestinian Authority, where he now works as a political organizer in Bethlehem, a city that will soon lie on the West Bank side of the fence. Even now, his work is reachable only by passing through an Israeli military checkpoint.

As he returned home from Bethlehem with his toddler son, Suleiman, and some Palestinian laborers last month, Darawi said, soldiers at the checkpoint ordered them out of his Isuzu Trooper. The soldiers began a search and then told the men to lift their T-shirts, though Darawi refused as his son looked on. The others obeyed.

"I have my dignity," he said. "I have my self-respect and I won't take my clothes off for them."

Erased From the Map

Darawi was an infant when Israeli soldiers arrived in the weeks after the war with pens and notepads to carry out a census. The troubles of the village can be traced to that day.

At the time the war broke out, the village was located in Jordan. Some of the village men were working construction in Amman, the capital, and were unable to return for years after Israel occupied the land. According to aerial photographs taken in August 1967 by Israel's mapping agency, 13 houses ran along the ridge. While showing that the houses existed, the photos have not resolved the question of who lived in them at the time.

The soldiers registered the people they found there as residents of Um A-Talla, a West Bank village where the head of their clan lived. Israel then renamed the village Mazmuriya for a Roman archaeological site nearby, erasing Nuaman from the map.

Whether a clerical error or deliberate, the West Bank residency classification deprived the families of the right to live, vote in municipal elections and work in Jerusalem that thousands of other Palestinians in the city's annexed neighborhoods received.

Sabin Hadad, a spokeswoman for Israel's Interior Ministry, said that "either they were not there when the census took place or they did not live there continuously, and therefore did not enjoy the right to obtain an Israeli ID."

"The fact that they now live in Israel does not make them automatic Israeli residents, just as living in the United States does not grant you automatic rights of citizenship or residency," Hadad said.

A Settlement Rises

Yusef Darawi's mobile phone rang.

The voice on the other end came in angry shouts -- his boss. Yusef's almond eyes looked into his lap.

"We're under pressure," he said, snapping his phone shut with calloused hands. "We're behind schedule because they won't let us in." He had been denied passage through a checkpoint to work on a construction site.

Yusef was born in the house behind his own 41 years ago, one of 15 children of a father with two wives. Now he was helping build a Jewish settlement planned in the years after Oslo that, according to its development plan, would likely displace his own village one day.

Throughout Israel and the territories, peace seemed a possibility after the Oslo accords. The village of Nuaman had grown to 25 homes by then. Young men like Yusef were starting their own families and building multistory houses next to the squat one-room cottages they were born in.

Then one day, within a year of the Oslo accords, a pair of Israeli building inspectors arrived at the unfinished home of Mahmoud Atiyeh Shawarwa, one of Yusef's many distant cousins. The inspectors ordered the construction, which Shawarwa was doing himself, to stop for lack of building permits granted by the city of Jerusalem.

"We never knew this was part of Jerusalem until they told us that," Yusef recalled. "The inspector who told us was surprised to see we had West Bank identification. We told him everyone here did."

Some residents began appealing to the Interior Ministry for residency rights, though none were successful. All building in the village was frozen. On a hilltop, construction for the Jewish settlement expansion began rising. It is now visible from the window of Yusef's comfortable living room.

Israeli planning maps show that Har Homa's "D" neighborhood is to be built in the years ahead on the hilltop where his home is now. Yusef runs a 30-person construction crew at the site of the settlement, but on this day Israel had closed the territories and kept his men from reaching the job, despite their permits.

"No one wants to work on land that belongs to Arabs," Yusef, a father of six, said with a thin smile. "But you have to feed your family."

The Daily Crossing

By 6:30 a.m., clusters of children began gathering outside homes and filing onto the road in the village. Samar and Yara Darawi, Jamal's daughters, were among the bundled crowd.

Students from the village went to school in Jerusalem for years. In 1995, two years after the Oslo accords, the Israelis began turning them away. The students lived inside the city limits, but the Israelis said their parents held West Bank residency documents, based on the census decades earlier, and the children were no longer allowed in Jerusalem schools.

After Oslo, as the two societies began a complicated separation, Nuaman found itself in a crack between them. Although the village was part of Jerusalem, the Palestinian Authority assumed responsibility for its water, electricity and telephone services. Village residents turned to Bethlehem for medical care, but were forced to navigate new Israeli checkpoints along the one road to the outside world.

In her blue-and-white striped school smock, Samar, along with her sister and cousins, walked pensively across the valley -- out of Jerusalem and into the West Bank. The children cast shifting shadows against the exposed hillside, carved out for the new road. Once the fence is complete, the children of Nuaman will have to pass through a chain-link barrier, manned by Israeli soldiers, to reach their school.

On this day, however, the soldiers were huddled against the chill, inside an armored personnel carrier that sat near the site where the terminal will be built. Coils of concertina wire marked the location.

Only the patter of light footsteps sounded as the children wound their way down the road to the valley floor, Samar's long single braid bouncing against her pink backpack. Two days earlier, the Darawi girls had not gone to school because they were frightened to cross the Israeli checkpoint. Samar, flushed cheeks beneath brown eyes, said Israeli soldiers had searched her backpack and torn up a map of historic Palestine she had inside.

This day the soldiers waved and smiled at the children. As they climbed past a small graveyard, the mood lightened. Samar and her friends began jostling each other along the footpath, laughing and shouting. Yara turned toward kindergarten, housed in the town council building. Samar and the others stopped at a corner grocery to buy grape drinks and lollipops.

"Now there is no fear," Samar said. "We have passed."

A Narrowing Existence

The authorities came to Raed Shawarwa's house, a smooth concrete cube behind his father's, while he was on a job hours away. His wife received them nervously on a March day in 2004. The house, they said, would have to be torn down.

"The Jews told us we had no building permits," said Shawarwa, a cousin of Mahmoud and a distant cousin of the Darawis. "But no one here does."

For years, the village had been growing slowly, clandestinely, despite the 1993 Israeli orders to cease construction. Village sons like Yusef Darawi married and brought their brides from surrounding towns, some with Jerusalem residency. Families grew larger. Today, children's tiny purple pants and school smocks dry on lines strung beneath vine-laced trellises outside many of the homes in the warm evening.

The construction to enlarge homes and accommodate the population growth was done without permits, which Arab residents receive from the Jerusalem municipality only with great difficulty. City officials say the decisions are based on planning criteria. But human rights groups counter that denying permits is a way to limit Arab population growth and increase the proportion of the city's Jewish residents.

An Israeli organization that tracks home demolitions reports that the Jerusalem municipality has destroyed 467 homes that it says were built without permits since 2000 -- the year the second Palestinian uprising began.

As the intifada intensified around him, Shawarwa had more immediate concerns -- saving his house, which with his slight savings, he had built himself. He commuted several hours each day to Ramallah, where, as a heavy-machinery operator on a construction crew, he made far more than in Bethlehem. In a good month, he says, he brings home $225.

Shawarwa appeared in court in 2004 in a bid to make his house legal. He was fined the equivalent of $6,000, more than two years' salary, and the house was ordered sealed until permits could be arranged. Raed bricked up his own windows.

"I felt like I was killing myself," Shawarwa said over warm flat bread and tea under an olive tree on his doorstep.

The house is still sealed two years later. When he went to the Jerusalem municipality to arrange for permits, he discovered he lived nowhere.

"The people there told us we didn't belong to Jerusalem but to Bethlehem," said Shawarwa, who is still paying off his fine in monthly increments. "When we went to Bethlehem, they told us we belong to Jerusalem. So we learned that we don't belong to either side."

Last year, a lawyer for Nuaman and the Israeli government reached an agreement that would allow the families to apply for Jerusalem residency without a guarantee of success, a risky proposition given that failure would likely cost them their homes. The status of the agreement appears uncertain now, and the villagers have appealed to the Jerusalem municipality for the fence to be rerouted in a way that leaves them in the West Bank.

Life in the village, meanwhile, is narrowing.

At the end of April, Israeli work crews installed a steel gate at one end of the road into the village. A lock and chain appeared on it a week later, the only keys in the hands of border police and the work crews in the valley below. No taxis, buses or private vehicles that do not belong to village residents are allowed in.

The village has been without running water for much of this month, shut off by the construction crews working below. Lowering buckets into makeshift backyard wells, men and women fetch their own water just as their parents and grandparents did on the same hilltop decades ago.

Lives Dismantled

Nidal Darawi, a schoolteacher, married in late 2005. The newlyweds added a kitchen to the small house he had built eight years earlier without permits. But the construction job drew the notice of passing border police patrols. The demolition team arrived soon after, on the last day of January.

Using a backhoe, the crew dismantled the house as the family and soldiers looked on. The carefully tended rosebushes rimming the property remain intact, surrounding a heap of rubble and twisted rebar.

"This is a threat to Israel?" asked Yusef Darawi, a brother, looking over the wreckage of the house in the lot behind his own. "This was his blood and the blood of his children -- all of his savings."

Saddam-Era General Eyed For Defense Ministry

By Sharon Behn
Washington Times
May 29, 2006

BAGHDAD -- Iraq's political leaders have asked at least one Sunni Saddam-era general to consider returning to Iraq from abroad to run the powerful Ministry of Defense, U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad said yesterday.

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki also has given his approval, in principle, to a new security plan for Baghdad prepared by U.S. and Iraqi advisers, Mr. Khalilzad told The Washington Times in an interview at his office in Baghdad.

The plan, still being fine-tuned, stresses ways to identify those behind the violence in the capital -- including militias, gangs and terrorists -- and make the cost of their actions prohibitive.

Mr. al-Maliki also intends to tighten up Iraq's porous border with Iran, in an attempt to stop the flow of terrorists and sophisticated weapons into the country, the ambassador said.

A Sunni source close to several exiled generals who served in dictator Saddam Hussein's Ba'athist regime said Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice met with some of those generals during a late February visit to Saudi Arabia to discuss a return to Iraq.

State Department officials said they were "not aware" of such a meeting.

"I think that a couple of people have come from abroad for interviews that I'm aware of," Mr. Khalilzad said in his modest but comfortable office in what was once one of Saddam's elaborate palaces.

"One is a former general, Nuri Al-Dulemi, and also another retired general, Mr. Rubaie," the ambassador said.

Mr. Duleimi, a Sunni, is living in the United Arab Emirates, and Mr. Rubaie is living in Britain. The ambassador did not provide Mr. Rubaie's first name.

Government officials have said they most likely would pick a Sunni to lead the Defense Ministry and a Shi'ite to lead the Interior Ministry.

Mr. al-Maliki, a tough-talking Shi'ite who was sworn in with his Cabinet last week, has made security his top priority. But he has struggled to reach a governmentwide consensus on who should lead the two top security posts and, yesterday, failed to meet a deadline for filling the portfolios.

Mr. Khalilzad said the search likely would take a few more days, but cautioned that the political process -- although it has helped divide the Sunni-driven insurgency -- would not be enough to end an uprising that has left thousands dead.

"For the insurgency to end, there has to be a program of national reconciliation with emphasis on unity, for the insurgents have to be engaged and convinced to lay down their arms," the ambassador said.

"And for the other unauthorized military formations and militias, there has to be a decommissioning demobilization and reintegration plan. There have to be steps with regards to de-Ba'athification. There has to be an overall plan with different elements and sequenced appropriately to end this conflict."

Mr. Khalilzad said that Mr. al-Maliki had, in principle, approved a plan presented to him by U.S. and Iraqi officials on Thursday for enhancing security in Baghdad.

"It's going to be operationalized, turned into an operational plan, in the coming period and then taken back to him for final approval," he said.

"The key issue is how to convince those involved in these sectarian killings and so on that it's risky business to get involved in this. And those will be punished, to deter them, because you can't prevent [it], you can't have security forces protecting each house in Baghdad, so the strategy has to have the intent of deterring people from doing this."

The ambassador said Iran has become a corridor into Iraq for terrorists coming from Pakistan and Afghanistan and is providing training and money for terrorist groups in Iraq.

"I am not alleging that that is being facilitated by the government of Iran, but they do come through. But I believe that with Ansar al-Sunnah, it would be surprising that the government did not know of their presence in northwest Iran and coming across," he said.

The terrorist group Ansar al-Sunnah, which is linked to al Qaeda, operates in northern Iraq along the Iran border.

"Iran has some negative aspects with regard to its policy here. It has ties to extremists, including some militias. It supports some of these extremist groups and militias with arms, including the deadly EFP technology," he said, referring to explosively formed projectiles, a particularly lethal form of bomb technology being used against U.S. forces in Iraq. "[Iran] provides money; it provides training. This is not good for Iraq; it's not good for the world."

Mr. Khalilzad is largely credited for having shepherded the Iraqi national elections and government-forming process through a series of sectarian and ethnic hurdles.

He said he never doubted that all the factions would come together.

"There were times that I thought this was taking too long, that they had to accelerate the process, come to a decision at a faster pace, but no, never that they would never come to an agreement. The question was not whether, but when," he said.

Egypt's Democrats Feel Betrayed

Bret Stephens
Wall Street Journal
30 May 2006

This month, in Cairo, pro-democracy activists such as 39-year-old Ahmed Salah of the Egyptian Movement for Change and dozens of his colleagues were beaten, arrested, and detained - ostensibly for congregating publicly in groups larger than five. Ayman Nour, the imprisoned liberal politician who ran second to Mubarak in last September's rigged presidential election, lost his final appeal against a five-year prison sentence on forgery charges. Speak to opposition figures in Egypt and the sense of American betrayal is palpable.

According to Gameela Ismail, a prominent journalist and Nour's wife, the culprit here is Gamal Mubarak, who despite avowals to the contrary is setting himself up as his father's successor. She also notes that despite the billions the U.S. provides Egypt, the Mubarak regime continues to stoke anti-American sentiment in its press campaigns against Nour. "They call my husband, 'Nour, the spy of the U.S.'" The regime needs to destroy liberal opponents such as Nour so that Hosni Mubarak, and eventually his son, can present themselves to the U.S. as the only viable bulwark against the Muslim Brotherhood. The regime and the Brotherhood depend on one another to exclude any decent middle way.

Monday, May 29, 2006

The Case for Bargaining With Iran

By Joschka Fischer
The Washington Post
Monday, May 29, 2006; A23

The Iran crisis is moving fast in an alarming direction. There can no longer be any reasonable doubt that Iran's ambition is to obtain nuclear weapons capability. At the heart of the issue lies the Iranian regime's aspiration to become a hegemonic Islamic and regional power and thereby position itself at eye level with the world's most powerful nations. It is precisely this ambition that sets Iran apart from North Korea: Whereas North Korea seeks nuclear weapons capability to entrench its own isolation, Iran is aiming for regional dominance and more.

Iran is betting on revolutionary changes within the power structure of the Middle East to help it achieve its strategic goal. To this end, it makes use of Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as well as Lebanon, Syria, its influence in the Persian Gulf region and, above all, Iraq. This combination of hegemonic aspirations, questioning of the regional status quo and a nuclear program is extremely dangerous.

Iran's acquisition of a nuclear bomb -- or even its ability to produce one -- would be interpreted by Israel as a fundamental threat to its existence, thereby compelling the West, and Europe in particular, to take sides. Europe has not only historical moral obligations to Israel but also security interests that link it to the strategically vital Eastern Mediterranean. Moreover, a nuclear Iran would be perceived as a threat by its other neighbors, which would probably provoke a regional arms race and fuel regional volatility further. In short, nuclear Iran would call Europe's fundamental security into question. To believe that Europe could keep out of this conflict is a dangerous illusion.

In this crisis, the stakes are high, which is why Germany, Britain and France began negotiations with Iran two years ago with the goal of persuading it to abandon its efforts to close the nuclear fuel cycle. This initiative failed for two reasons. First, the European offer to open up technology and trade, including the peaceful use of nuclear technology, was disproportionate to Iran's fundamental fear of regime change on the one hand and its regional hegemonic aspirations and quest for global prestige on the other. Second, the disastrous U.S.-led war in Iraq has caused Iran's leaders to conclude that the leading Western power has been weakened to the point that it is dependent on Iran's goodwill and that high oil prices have made the West all the more wary of a serious confrontation.

The Iranian regime's analysis may prove to be a dangerous miscalculation, because it is likely to lead sooner rather than later to a "hot" confrontation that Iran simply cannot win. After all, the issue at the heart of this conflict is this: Who dominates the Middle East -- Iran or the United States? Iran's leaders underestimate the explosive nature of this issue for the United States as a global power and thus for its own future.

Nor is the debate about the military option -- destruction of Iran's nuclear program through U.S. airstrikes -- conducive to resolving the issue. Rather, it rings of a self-fulfilling prophecy. There is no guarantee that attempts to destroy Iran's nuclear potential and thus its capability for a nuclear breakout would succeed. Moreover, as a victim of foreign aggression, Iran's nuclear weapons ambitions would be fully legitimized. Finally, a military attack on Iran would mark the beginning of a regional, and possibly global, military and terrorist escalation -- a nightmare for all concerned.

So what should be done? There remains a serious chance for a diplomatic solution if the United States, in cooperation with the Europeans and with the support of the U.N. Security Council and the non-aligned states of the Group of 77, offers Iran a "grand bargain." In exchange for long-term suspension of uranium enrichment, Iran and other states would gain access to research and technology within an internationally defined framework and under comprehensive supervision by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Full normalization of political and economic relations would follow, including binding security guarantees upon agreement of a regional security design.

The high price for refusing such a proposal has to be made absolutely clear to the Iranian leadership: Should no agreement be reached, the West would do everything in its power to isolate Iran economically, financially, technologically and diplomatically, with the full support of the international community. Iran's alternatives should be no less than recognition and security or total isolation.

Presenting Iran with these alternatives presupposes that the West does not fear rising oil and gas prices. Indeed, the two other options -- Iran's emergence as a nuclear power or the use of military force to prevent this -- would, in addition to all the other horrible consequences, increase oil and gas prices. Everything speaks in favor of playing the economic-financial and technology card vis-à-vis Iran.

Knowledge of the potentially horrible consequences of a military confrontation and of the equally horrific consequences of Iranian possession of the atomic bomb must force the United States to abandon its policy of no direct negotiations and its hope for regime change. It is not enough for the Europeans to act while the Americans continue to look on as the diplomatic initiatives unfold, partaking in discussion only behind the scenes and ultimately letting the Europeans do what they will. The Bush administration must lead the Western initiative in harmonized, direct negotiations with Iran, and, if these negotiations succeed, the United States must also be willing to agree to appropriate guarantees. In this confrontation, international credibility and legitimacy will be the deciding factors, and ensuring them will require farsighted and cool, calculated American leadership.

An offer of a "grand bargain" would unite the international community and present Iran with a convincing alternative. Were Iran to accept, its suspension of nuclear research in Natanz while negotiations are ongoing would be the litmus test of its sincerity. Were Iran to refuse the offer or fail to honor its obligations, it would totally isolate itself internationally and provide emphatic legitimization to further measures. Neither Russia nor China could avoid showing solidarity within the Security Council.

But such an initiative can succeed only if the American administration assumes leadership among the Western nations and sits down at the negotiating table with Iran. Even then, the international community would not have long to act. As all sides must be aware, time is running out for a diplomatic solution.

The writer was Germany's foreign minister and vice chancellor from 1998 to 2005 and was a leader in the Green Party for nearly 20 years.