Inside U.S. War Plans
washingtonpost.com
"Do Pentagon war planners game-play war against Venezuela? Of course they do," says WS, commenting on my blog saying that the Pentagon was newly eyeing Venezuela as a military threat and initiating war planning, "they probably game-play war against the Swiss!"
"I'd guess that there are hundreds of contingency plans in existence," Dave comments, "perhaps … even including some developed to respond to changes in our current allies' positions."
WS and Dave credit the Pentagon with far more prescience and capability then it actually possesses. Though there is an awful lot of contingency planning going on in this military-first, post 9/11 world, there aren't plans for every country or even for every potentially hostile country.
On the other hand, under Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the military has made radical changes in both its methods of war planning and the plans themselves, a move that ultimately eases the ability of the government to take military action. Since the act of preparing a war plan for a country like Venezuela has such profound political consequences, it is a system that requires much greater transparency. Here is my small contribution:
According to Pentagon documents, my research and a lot of educated guesswork, the United States military currently has some 70 overall plans. These plans themselves take many forms, some being full-fledged war plans, others short fused "strategic concepts" for plans.
Of the 70 operations plans, only 48 are actual plans contemplating combat with other countries. That is because 10 plans deal with the air defense of the United States, homeland defense and other domestic defense tasks while 11 are generic "functional" plans (FUNCPLANs) dealing with humanitarian assistance, counter-narcotics, peacekeeping, and other military operations in "permissive" environments.
Of the 48, five are what are called "complete" OPLANs, or operations plans. OPLANs are prepared for specific threats (that is, specific countries) of "compelling national interest" where prospective large scale operations demand detailed planning, actual target lists, and the logistics and choreography worked out for a conflict.
Of the five current OPLANs (and that is all that there are), one is the United States nuclear war plan (OPLAN 8044, and sometimes known as the Single Integrated Operational Plan or SIOP). Two are contingencies in Asia, one regarding defense of South Korea against a North Korea invasion (OPLAN 5027) and the other presumably a different Korean peninsula scenario (OPLAN 5077). Two war plans exist for the Middle East: one for Iraq (OPLAN 1003) that has already been implemented and another for an unknown contingency, possibly Iran. A sixth OPLAN (OPLAN 2002) exists, but it deals purely with homeland defense.
Thirty-nine of the remaining 43 plans are what are called CONPLANs, "Operations Plans in Concept Form Only." These are operations plans in an abbreviated format prepared for less compelling contingencies, plausible but not likely in the near term. CONPLANs can be prepared for smaller scale operations as well as for what are called non-specific threats.
In addition to OPLANs and CONPLANs, there are four "strategic concepts" that have been more recently prepared. Though every OPLAN and CONPLAN includes the commander's statement of his strategic concept, stand alone strategic concepts are a post 9/11 invention allowing regional commanders to develop plan concepts, enemy estimates, alternative courses of action, and target lists prior to the completion of a CONPLAN or OPLAN.
By regional command, the OPLANs, CONPLANs, and Strategic Concepts plans are broken down as follows:
Central Command (Middle East): 2 OPLANs, 7 CONPLANs, 2 strategic concepts
European Command: 10 CONPLANs
Pacific Command: 2 OPLANs, 12 CONPLANs, 2 strategic concepts
Southern Command (Latin America): 7 CONPLANs
U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), in addition to preparing the central nuclear war plan (OPLAN 8044), also has responsibility for three global CONPLANs, one for nuclear and conventional "global strike" (CONPLAN 8022), which is the implementation of the Bush administration's policy of preemption, one for ballistic missile defense (CONPLAN 8055), and one of unknown nomenclature (CONPLAN 80??) presumably for "information operations," or cyber warfare, STRATCOM's newly assigned global mission.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff organization is also responsible for two weapons of mass destruction plans, one (CONPLAN 0400) dealing with offensive counter-proliferation and the other (CONPLAN 0300) for special operations support in the event of a WMD incident. A third JCS CONPLAN is for unknown purposes. Finally, it is presumed that the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) has a newly produced CONPLAN to fight the global war on terrorism.
For some contingencies, such as North Korea, there are multiple OPLANs and CONPLANs: CONPLAN 5026, 5027, 5029, and 5030 are all known to deal with different Korean peninsula scenarios. There are also specific OPLANs and CONPLANs for Iraq.
You must be thinking if you've kept up with the arithmetic that with some 30 plans left, clearly there is room for Venezuela. Not so quick. Each of the commands has war plans for the "defense" of key allies: CONPLAN 4305 exists for the defense of Israel; CONPLAN 5055 seems to deal with the defense of Japan. Add up U.S. treaty commitments and deployments, and the number now shrinks to about 20.
Then there are the one or two generic CONPLANs each command has to guide unassigned small scale contingencies. European command, in addition, has a new set of "non-specific" CONPLANs dealing with potential regional action in the Transcaucasus, the Baltics, West Africa, Equatorial Africa and Southern Africa. Pacific Command has regional plans for South Asia, the Southeast Asia mainland, and Southeast Asian islands. Central Command has a regional plan for the Horn of Africa; Southern Command has one for the Caribbean.
So there are no more than ten plans that deal with specific "threats" and that has to accommodate one or more plans for Iran and China, possible contingency plans if thing go sour with Russia, additional contingencies dealing with Syria and Cuba, and yes, even Venezuela.
So on the one hand there are generic contingencies for virtually every corner of the planet, as well as war plans supporting transnational global combat -- preemption, cyber warfare, the war on terrorism -- that cross command boundaries and can apply to more than one country.
On the other, there are only a limited number of staff officers and a limited amount of resources. A decision to undertake serious planning for a new contingency -- such as a Venezuela -- is a big one. It is particularly burdensome on the intelligence community, which has to produce "threat" estimates and enemy order of battle and target lists.
As planning software improves and the military moves to integrated network operations, the ease with which a plan can be quickly prepared will also increase. Already the Pentagon has shaved the time it takes in the old process to build a plan from 12-22 months to 4-6 months. With Rumsfeld's new "adaptive planning" initiative -- the draft Adaptive Planning Roadmap was approved on March 11 -- a whole new process of quick reaction plans is in the works.
Today, as far as I can surmise, there isn't a contingency plan for Venezuela. But there can be one real soon.
By William M. Arkin | November 4, 2005