Egypt allows George Galloway entry after delay

Reuters
4 February 2006

CAIRO - Egyptian security officials allowed British member of parliament George Galloway to enter the country on Saturday after preventing him from doing so for more than 15 hours, airport officials said.

Galloway’s hosts had increased their efforts to persuade the authorities to allow him to enter while preparations were made in the airport for the prominent opponent of the invasion of Iraq to leave Egypt, the officials said.

“The Egyptian Foreign Ministry became involved in the issue and agreed Galloway could enter the country,” said an airport official who did not want to be named.

Egyptian immigration officials stopped Galloway from entering the country on Friday night because he is on a blacklist, airport sources previously said.

“He was refused entry on grounds of national security, presumably by the secret police,” said Ron McKay, spokesman for Galloway, an advocate of Palestinian rights.

Galloway had flown to Cairo to take part in a mock trial of US President George W. Bush, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and British Prime Minister Tony Blair for their policies in Iraq and the Palestinian territories.

The airport sources said Galloway, who arrived on an Egypt Air flight from London, phoned organisers of the “trial” for help and spent much of the night in a chair.

“He has been held all night, first in the executive lounge, and then in what he described as a kind of cell with several others who he presumed had tried to get into the country illegally,” McKay said.

“He was surprised and of course he’s very angry,” he added.

Galloway has been in Egypt many times before, most recently about six months ago. But he has been very critical of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in the past.

The two-day “trial”, which ends on Saturday, has been organised by the Union of Arab Lawyers, which said former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad was taking part.

Keep up the Pressure on Hamas

By David Makovsky
Senior fellow and director of the Project on the Middle East Peace Process
Washington Institute for Near East Policy
February 3, 2006

Since its parliamentary victory in the West Bank and Gaza last week, the militant Islamic organization Hamas seems to expect that the international community will provide it with diplomatic support and hundreds of millions of dollars in aid without requiring any change in its commitment to Israel's destruction. Hamas, or the Islamic Resistance Movement, judging from its statements, understands that if it can win international support for business as usual, this will mean success in its strategy to sharply lower the bar and allow its extreme ideas to gradually enter the mainstream of civilized discourse.

For example, it would mean that targeting innocent Israeli civilians would be accepted if it is called "resistance" and that not recognizing Israel's existence—which has been a prerequisite for Palestinians to win broader international approval—would be tolerated.

When Hamas says the most that can be hoped for is a truce if Israel yields to all of Hamas' demands, even this idea of peace may be deemed too ambitious. This must not be tolerated.

Further, a soft international stance on Hamas would break faith with Palestinian moderates, who repeatedly lectured radicals that a refusal to recognize Israel's existence would guarantee the Palestinians pariah status.

If there is no pressure for Hamas to make tough decisions, the moderates will be severely marginalized. The pressure to make hard choices is aimed not only at hardcore ideologues who may not yield easily on religious issues but also at those Palestinians who voted for Hamas because of its aversion to corruption. The Palestinian public needs to see the price of misplaced support. Much is at stake.

Fortunately, there are preliminary signs that the international community does not want Hamas to be spared the consequences of its victory.

The Bush administration got off to a good start with its orchestrated summit in London on Monday. The Quartet—the United States, the European Union, Russia and the United Nations—made clear that aid to the Palestinian Authority "would be reviewed by donors against [the] government's commitment to the principles of nonviolence, recognition of Israel and acceptance of previous agreements and obligations including the road map [to peace]."

But such a statement should be only the beginning, not the end. It will not be easy. Since a new Palestinian government has not yet been formed, the Quartet has not yet been put to the test of making decisions on funding, which could strain trans-Atlantic unity.

On many issues, as one European official admitted to me, the European penchant is "to walk softly and carry a big carrot." This is often true on the Palestinian issue; the EU looked away from Palestinian corruption. Europe has tended to view the conflict as a Palestinian David facing an Israeli Goliath—giving Palestinians, not Israelis, the benefit of the doubt.

Frequent trans-Atlantic consultations seem useful to prevent European backsliding. Such backsliding is more likely to occur either after the formation of a Hamas government, when the funding issue is acute, or after the March 28 Israeli elections. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has pledged humanitarian provisions, which could ease subsequent trans-Atlantic differences.

The key for the United States is managing a set of relationships to ensure that the trans-Atlantic consensus remains and that key Arab states realize that Washington is watching carefully how they deal with Hamas. Otherwise, Hamas will be able to drive a wedge, and the United States will be outmaneuvered.

Hamas, which enjoys a long-standing relationship with Iran, reportedly turned to Tehran in December for a sharp increase in aid. A decision by the Quartet to halt aid to Hamas won't drive Hamas closer into the arms of Iran because it's already there. Tehran may try to counter any Palestinian budget shortfalls because it views Hamas' victory as a regional windfall for Islamism and anti-Israel activity.

The Palestinian Authority receives $900 million a year from international donors, and Iran gives at least $150 million annually to its favorite terror group, Hezbollah.

If Iran does not come through, it is also possible that Hamas will seek to court the only other major source of funding potentially available to the group—the Persian Gulf countries, which are flush with oil revenues. All of them cherish their relationship with the United States, and it would be useful if Washington warned them that aid to Hamas carries a diplomatic price. Arab states should follow the lead of Egypt, which made clear that Hamas must recognize Israel and halt violence.

According to the World Bank, there are no people who have received more per capita largesse from the world in the last five years than the Palestinians—$5 billion. This investment stemmed from a belief in a two-state solution, Israel and Palestine. If this commitment is not there, the support will dissipate.

A free election does not mean a free ride.

Between Palestinian and Israeli Elections: Implications for U.S. Policy

Robert Satloff, Dennis Ross, and Michael Herzog
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
February 2, 2006

On January 30, 2006, Robert Satloff, Dennis Ross, and Michael Herzog addressed The Washington Institute’s Special Policy Forum. Dr Satloff is the Institute’s executive director. Ambassador Ross is the Institute’s counselor and Ziegler distinguished fellow. Michael Herzog is a brigadier general in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and a visiting military fellow at the Institute. The following is a rapporteur’s summary of their remarks.

ROBERT SATLOFF

Hamas’s 44.5 percent of the vote in the January 25 Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) elections was, in comparative terms, a landslide—more than Britain’s Labor and Conservative parties ever received under Tony Blair or Margaret Thatcher, and more than U.S. presidents Bill Clinton and Richard Nixon received in their first White House victories. Pollsters tell us that the key issues in the Hamas victory were corruption, provision of services, and law and order, not the confrontation with Israel. In practical terms, the reason for Hamas’s victory matters little; the election empowers a party whose raison d’être is the destruction of the Jewish state.

Given Hamas’s opposition to the existence of Israel and to any agreements that derive from recognizing Israel, its electoral success represents a democratic coup against the institutions of peacemaking. With the Islamist group’s majority of seventy-six seats in the PLC, the Palestinian Authority (PA) will move from a flawed potential partner for peace to an adversary—or, depending on the PA’s behavior, even an enemy. The repercussions will be felt beyond the West Bank and Gaza: among Israel’s Arab population, in Jordan (where the Hamas wing of the Muslim Brotherhood is ascendant), and throughout Arab and Muslim societies. What makes this especially tragic is that this outcome could have been prevented with fully democratic means—i.e., the imposition of strict but legitimate conditions for the participation of any party in the election, including the renunciation of violence and the recognition of Israel’s right to exist.

Hamas was formed in December 1987 to provide the Muslim Brotherhood with a vehicle to participate in the first Palestinian uprising without exposing itself to the risk of fully fledged Israeli retaliation. Hamas exists only as a means of confrontation with Israel, and would revert to being a wing of the Muslim Brotherhood were it to renounce violent resistance. Hamas is tactically flexible but strategically consistent—the eradication of Israel is the prime directive from which Hamas will never waver.

Observers who see a silver lining in Hamas’s victory take one of two positions. The first argues that with the responsibility of government, Hamas will be forced to moderate its position in order to negotiate with the Israelis and deliver on its promises to the Palestinian people. This school of thought mistakes tactics for strategy. Hamas is eager to leverage its victory to strengthen its grip on all levers of control of Palestinian society. Hamas will suspend terrorism against Israelis to achieve its near-term objective of taking over the institutions of power in the West Bank and Gaza; the goal, however, remains the ultimate fight to eradicate any Zionist presence in Palestine.

Other advocates of a “silver lining” argue that Hamas’s experiment in government will prove more difficult than opposition, and its failure to deliver will deal a blow to the Islamist model. This view, however, shows little care for the lives of millions of people who—like the long-suffering people of Iran—may have to live for decades under the rule of Islamist extremists.

In fact, there is no silver lining in the empowerment of an “Islamic Republic of Palestine.”

MICHAEL HERZOG

Hamas’s election victory will create many tensions among Palestinians and with Israel.

The Hamas-Fatah relationship. Fatah currently controls the entire apparatus of the Palestinian government and will be unwilling to abandon its control without a struggle. Fatah officials are likely to reject the idea of taking orders from Hamas, and some leaders—such as the former security chief Mohammad Dahlan—are already positioning themselves for a confrontation. Such a situation promises to foster instability for near and medium terms.

The Hamas-Abbas relationship. Upon his election as PA president in 2005, Abbas promised to instigate a system of one authority, one law, and one gun under the auspices of political pluralism. His failure to do so has led in part to the current situation and has ushered in a period in which Abbas will be maneuvering for his political future and trying to maximize his authority. At the same time, Hamas will depend on Abbas’ reputation and negotiating skills to secure financial aid, communicate with the Israelis, and lend some international legitimacy to the Palestinian cause. If Abbas decides to resign because he is unable to carry out his program, the international community would be faced with the undesirable possibility of a Hamas president in addition to a Hamas-led PLC.

Hamas and Israel. Hamas has stated that it is open to the possibility of negotiations with Israel through a third party. Israel has firmly stated that it will not deal with Hamas in any capacity until the organization renounces violence and accepts Israel’s right to exist. Moreover, the Israeli government has yet to decide whether or not it will pass on the revenues it collects on behalf of the PA (some $40 million–$50 million per month) to a government led by Hamas. Such a situation spells the death of the internationally sponsored Roadmap to peace and is likely to encourage Israel’s increasingly strong reliance on unilateralism. This will mean the completion of the separation barrier, imposition of tighter security measures, and implementation of further unilateral withdrawals from Palestinian territory.

Security implications. The Palestinian security forces number more than 76,000 and are made up of a dysfunctional collection of mostly Fatah loyalists. Many of these men will be unwilling to take orders from Hamas. Hamas is therefore faced with a difficult choice: to confront the lackadaisical security employees and risk a violent confrontation, or to avoid a confrontation and thereby miss an opportunity to monopolize the means of coercion within Palestinian society. Neither path promises a clear outcome; both lead to the possibility of the continued dysfunctionality of the Palestinian security services, a continuation of terror from Palestine Islamic Jihad and the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, and the possibility of growing Iranian influence.

DENNIS ROSS

The last fourteen months in the Middle East have produced three developments that should have transformed the situation dramatically for the better: the death of former PA president Yasser Arafat; the election of Abbas, who ran on a platform of nonviolence, with 62 percent of the popular vote; and Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s withdrawal of Israeli troops and settlers from Gaza. The window of opportunity that should have been exploited was not. With Hamas’s victory, that window has closed. Israelis and Palestinians are now in the midst of two earthquakes with two very different implications. Sharon built a broad Israeli consensus in favor of unilateral separation from the Palestinians; as a result, Israelis are prepared to withdraw from most of the West Bank. An opinion poll conducted before the Palestinian elections found that 77 percent of Israelis felt there was no Palestinian partner for peace; if anything, the unilateralist impulse will be stronger after Hamas’s victory.

The election of Hamas may be first and foremost about remaking Palestinian governance. But Hamas rejects Israel’s right to exist and promotes violence to achieve its ends. Hamas’s goal is a wholesale restructuring of the PA, from education and security to health care and corruption. It cannot achieve any of these objectives if it is at war with Israel. As such, it needs the tahdiya, the calm, more than Israel, especially in the early period of its government. But Hamas should not get continued calm for free. If it wants calm, then Hamas cannot amass Qassam rockets, build increasing numbers of bombs, or turn a blind eye to acts of terror against Israel perpetrated by Islamic Jihad or the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades. Hamas also wants and needs assistance from the outside. Here again, Hamas must not be allowed to escape the dilemmas of governing and the need to make choices. If it wants assistance and hopes to avoid isolation, it must recognize Israel’s right to exist and end its support of violence.

Hamas must be presented with a choice that clearly dictates the consequences of its actions, that forces Hamas either to change its policies or face isolation. Any cooperation with the new Palestinian government without such a change in Hamas policy would indirectly legitimize the very policies the international community rejects. In this respect, the U.S. government has an important role to play in conducting an intensive and continued diplomatic effort to forge a common front among the Quartet of the United States, the EU, Russia, and the UN.

Deter and Contain: Dealing with a Nuclear Iran

Testimony before the House Committee on Armed Services
Michael Eisenstadt
Senior Fellow and Director of Security Studies
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
February 1, 2006

Conclusions

Efforts to deter and contain a nuclear Iran would likely encounter significant challenges. The nature of the Islamic Republic, regional politics, and Iran’s involvement in terrorism make establishing a stable deterrent relationship with a nuclear Iran risky and uncertain. The experience of the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and of India and Pakistan since then, demonstrate that both preventive diplomacy and luck may be necessary to avert some kind of nuclear crisis involving Iran, and Israel or the United States, should Iran become a nuclear power in the coming years. Managing the uncertainty and instability created by a nuclear Iran is likely to pose major challenges for U.S. policy makers.

Iran may, however, emerge as the driving force behind the creation of a new regional security architecture in the Persian Gulf and southwest Asia. While it is in the long-term U.S. interest to create a free-standing balance of power in the Gulf that obviates the need for a permanent forward U.S. presence, for the foreseeable future, the stabilization of Iraq, the Global War on Terrorism, and ongoing efforts to counter the nuclear ambitions of Iran will draw the United States deeper into the affairs of the region. Enhancing the military capabilities of regional allies threatened by Iran, deepening bilateral cooperation with these countries, and encouraging multilateral cooperation in the areas of air- and missile-defense and beyond may be the best way to lay the basis for future regional collective defense arrangements. For the near term, however, the United States will remain the ‘indispensable nation’ when it comes to formulating a response to the possible emergence of a nuclear Iran, and to achieving security and stability in a proliferated region.

Download the full text of this testimony (PDF).

Democracy's Consequences

The Washington Post
Saturday, February 4, 2006; A16

OPPONENTS OF U.S. policy in the Middle East have described Hamas's victory in last week's Palestinian elections as a disaster that proves that President Bush was wrong to insist on elections in the West Bank and Gaza. The result, they say, has been the destruction of the peace process and the empowerment of a movement inimical to Israel and the United States; the lesson is that Mr. Bush should stop pressing for democratic change elsewhere in the region. While the consequences of the Palestinian vote remain highly uncertain, this rush to condemnation is nonsensical. It ignores the collapse of authority in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip before the elections, and it ignores the opportunity democracy created to remedy it.

By the time the Palestinian vote was held, it had become painfully clear that President Mahmoud Abbas would not and could not establish a viable government or rein in the armed thugs even of his own Fatah movement. The corrupt cadres that Yasser Arafat installed in Palestinian ministries had resisted reform or displacement, while the Palestinian payroll had grown so heavy with gunmen that European nations had suspended aid. Militants were attacking police stations and border posts in Gaza, kidnapping foreigners and firing rockets at Israel with impunity. For its part, the Israeli government barely concealed its view that peace talks with Mr. Abbas were useless and that its only option was to continue unilateral steps toward establishing a de facto border in the West Bank.

Some critics say that Mr. Bush should have forced Mr. Abbas to call off the elections or exclude Hamas from the ballot. Had he done so, the result almost certainly would have been a resumption of the Islamic movement's armed campaign against Israel, along with the perpetuation of a corrupt and crumbling regime. By insisting that the elections go forward, Mr. Bush and Mr. Abbas empowered the Palestinians to carry out the clean sweep of Mr. Arafat's cronies that had previously proved impossible. They also ensured that Hamas would recommit itself to a cease-fire that has led to a dramatic reduction in bloodshed and returned normality to Israeli cities. The chances that the Palestinian Authority will be able to restore some order in Gaza have risen.

While Hamas is unlikely to recognize Israel or formally renounce violence, it is no more likely to turn the Palestinian territories into an Islamic state. Most probably it will seek to implement its moderate campaign platform, which promised an uncorrupted and effective government while working out a modus vivendi with Israel. It should have to try this without direct Western aid or diplomatic recognition. But more extreme measures by Israel, Egypt or others to prevent the formation of a Hamas cabinet, or strangle the Palestinian territories with a cutoff of tax revenue or essential services, would likely only strengthen the Islamists or trigger a resumption of terrorism.

The Hamas victory is a poor guide to elections that might be held elsewhere in the Middle East. Despite the disarray of secular parties, the Islamists won only 44 percent of the popular vote. If there is a lesson to be drawn from Hamas's victory, it is that it is unwise to suppose that corrupt and autocratic regimes can somehow be induced to renew themselves enough to win free elections. Rather than banking on such governments, the United States should be insisting that they allow the growth of independent political movements, including secular alternatives.

Democratization in the Middle East will inevitably mean that Islamists and others with anti-Western agendas will have the chance to compete for power -- and occasionally to govern. If so they will be forced to choose, as Hamas now will, between ideology and pragmatic success, and suffer democracy's consequences if they fail. To oppose that development is to invest in an untenable status quo and to raise the chances that the Islamists -- who are a force the Middle East will live with for decades to come -- will assume power and rule not by democracy but by violence.

Is this why the cartoons were published?

The New York Times
To the Editor:

The widespread anger across the Islamic world and in Muslim communities in Europe over the depiction of the Prophet Muhammad in the European press is ironic considering that newspapers in the Arab and Muslim world have no moral scruples when it comes to demonizing and stereotyping Jews in editorial cartoons.

In the Muslim and Arab press, Jews are routinely depicted as stereotypical hook-nosed, greedy and manipulative killers.

Moreover, leaders of regimes like Egypt and Saudi Arabia have virtually ignored appeals from the United States and Jewish organizations to put an end to incitement in the media, excusing it in the name of "freedom of the press."

One would hope that Muslim and Arab leaders would turn all of the anger being aimed at the European press into a larger lesson for their own people about the power of images. Those incensed by the portrayal of Muhammad should turn a mirror on their own press before assuming the moral high ground in a discussion of press freedom.

Abraham H. Foxman
National Director
Anti-Defamation League
New York, Feb. 3, 2006

Ability to Wage 'Long War' Is Key To Pentagon Plan

Conventional Tactics De-Emphasized
By Ann Scott Tyson
Washington Post
Saturday, February 4, 2006; A01

The Pentagon, readying for what it calls a "long war," yesterday laid out a new 20-year defense strategy that envisions U.S. troops deployed, often clandestinely, in dozens of countries at once to fight terrorism and other nontraditional threats.

Major initiatives include a 15 percent boost in the number of elite U.S. troops known as Special Operations Forces, a near-doubling of the capacity of unmanned aerial drones to gather intelligence, a $1.5 billion investment to counter a biological attack, and the creation of special teams to find, track and defuse nuclear bombs and other catastrophic weapons.

China is singled out as having "the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States," and the strategy in response calls for accelerating the fielding of a new Air Force long-range strike force, as well as for building undersea warfare capabilities.

The latest top-level reassessment of strategy, or Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), is the first to fully take stock of the starkly expanded missions of the U.S. military -- both in fighting wars abroad and defending the homeland -- since the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.

The review, the third since Congress required the exercise in the 1990s, has been widely anticipated because Donald H. Rumsfeld is the first defense secretary to conduct one with the benefit of four years' experience in office. Rumsfeld issued the previous QDR in a hastily redrafted form days after the 2001 strikes.

The new strategy, summarized in a 92-page report, is a road map for allocating defense resources. It draws heavily on the lessons learned by the U.S. military since 2001 in Iraq, Afghanistan and counterterrorism operations. The strategy significantly refines the formula -- known as the "force planning construct" -- for the types of major contingencies the U.S. military must be ready to handle.

Under the 2001 review, the Pentagon planned to be able to "swiftly defeat" two adversaries in overlapping military campaigns, with the option of overthrowing a hostile government in one. In the new strategy, one of those two campaigns can be a large-scale, prolonged "irregular" conflict, such as the counterinsurgency in Iraq.

In the 2001 strategy, the U.S. military was to be capable of conducting operations in four regions abroad -- Europe, the Middle East, the "Asian littoral" and Northeast Asia. But the new plan states that the past four years demonstrated the need for U.S. forces to "operate around the globe, and not only in and from the four regions."

Yet, although the Pentagon's future course is ambitious in directing that U.S. forces become more versatile, agile and capable of tackling a far wider range of missions, it calls for no net increases in troop levels and seeks no dramatic cuts or additions to currently planned weapons systems.

For example, the active-duty Army will revert by 2011 to its pre-2001 manpower of 482,400, with the additional Army Special Operations Forces incorporated in that number, defense officials said. The Air Force will reduce its strength by about 40,000 personnel.

Moreover, the review's key assumptions betray what Pentagon leaders acknowledge is a certain humility regarding the Defense Department's uncertainty about what the world will look like over the next five, 10 or 20 years, as well as its realization that the U.S. military cannot attain victory alone.

"U.S. forces in all probability will be engaged somewhere in the world in the next decade where they're not currently engaged. But I can tell you with no resolution at all where that might be, when that might be or how that might be," Ryan Henry, principal deputy undersecretary of defense for policy, said at a Pentagon news briefing unveiling the QDR.

"Things get very fuzzy past the five-year point," Henry said of the review in a talk last month.

At the same time, Henry stressed yesterday, "we cannot win this long war by ourselves."

When a major crisis, such as a terrorist strike or outbreak of hostilities, occurs -- requiring a "surge" in forces -- the U.S. military will plan for "somewhat higher level of contributions from international allies and partners, as well as other Federal agencies," the review concludes.

The new strategy marks a clear shift away from the Pentagon's long-standing emphasis on conventional wars of tanks, fighter jets and destroyers against nation-states. Instead, it concentrates on four new goals: defeating terrorist networks; countering nuclear, biological and chemical weapons; dissuading major powers such as China, India and Russia from becoming adversaries; and creating a more robust homeland defense.

Central to the first two goals is a substantial 15 percent increase in U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF), now with 52,000 personnel, including secret Delta Force operatives skilled in counterterrorism.

The review calls for a one-third increase in Army Special Forces battalions, whose troops are trained in languages and to work with indigenous fighters; an increase in Navy SEAL teams; and the creation of a new SOF squadron of unmanned aerial vehicles to "locate and target enemy capabilities" in countries where access is difficult.

In addition, civil affairs and psychological operations units will gain 3,500 personnel, a 33 percent increase, while the Marine Corps will establish a 2,600-strong Special Operations force for training foreign militaries, conducting reconnaissance and carrying out strikes.

"SOF will increase their capacity to perform more demanding and specialized tasks, especially long-duration, indirect and clandestine operations in politically sensitive environments and denied areas," the report says. By 2007, SOF will have newly modified Navy submarines, each armed with 150 Tomahawk missiles, for reaching "denied areas" and striking individuals or other targets.

"SOF will have the capacity to operate in dozens of countries simultaneously" and will deploy for longer periods to build relationships with "foreign military and security forces," it says.

To conduct strikes against terrorists and other enemies -- work typically assigned to Delta Force members and SEAL teams -- these forces will gain "an expanded organic ability to locate, tag and track dangerous individuals and other high-value targets globally," the report says.

The growth will also allow for the creation of small teams of operatives assigned to "detect, locate, and render safe" nuclear, chemical and biological weapons -- as well as to prevent their transfer from states such as North Korea to terrorist groups.

To strengthen homeland defense, the report calls for improving communications and command systems so that military efforts can be better coordinated with state and local governments.

US begins quest for approval for UN Darfur force

By Evelyn Leopold

UNITED NATIONS, Feb 2 (Reuters) - A U.S.-drafted Security Council statement calls for U.N. peacekeepers to be sent to Sudan's violent Darfur region and asks United Nations to draw up plans for an eventual takeover from an African Union force.

The statement, circulated for discussion to Security Council members on Thursday by U.S. Ambassador John Bolton, would be the first step toward authorizing a larger force in Darfur where killings, rape and pillaging continue unabated.

But the statement, which needs approval from all council members, has not yet received agreement from Qatar, the only Arab nation in the 15-member body and China, a close ally of Khartoum, council envoys said.

Specifically, the Security Council would "support in principal" a transition from the African Union mission in Darfur to a U.N. operation, the draft says. The AU has some 7,000 monitors and soldiers in a region the size of France and chronically suffers from lack of financing.

The draft statement requests U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan to "initiate contingency planning without delay" on a range of options and integrate any new operation with the current U.N. peacekeeping mission in southern Sudan.

Final authorization will take at least another month. The African Union has not yet formally agreed to join or turn over it operation to the United Nations. Nor has the Khartoum government given its consent.

The Darfur conflict erupted into violence in early 2003 when African tribes took up arms accusing the Arab-dominated Khartoum government of neglect. The government retaliated by arming Arab militia, known as Janjaweed, who began a campaign of murder, rape, arson and plunder and drove 2 million villagers into squalid camps. Khartoum denies responsibility.

SEVERAL YEARS

In Khartoum on Thursday, the head of the AU mission in Sudan, Baba Gana Kingibe, told reporters any U.N. force should count on being in Darfur for two to three years to help guard refugees returning to villages from squalid camps.

But he said it was inevitable the United Nations would have to take over.

"It is clear in our minds that a transition is inevitable in the long run for the simple reason that it will create a more efficient single peace support operation for the whole of Sudan, bringing coherence and synergy, and integration of political, humanitarian, military and post-conflict issues," Kingibe said.

Jean-Marie Guehenno, the undersecretary-general for peacekeeping, has started planning but needs a firm decision from the Security Council before recruiting any troops.

No one knows who would join such a force, with Annan hoping Western nations, including the United States and Europeans, would help with an aggressive mobile force and air power.

Bolton's presidency of the Security Council for the month of February brought calls from advocacy and humanitarian groups for the United States to do something in Darfur following an analysis from the top U.N. envoy in Sudan that international efforts to bring peace to Darfur had failed.

"All we did was picking up the pieces and muddling through, doing too little too late," Jan Pronk told the Security Council on Jan. 13.

He estimated 20,000 troops would be needed to disarm marauding militias and protect refugees who want to go home, but U.N. officials say this number is too high. (Opheera McDoom in Khartoum contributed to this report)

Coleman first Jew to lead prayer breakfast

02/03/2006

WASHINGTON (AP) - An Orthodox Jewish group praised today's National Prayer Breakfast for its inclusive tone, following concerns the event has become too Christian in recent years.

This year's breakfast was co-chaired by Senator Norm Coleman of Minnesota, marking the first time in memory that a Jew had led the gathering.

Nathan Diament, director of public policy for the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America, said the program should be held up as a model for future events.

The breakfast included Hebrew prayers delivered by Coleman and Representative Joe Lieberman of Connecticut and a speech by King Abdullah the Second of Jordan, who is Muslim. President Bush commented that in the United States citizens are free to profess any faith they choose, or no faith at all.

The breakfast is staged without government funding every year by the Fellowship Foundation, an evangelical Christian group.

Senate urges Hamas cutoff

The U.S. Senate unanimously passed a resolution that urged an end to assistance to the Palestinian Authority if its leaders reject Israel’s existence.

The non-binding resolution, passed Wednesday, is the first of several legislative initiatives aimed at cutting off assistance to Hamas, the terrorist group that won a landslide victory in last week’s legislative elections. It was initiated by Sen. John Thune (R-S.D.) and Sen. Joseph Lieberman (D-Conn.)

Three bills in the House of Representatives, including one introduced Thursday by Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-Fla.) and Rep. Tom Lantos (D-Calif.) would legislate a ban on U.S. assistance to a Hamas-led government.

The Next Secretary General

At Stake in This Election: U.N.'s Future, Asia's Clout
By Richard Holbrooke
The Washington Post
Friday, February 3, 2006; A19

Almost invisible to the general public, a major international election campaign is underway. It is the equivalent of primary time now, and candidates are flying quietly into New York, Washington, Beijing, Paris, Moscow and London, meeting with foreign ministers and other officials with little or no fanfare, and slipping out of town again, often denying they are running for anything at all. Although most Americans have not yet heard of any of the candidates, the winner will instantly become a major world figure.

The job they are running for is, of course, secretary general of the United Nations; Kofi Annan's term ends Dec. 31. Historically, the job rotates by region, and by tradition it is Asia's turn. But things are never simple at the United Nations, and other regions and nations are disputing Asia's claim to the next "S-G." Eastern Europe, in particular, says that it now constitutes a separate regional grouping that emerged after the Cold War, and two people greatly popular in Washington, former Polish president Aleksander Kwasniewski and Latvian President Vaira Vike-Freiberga, have tossed their hats into the ring. But any one of the five permanent members of the Security Council can veto the choice of secretary general (it was this power that President Bill Clinton wisely used in 1996 to block a second term for Boutros Boutros-Ghali), and Russia seems virtually certain to oppose any candidate from what it still regards as its former "space."

The U.S. ambassador to the United Nations has said that the world body should not be bound by the rotation system; let the best man or woman be chosen. Nothing wrong with that theory, but, as with our own election system, certain traditions are difficult to discard. I seriously doubt that the Asians, having allowed Africa to hold the position for 15 straight years (Boutros-Ghali and two terms for Kofi Annan), and not having had an Asian secretary general for almost 40 years (since U Thant of Burma in the 1960s), will allow the brass ring to pass them by again. Especially for China, the next S-G -- who would be the first Asian in the post since Beijing took over the Chinese seat in 1972 -- offers a major opportunity that coincides with their newly assertive diplomacy throughout the world. And remember: No one who is not acceptable to both Beijing and Washington can get this job, and the two countries have significantly different views of what the role of the United Nations should be. The Americans will presumably want a more assertive, reform-minded and interventionist secretary general than China.

Bear in mind also that at the United Nations, Asia may not be what you think. For bureaucratic and historical reasons, the Asian group runs from the shores of the Mediterranean to the far islands of the South Pacific; it includes most of the Arab world and even Turkey, which has, in Kemal Dervis, currently head of the U.N. Development Program, an excellent dark-horse candidate respected by all.

A handful of other names have begun to emerge, but I warn the reader inclined to handicapping: The next S-G may well come from names that have not yet surfaced. The possibilities include:

· Surakiart Sathirathai, Thailand's deputy prime minister, has been running openly since last year and has visited dozens of capitals around the world. He has the formal endorsement of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, a solid base from which to launch a candidacy.

· Ban Ki Moon, South Korea's impressive foreign minister, has excellent relations with both Washington and Beijing. But would China accept a secretary general from a treaty ally of the United States, and a diplomat who is deeply engaged in sensitive six-party talks on North Korea's nuclear programs?

· Jose Ramos-Horta is foreign minister of East Timor -- the newest nation in the world and, until recently, itself a war-torn half-island in the South Pacific administered by the United Nations. Ramos-Horta is a Nobel Peace Prize laureate and is well known internationally, but his country is tiny, with only 800,000 people.

· Jayantha Dhanapala, a respected Sri Lankan, served as U.N. undersecretary general for disarmament and as ambassador to the United States. He has been openly campaigning for over a year, but some question the selection of another U.N. bureaucrat right after Kofi Annan.

Anyway, you get the idea. As I said, the next S-G may not be on this list at all. The former prime minister of Singapore, Goh Chok Tong, could, for example, emerge at the very end. Another dark horse, Prince Zeid Raed Hussein, the deft and elegant young Jordanian ambassador to the U.N., deserves closer scrutiny. My guess is that the final decision will not come until at least the end of September, during the annual convention of foreign leaders at the U.N. General Assembly. Then, with a deadline staring them in the face, the leaders of the Big Five and other major powers, including India and Japan, will get down to it. It is not coincidence that all U.N. secretaries general since the first (from Norway, but pre-NATO) have come from nonaligned countries (Sweden, Burma, Austria, Peru, Egypt, and Ghana). Big aligned countries tend to cancel each other out.

But the job does matter. A weak S-G means a weaker United Nations, and although that may please some die-hard U.N.-haters, the United Nations has been an important part of American foreign policy on many issues since the end of the Cold War. Right now, for example, the Security Council is about to become a major focal point for the Iranian nuclear issue. The secretary general can play an important role on such issues, and it is in the American interest, more often than not, to have a strong secretary general exerting pressure on reluctant or rogue states. The same may not be true of China. The drama coming up, especially between Beijing and Washington, will be interesting to follow, and will tell us a lot about both the future of the United Nations and the long-term intentions of China on the world stage.

Richard Holbrooke, an ambassador to the United Nations during the Clinton administration, writes a monthly column for The Post.

Another $120B Sought For Wars

Rebuilding is extra; more requests likely
By Richard Wolf
USA Today
February 3, 2006

WASHINGTON — The Bush administration will ask Congress soon for another $120 billion to pay for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, bringing total spending since the Sept. 11 attacks to about $440 billion.

Administration officials said the request is intended to fund operations into next year. However, deputy budget director Joel Kaplan and Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman acknowledged that won't be enough, even as the U.S. military tries to turn more responsibility over to Iraqi forces.

Training and equipping Iraqi forces will allow U.S. troops to “take more of a supporting role, a training role, and eventually be able to reduce our numbers as they take over more control,” Whitman said.

The war in Iraq is costing about $150 million a day, while continued fighting in Afghanistan is costing about $27 million a day.

The cost of the Iraq war has substantially exceeded early estimates. In 2002, White House economic adviser Lawrence Lindsey suggested the cost could reach $200 billion. Mitch Daniels, then the White House budget director, said Lindsey's number was too high, and said the cost would be $60 billion or less. Lindsey resigned a few months later.

Taken together, the two wars' projected $440 billion cost is almost as much as the Korean War, which cost $445 billion in 2006 dollars, according to the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Only World War II and the Vietnam War were more expensive.

The new request is not likely to include any money for reconstruction in Iraq, officials said. Congress appropriated $18 billion for that in 2003, but much of it has been diverted to train and equip Iraqi forces.

All funding requests for the troops have been strongly approved by Congress, and this one is unlikely to generate much opposition.

“This Congress, in a very strong bipartisan way, has done anything they've been asked to do to be supportive of the troops,” said Rep. C.W. Bill Young, R-Fla., chairman of the House defense appropriations panel.

Democrats say that with the federal budget deficit expected to reach about $360 billion this year, more should be done to offset the wars' costs.

“The way we're doing this is very irresponsible,” said Rep. Norm Dicks, D-Wash. “We're not demanding a sacrifice from the American people.”

The administration also will ask Congress for:

•About $18 billion for hurricane-related expenses in the Gulf Coast. That would bring the total to about $103 billion. Rep. Richard Baker, R-La., expressed concern that “Congress is in no mood to continue spending such resources.”

•About $2.3 billion to prepare for a potential bird flu pandemic. Health and Human Services Secretary Mike Leavitt told USA TODAY that while a vaccine is available, “We don't have the capacity to manufacture it in great enough quantities in small enough times.”

War costs
Money for the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan:

•$120 billion -- Upcoming request

•$440 billion -- Total to Sept. 2007

•$1,477 -- Cost per person in USA

Sources: Office of Management and Budget; Census Bureau

Rumsfeld Offers Strategies For Current War

Pentagon to Release 20-Year Plan Today
By Josh White and Ann Scott Tyson
Washington Post
February 3, 2006

The United States is engaged in what could be a generational conflict akin to the Cold War, the kind of struggle that might last decades as allies work to root out terrorists across the globe and battle extremists who want to rule the world, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld said yesterday.

Rumsfeld, who laid out broad strategies for what the military and the Bush administration are now calling the "long war," likened al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden to Adolf Hitler and Vladimir Lenin while urging Americans not to give in on the battle of wills that could stretch for years. He said there is a tendency to underestimate the threats that terrorists pose to global security, and said liberty is at stake.

"Compelled by a militant ideology that celebrates murder and suicide with no territory to defend, with little to lose, they will either succeed in changing our way of life, or we will succeed in changing theirs," Rumsfeld said in a speech at the National Press Club.

The speech, which aides said was titled "The Long War," came on the eve of the Pentagon's release of its Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which sets out plans for how the U.S. military will address major security challenges 20 years into the future. The plans to be released today include shifts to make the military more agile and capable of dealing with unconventional threats, something Rumsfeld has said is necessary to move from a military designed for the Cold War into one that is more flexible.

He said the nation must focus on three strategies in the ongoing war: preventing terrorists from obtaining weapons of mass destruction, defending the U.S. homeland and helping allies fight terrorism. He emphasized that these goals could take a long time to achieve.

Indeed, the QDR, mandated every four years by Congress, opens with the declaration: "The United States is a nation engaged in what will be a long war."

The review has been widely anticipated in Washington defense circles because of the dramatic changes in the U.S. military's global role since the last review in 2001. Adding to the high expectations is the fact that Rumsfeld and his team have now been in place for more than four years.

The QDR strategy draws heavily on lessons learned by the military from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the worldwide campaign against terrorism, shifting the Pentagon's emphasis away from conventional warfare of the Cold War era toward three new areas.

First are "irregular" conflicts against insurgents, terrorists and other non-state enemies. Iraq and Afghanistan are the "early battles" in the campaign against Islamic extremists and terrorists, who are "profoundly more dangerous" than in the past because of technological advances that allow them to operate globally, said Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon R. England in an address on Wednesday.

The QDR also focuses on defending the U.S. homeland against "catastrophic" attacks such as with nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. Finally, it sets out plans for deterring the rising military heft of major powers such as China.

The strategic vision outlined in the QDR has won high marks from defense analysts for diagnosing the problems the U.S. military will likely face. However, it is less successful in translating those concepts into concrete military capabilities, the analysts say.

The review does not dramatically change the "force construct" -- the set of world contingencies that the U.S. military is expected to be able to deal with. The most important change is the recognition that U.S. forces may have to carry out long-term stability operations, or surge suddenly to a world hot spot. There are not "huge tectonic shifts," said Adm. Edmund P. Giambastiani, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in an address Wednesday.

The strategy does call for devoting resources to accelerate a long-range strike capability directed at hostile nations, and for new investments aimed at countering biological and nuclear weapons -- such as teams able to defuse a nuclear bomb. But it makes relatively minor adjustments in key weapons systems, with the biggest programs such as the Joint Strike Fighter and the Army's Future Combat Systems escaping virtually unscathed. This leaves less room for investments in innovative programs and forces to address the types of problems that the QDR identifies, analysts say.

"A lot of tough choices are kicked down the road," said Andrew F. Krepinevich, executive director of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

One of the toughest battles facing the United States, Rumsfeld said yesterday, is recognizing the seriousness of the terrorist threat and the immediacy of fighting the nation's enemies. He said the task facing Western nations could be arduous, as terrorists operate in numerous countries around the world, hidden, and with the willingness to wait long periods between attacks. Military leaders and officials in the Bush administration have taken to calling the global war on terrorism the "long war," which defense experts say is a recognition that there is no end in sight.

"Dealing with the issue of terrorism and extremism is going to take a long time," said Robert E. Hunter, senior adviser at Rand Corp. and a former ambassador to NATO. "But we have to define success. You're never going to get rid of all terrorism."

Rumsfeld said he does not believe the war will end with a bang but, instead, with a whimper, "fading down over a sustained period of time as more countries in the world are successful," much as how democracy outlasted communism in the Cold War. He added that the early decades of the Cold War also brought confusion and doubt.

"The only way that terrorists can win this struggle is if we lose our will and surrender the fight, or think it's not important enough, or in confusion or in disagreement among ourselves give them the time to regroup and reestablish themselves in Iraq or elsewhere," he said.

President Carter: We did not need to go into Iraq. We went in there under false pretenses

CNN -- Larry King Live - Interview with President Carter
02/01/05

KING: Do you support the Iraq war?

CARTER: No, I haven't supported it from the very beginning. In fact, I wrote a major, I thought it was a major editorial in "The New York Times" a few months before we invaded Iraq pointing out that it was an unnecessary and unjust war and the editorial was repeated on full page ads in a lot of other newspapers.

So, I've always been against the war. But once we got there, obviously we need to give our young men and women our absolute and full support, so I'm not in favor of an immediate withdrawal. I think we ought to decide as a nation that we will turn over as quickly as possible not only the military responsibilities to the Iraqi people but also let them manage their own economic affairs.

I don't think we have any idea now of turning over their oil supplies and let them handle who gets to manage the oil, like even France and Russia and I hope we'll back off and let them run their own political affairs.

But, what I believe is that there are people in Washington now, some of our top leaders, who never intend to withdraw military forces from Iraq and they're looking for ten, 20, 50 years in the future...

KING: Why?

CARTER: ...having major American military board -- well, because that was the reason that we went into Iraq was to establish a permanent military base in the Gulf region and I have never heard any of our leaders say that they would commit themselves to the Iraqi people that ten years from now there will be no military bases of the United States in Iraq.

I would like to hear that. But that's one of the things that concerns Iraqi people. And when I meet with Arab leaders around the world they all have noticed this. They're the ones that have brought it to my attention and I think it's an accurate statement.

KING: Do you believe that's the intent of the administration to keep the -- when you say high officials do you mean the Bush administration wants to keep troops in Iraq ad infinitum?

CARTER: Yes, I do and I hope I'm wrong. I don't think there's any doubt that we did not need to go into Iraq. We went in there under false pretenses, either inadvertent misunderstanding of intelligence or maybe deliberate. I'm not saying it was deliberate. I don't think President Bush was deliberately misleading us, maybe some of his subordinates.

But, I think it was a mistake to go in and I think that the United States has got to make sure that the Iraqi people know and the surrounding neighbors know we're willing to get our troops out of Iraq when and if a government is established and I hope that will be soon and the Iraqis are able to maintain order.

And, I think a lot of the violence that takes place now in the streets of Iraq are caused by the fact that American troops are still there. I think that will in itself that change will automatically reduce the terrorism considerably.

I was with Bob Woodruff by the way. He was with me in Palestine the night of the election and he interviewed me, he and his cameraman and after that he immediately left immediately and went to Iraq and unfortunately was seriously injured and I pray that he'll be OK.

In defense of foreign aid – for Hamas

By Patrick J. Buchanan
02/01/06

Ever since President Bush, sometime after 9-11, converted to neoconservatism, his Middle East policy has suffered from the triple defects of that subspecies of the Right: hubris, ideology and immaturity.

Neoconservatives see the world as they wish it to be, not as it is. Like teenagers, they act on impulse and rail against the counsel of experience. "Often clever, never wise," Russell Kirk said of the breed.

Repeatedly, Bush was warned by traditional conservatives that to send a U.S. army to occupy Baghdad would engender Arab rage and Islamic terror. Heeding the "cakewalk" crowd, he refused to listen. Three years later, we are trying to extricate a U.S. army from Iraq with the least possible damage to U.S. security interests.

Prodded again by neoconservatives, Bush declared our true goal had always been to democratize Iraq and the entire Islamic world. His second Inaugural resonated less of Reagan than of Rousseau:

So, it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.

To advance the end of "tyranny in our world," Bush began to call for elections across the Middle East. Again, he and Condi were warned that if these people were allowed to vote their convictions, they might just vote to throw us out and throw the Israelis into the sea.

Now that elections have been held, what do the returns show?

Propelled into or toward power have been Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Iran, pro-Iranian Shiite zealots in Iraq, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and Hamas in Gaza and on the West Bank.

Now, Condi, who denounced Bush's predecessors back to FDR for supporting dictators while preaching democracy in the Middle East, appears about to engage in a bit of hypocrisy of her own.

After insisting Hamas be included in the elections, Condi, stunned by the results and under pressure from Israel, has declared we will cut all aid to the Palestinian Authority if Hamas takes over the government, as Hamas was elected to do.

Bush agrees. Unless Hamas surrenders its weapons, abandons all armed resistance and recognizes Israel's right to exist, we will not give 10 cents to a Palestinian Authority that has Hamas as its head. Rice is said to be pressuring Europe to do the same. Unless Hamas remakes itself into a Mideast version of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference of Dr. King, we terminate aid.

Before adopting this knee-jerk reaction to an election we insisted go ahead, one trusts the president, this once, will think it through.

What is likely to happen if we proceed on such a course?

If we and the Europeans cut off aid, and Israel refuses to remit to the Palestinians the taxes they collect, the Palestinians will be put through hell for voting the wrong way. The Arabs will call us hypocrites who believe in elections only if they produce the results we demand.

And who could say they are wrong?

What will Hamas do? They are not going to disarm in the face of an Israeli military that has been killing Palestinians – collateral damage, of course – at four times the rate that Palestinians have been killing Israelis. They are not going to give up their trump card and recognize Israel's right to exist before they get a Palestinian state.

What will Hamas do? Hamas will accept the cut-off of aid, seek money from the Saudis and Iranians, do their best to keep the Palestinian people fed, clothed, housed and educated, and sacrifice for their people. And Hamas will fail. And when they fail, whom do we think will be blamed? When the Palestinian people have been broken because they voted the wrong way, whom do we think they will hate?

Let me propose another course. Put Hamas on probation.

For almost a year, Hamas has held to a truce with Israel and not engaged in attacks. Let America and Europe send word that if the truce holds, if Hamas does not attack Israeli civilians, if Hamas show its first concern is, as it claims, bettering the life of the Palestinian people, we will let the aid flow. But if Hamas reignites the war, we will not finance the war. We will terminate the aid.

Make Hamas responsible for continuing the aid. And make Hamas responsible for terminating it, if it comes to that.

Understandably, the Israelis are close to hysterical over the landslide for Hamas and are on a diplomatic campaign to have all donors end all aid to a Palestinian Authority dominated by Hamas.

But that is not in our interests. It is not even in Israel's interest. For it has been Israel's behavior, and uncritical U.S. support for that behavior, that produced this victory for Hamas. To continue on that road is to arrive at, literally, a dead end.

Bush has unleashed a revolution in the Middle East, and it is everywhere bringing to power Islamic fundamentalists. Either we deal with them, or fight them or get out of the Middle East.

The White House memo

Revealed: Bush and Blair discussed using American Spyplane in UN colours to lure Saddam into war.
By: Gary Gibbon
Channel 4 (UK)
2 Feb 2006

Channel 4 News tonight reveals extraordinary details of George Bush and Tony Blair's pre-war meeting in January 2003 at which they discussed plans to begin military action on March 10th 2003, irrespective of whether the United Nations had passed a new resolution authorising the use of force.

Channel 4 News has seen minutes from that meeting, which took place in the White House on 31 January 2003. The two leaders discussed the possibility of securing further UN support, but President Bush made it clear that he had already decided to go to war. The details are contained in a new version of the book 'Lawless World' written by a leading British human rights lawyer, Philippe Sands QC.

President Bush said that:

"The US would put its full weight behind efforts to get another resolution and would 'twist arms' and 'even threaten'. But he had to say that if ultimately we failed, military action would follow anyway.''

Prime Minister Blair responded that he was: "solidly with the President and ready to do whatever it took to disarm Saddam."

But Mr Blair said that: "a second Security Council resolution would provide an insurance policy against the unexpected, and international cover, including with the Arabs."

Mr Sands' book says that the meeting focused on the need to identify evidence that Saddam had committed a material breach of his obligations under the existing UN Resolution 1441. There was concern that insufficient evidence had been unearthed by the UN inspection team, led by Dr Hans Blix. Other options were considered.

President Bush said: "The US was thinking of flying U2 reconnaissance aircraft with fighter cover over Iraq, painted in UN colours. If Saddam fired on them, he would be in breach."

He went on: "It was also possible that a defector could be brought out who would give a public presentation about Saddams WMD, and there was also a small possibility that Saddam would be assassinated."

Speaking to Channel 4 News, Mr Sands said:

"I think no one would be surprised at the idea that the use of spy-planes to review what is going on would be considered. What is surprising is the idea that they would be used painted in the colours of the United Nations in order to provoke an attack which could then be used to justify material breach. Now that plainly looks as if it is deception, and it raises some fundamental questions of legality, both in terms of domestic law and international law."

Also present at the meeting were President Bush's National Security Adviser, Condoleeza Rice and her deputy Dan Fried, and the Presidents Chief of Staff, Andrew Card. The Prime Minister took with him his then security adviser Sir David Manning, his Foreign Policy aide Matthew Rycroft, and and his chief of staff, Jonathan Powell.

Those present, as documented in Mr Sands' book, also discussed what might happen in Iraq after liberation.

President Bush said that he: "thought it unlikely that there would be internecine warfare between the different religious and ethnic groups."

Out of jail, into the Army

Facing an enlistment crisis, the Army is granting "waivers" to an increasingly high percentage of recruits with criminal records -- and trying to hide it.
By Mark Benjamin
Salon
Feb. 02, 2006

We're transforming our military. The things I look for are the following: morale, retention, and recruitment. And retention is high, recruitment is meeting goals, and people are feeling strong about the mission.

-- George W. Bush, in a Jan. 26 press conference

It was about 10 p.m. on Sept. 1, 2002, when a drug deal was arranged in the parking lot of a mini-mall in Newark, Del. The car with the drugs, driven by a man who would become a recruit for the Delaware Air National Guard, pulled up next to a parked car that was waiting for the exchange. Everything was going smoothly until the cops arrived.

"I parked and walked over to his car and got in and we were talking," the future Air Guardsman later wrote. "He asked if I had any marijuana and I said yes, that I bought some in Wilmington, Del., earlier that day. He said he wanted some." The drug dealer went on to recount in a Jan. 11, 2005, statement written to win admission into the military, "I walked back to my car [and] as soon as I got in my car an officer put his flashlight in the window and arrested me."

Under Air National Guard rules, the dealer had committed a "major offense" that would bar him from military service. Air National Guard recruits, like other members of the military, cannot have drug convictions on their record. But on Feb. 2, 2005, the applicant who had been arrested in the mini-mall was admitted into the Delaware Air National Guard. How? Through the use of a little-known, but increasingly important, escape clause known as a waiver. Waivers, which are generally approved at the Pentagon, allow recruiters to sign up men and women who otherwise would be ineligible for service because of legal convictions, medical problems or other reasons preventing them from meeting minimum standards.

The story of that unnamed Air National Guard recruit (whose name is blacked out in his statement) is based on documents obtained by Salon under the Freedom of Information Act. It illustrates one of the tactics that the military is using in its uphill battle to meet recruiting targets during the Iraq war. The personnel problems are acute. The Air National Guard, for example, missed its recruiting target by 14 percent last year. And the regular Army missed its goal by 8 percent, its largest recruiting shortfall since 1979.

This is where waivers come in. According to statistics provided to Salon by the office of the assistant secretary of defense for public affairs, the Army said that 17 percent (21,880 new soldiers) of its 2005 recruits were admitted under waivers. Put another way, more soldiers than are in an entire infantry division entered the Army in 2005 without meeting normal standards. This use of waivers represents a 42 percent increase since the pre-Iraq year of 2000. (All annual figures used in this article are based on the government's fiscal year, which runs from Oct. 1 to Sept. 30. So fiscal year 2006 began Oct. 1, 2005.)

In fact, even the already high rate of 17 percent underestimates the use of waivers, as the Pentagon combined the Army's figures with the lower ones for reserve forces to dilute the apparent percentage. Equally significant is the Army's currently liberal use of "moral waivers," which are issued to recruits who have committed what are loosely defined as criminal offenses. Officially, the Pentagon states that most waivers issued on moral grounds are for minor infractions like traffic tickets. Yet documents obtained by Salon show that many of the offenses are more serious and include drunken driving and domestic abuse.

Last year, 37 percent of the Army's waivers (about 8,000 soldiers) were based on moral grounds. Like waivers as a whole, these waivers are proliferating -- they're 32 percent higher than in the prewar year of 2000. As a result, the odds are going up that the soldiers fighting and taking the casualties in Iraq entered the Army with a criminal record.

"The more of those people you take, the more problems you are going to have and the less effective they are going to be," said Lawrence J. Korb, an assistant secretary of defense under Reagan and a senior fellow at the progressive Center for American Progress. "This is another way you are lowering your standards to meet your goals." Retired Lt. Gen. William E. Odom, who was the Army's chief intelligence officer from 1981 to 1985, also called the increase in waivers "disturbing."

He expressed concern that the lower standards would place a burden on military commanders who have to deal with "more lawbreakers and soldiers with anti-social behavior in their units."

Even without the waivers, the Army has lowered its standards for enlistees. The Army has eased restrictions on recruiting high school dropouts. It also raised the maximum recruitment age from 35 to 39. Moreover, last fall the Army announced that it would be doubling the number of soldiers that it admits who score near the bottom on a military aptitude test.

In response to inquiries about the number of waivers being used, the Pentagon's assistant secretary for public affairs issued a three-page statement to Salon on Monday, headlined, "Military Recruiting -- High Standards With Limited Waivers." Regarding the use of moral waivers, it argues that "in most cases, the [criminal] charges were from a time when the applicant was young and immature." The Pentagon document contends that many waivers were "simply for an unusual number of traffic violations." It also cites as typical in waiver cases such minor offenses as "curfew violations, littering, disorderly conduct, etc."

Other Pentagon officials, who requested anonymity, cautioned against regarding this statement from the public affairs desk as the definitive word on the waiver question. These personnel experts stressed that the Army has a major problem with its use of exemptions from normal enlistment standards. These sources went on to say that the Army's statistical data appears to have been scrubbed to make its use of waivers look more infrequent than it actually is.

One Pentagon official, whom Salon asked to inspect the Army's official waiver figure, said the Army's claim that it has issued waivers to 17 percent of recruits "is not a correct number." In fact, the percentage should be higher. The Army has made the number appear lower by combining data from Army Reserve forces, including the Army National Guard -- even though the Guard has its own separate recruiting program and (based on information provided to Salon under the FOIA) used waivers in only 6 percent of all cases in 2005.

When pressed, the office of public affairs admitted that it had lumped together data from several military services to derive the official Army waiver number. Lt. Col. Ellen G. Krenke, a Pentagon spokeswoman in the office of public affairs, confirmed that the data provided to Salon had combined the waivers records of the regular Army, the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard into a single entry. She confirmed by e-mail: "Yes, these numbers include the active duty and reserve components."

Krenke referred questions about the Army's actual waiver rate to its Recruiting Command at Fort Knox, Ky. Julia Bobick, an Army spokeswoman there, said her unit had received the document that the Pentagon had provided Salon and was "re-looking" at its own data in light of the follow-up questions. Until that reexamination is complete, Bobick said, the Army would have no additional comment. "The numbers that we have are not releasable," she said. "We are re-looking at these numbers in light of that query."

In short, the military's explanation seems a variant of Catch-22. Officials now admit that the Army waiver data originally given to Salon was contaminated with extraneous numbers, but the Army cannot comment on what its actual waiver percentage might be, since the Pentagon figures are so muddled. When told of these numbers games, Korb said, "I'm sure that somebody on Capitol Hill is going to demand the answers."

It is no secret to Congress that the Army, which is fighting the brunt of the war in Iraq, is facing a severe personnel crisis. A Pentagon-commissioned report by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments leaked last week warned that prolonged deployments and recruiting problems were "breaking" the Army. A chapter of that report, titled "A Recruiting and Retention Crisis?" goes so far as to say that the grind of war on the Army -- rather than any political imperatives from Washington -- will accentuate the pace of military withdrawal from Iraq.

Odom offered a similar interpretation: "We will get out this year, not because we want to; we don't have any more troops to send. What we are seeing is the declining capability of the Army caused by the administration's manning and deployment policies."

A contrary, though far from surprising, view was offered by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Asked about the report warning of a broken Army at a press conference last week, Rumsfeld said, "I just can't imagine someone looking at the United States armed forces today and suggesting that they are close to breaking."

This fits with the Pentagon's official response that most Army waivers on moral grounds are for minor infractions like traffic tickets and littering. While there is no way to independently verify those claims regarding the Army, records from another branch of service suggest how recruiting waivers can easily be misused.

Under the Freedom of Information Act, Salon obtained copies of a one-inch stack of waivers granted by the Air National Guard from January to July 2005. Many of the offenses excused are significantly more serious than driving with a defective tail light or failing to return overdue library books.

Lt. Gen. Daniel James III, the Air National Guard director, told the House Committee on Armed Services last July 19, "The Air National Guard's success is rooted in the quality of our recruits and our ability to retain them. Our people are unequivocally our most valued resource."

Yet according to the waivers, just four days earlier the Air Guard's national headquarters had approved the enlistment of a California recruit who had been charged in October 2003 with "assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury." True, the recruit was a 17-year-old juvenile when he committed the crime for which he was later convicted, but that date was less than two years before he was admitted to the Air Guard.

Other examples from the Air Guard files suggest a wider problem:

* After his parents filed a domestic-abuse complaint against him in 2000, a recruit in Rhode Island was sentenced to one year of probation, ordered to have "no contact" with his parents, and required to undergo counseling and to pay court costs. Air National Guard rules say domestic violence convictions make recruits ineligible -- no exceptions granted. But the records show that the recruiter in this case brought the issue to an Air Guard staff judge advocate, who reviewed the file and determined that the offense did not "meet the domestic violence crime criteria." As a result of this waiver, the recruit was admitted to his state's Air Guard on May 3, 2005.
* A recruit with DWI violations in June 2001 and April 2002 received a waiver to enter the Iowa Air National Guard on July 15, 2005. The waiver request from the Iowa Guard to the Pentagon declares that the recruit "realizes that he made the wrong decision to drink and drive."
* Another recruit for the Rhode Island Air National Guard finished five years of probation in 2002 for breaking and entering, apparently into his girlfriend's house. A waiver got him into the Guard in June 2005.
* A recruit convicted in January 2004 for possession of marijuana, drug paraphernalia and stolen license-plate tags got into the Hawaii Air National Guard with a waiver little more than a year later, on March 3, 2005.

Taken together, the troubling statistics from the Army and anecdotal information derived from the files of the Air National Guard raise a warning flag about the extent to which the military is lowering its standards to fight the war in Iraq. The president may be correct in his recent press conference boast that "we're transforming the military." But the abuse of recruiting waivers prompts the question: In what direction is this military transformation headed?

Arabs Pressure Hamas to Renounce Violence

By SALAH NASRAWI
Associated Press Writer
Wed Feb 1, 10:52 PM ET

Egypt and Jordan joined the West in pressuring the militant group Hamas Wednesday, declaring it must recognize Israel and renounce violence if it wants to lead the Palestinians. Hamas held fast to its militant platform but suggested it might extend its cease-fire with the Israelis.

The message from the two key American allies in the Arab world — both nations have signed peace treaties with Israel — was the strongest yet to the militant group, which calls for Israel's destruction, opposes peace talks, refuses to lay down its arms and had carried out dozens of deadly suicide bombings against Israelis.

Rumors had swirled through the Arab world over the past several days that moderate Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, whose Fatah faction was defeated in the vote, would meet by week's end with Hamas leaders in Gaza to talk about forming a government.

But all sides have subsequently played down that possibility, with Fatah members saying Abbas was in no hurry, viewing the passage of time as a tool for winning concessions from Hamas.

In Cairo, however, Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit spoke bluntly as he emerging from separate talks between President Hosni Mubarak with Abbas and Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni.

"When you (Hamas) sit in the (Palestinian) parliament, you talk with your tongue and not with a gun. ...(Hamas) should not run away from the reality," he said.

Omar Suleiman, Egypt's intelligence chief and point man on Palestinian issues, was even more emphatic: "Nobody will talk to them before they stop violence, recognize Israel and accept (peace) agreements."

Mubarak's spokesman, Suleiman Awaad, said Hamas had no choice but to abide by deals already made between the Palestinians and Israel.

Former Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat "was able to change his position. There is nothing that prevents smart political leaders from changing their positions to behave accordingly," Awaad said.

In Amman, Prime Minister Marouf al-Bakhit, said the Jordanian government — which expelled Hamas leaders after it signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1994 — would continue its ban on contacts with the group's exiled leaders.

That would signal an attempt to isolate Hamas and split its leadership abroad from members and leaders in the Palestinian territories, who have led the violent campaign against Israel.

Livni whose government has said it won't deal with the militant movement said Hamas' sweeping win in the Palestinian parliamentary vote threatened to undo years of negotiations.

The militant group, she said, posed "a danger to the future of the region.The international community should put conditions before it (Hamas) will be able to take over. I hope the Palestinian Authority will not turn into an authority of terrorism."

In an interview with The Associated Press, however, Hamas deputy leader Moussa Abu Marzouk pointed to a different reality and rejected President Bush's call in his State of the Union address for Hamas to disarm and recognize the Jewish state.

"These conditions cannot be accepted and the U.S. president should accept the reality, because the Palestinian people have exercised their democratic choice, with mechanisms that are basically Western, and they chose Hamas," Abu Marzouk said.

But he did hold out the possibility of extending the truce with Israel that expired at the end of last year but has held since then.

"We understand that they need a quiet region, without conflicts, and we know that it's possible to attain this goal," he said. "I believe that this (a renewed truce) is one of the options which we could propose in the future to cooperate with the international community to bring about peace and tranquility to this region."

Hamas, the Arab acronym for the Islamic Resistance Movement, was founded by Palestinian members of the Egypt-based Muslim Brotherhood Movement in 1988. Its aim was to destroy the state of Israel.

"The Islamic Resistance Movement believes that the land of Palestine is an Islamic consecration for future Muslim generations until Judgment Day. It, or any part of it, should not be squandered; it, or any part of it, should not be given up," the Hamas charter states.

The flood of statements and counter statements signaled the frenzied nature of Arab and international diplomacy that was spawned by Hamas's astounding success in its first political outing — last week's Palestinian vote.

Even Suleiman, head of Egyptian intelligence — dubbed the most powerful in the Arab world — said he was surprised.

"We thought they might take some 40 per cent (of the seats)," he said. In fact, Hamas swept the vote, capturing 74 of 132 seats.

With that kind of support, Suleiman said he doubted Hamas would be quick to change course.

"These are radical people," he said. "It's still difficult to make them change 180 degrees."

Egypt and Jordan fear the rise of Hamas might boost the momentum and popularity of radical groups in their own countries.

The Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt's largest Islamic opposition group, won some 20 per cent of the seats in recent parliamentary elections — a sevenfold increase over the last legislature and a thorn in Mubarak's regime's side. In Jordan, a leader of the Muslim Brotherhood group warned his movement would stage a Hamas-style resurgence if the government held a new parliamentary vote.

Squaring Islam With Democracy

By Jim Hoagland
The Washington Post
Thursday, February 2, 2006; A21

"I have no idea what the result will be, but I am certain that it will lead to a very interesting situation."

-- Arthur Balfour, on issuing the 1917 declaration that promised a national home in Palestine for the Jews.

President Bush has created his own Balfourian times to live in by betting his legacy on the shifting sands of Middle East politics and religion. Iran's demagogic president, Iraq's Shiite clerics and the Palestinian radicals of Hamas have in recent days reminded Bush of the audacity of his bet that democracy will transform and stabilize the region.

How much more interesting can it get? Hillary Clinton is running to the right of Bush with a call for economic confrontation with Iran. Centrist support is growing for John McCain's view that bombing Iran is now in the cards. Kofi Annan has joined European foreign ministers in telling Hamas to recognize Israel or in effect go hungry.

But these tactical maneuvers are likely to fail in the absence of a larger strategy to reconcile democracy as understood in the West and Islam as practiced in much of the Middle East. Bush should not abandon his push for Middle Eastern democracy because radicals draw temporary advantage from it. But he needs to reexamine where that push is taking him. This means forging a new Western strategy to engage with and support moderate forms of political Islam, rather than assuming that democratic elections and other reforms will automatically separate religion and politics and devalue the former in favor of the latter.

That theme echoed through the State of the Union address. Bush twice condemned "radical Islam" and said it would be defeated by American resolve. But he remained silent on mainstream Islam's role in politics and in jihad. A stronger commitment to democracy would overcome all, he suggested.

This fails to adjust his policies to the changes they have helped produce. Political Islam has largely been treated by American and European policymakers as an extremist phenomenon since Iran's Shiite clerics seized power in 1979. The tendency was reinforced by the atrocities of Sept. 11, 2001. Under the Bush doctrine, political Islam is to be fought country by country, through counterterrorism programs, diplomatic isolation and economic sanctions.

But political Islam finds democracy to be a congenial rather than an antithetical force. Calling for the destruction of Israel, as Hamas and the Iranians do, is a popular program sold to the masses under an Islamic banner. When Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was warned by friendly diplomats last September that his hard-line speech to the U.N. General Assembly would cost him international support, he reportedly scoffed: "I am getting good news from home" about reaction to the speech.

Or take Hamas's electoral victory over Fatah and other remnants of the Palestine Liberation Organization. It is the final nail in the coffin of pan-Arab nationalism, which is now as much a relic of history as the PLO itself. The obsolescence of pan-Arabism was also underlined by the victory of Shiite religious parties in Iraq's recent elections.

It is possible to reconcile democracy, Islam, peaceful coexistence with Israel and good governance. Turkey and Morocco are examples of countries making significant progress on these fronts. Iraq has the potential as well to show that Bush's emphasis on promoting democracy is not guaranteed to boomerang on him.

Bush's demand that freedom and democracy become the beacons toward which all nations in the region should advance was neither inherently flawed nor clueless, as critics maintain. The post-colonial Arab political order of militaristic or hereditary authoritarianism was tottering toward collapse in any event. American efforts to help channel the coming upheaval were, and are, appropriate.

"A democratic election is an exercise in accountability," says former secretary of state George Shultz. "It is no surprise the electorate threw these rascals out when they got the chance," continued Shultz, who in 1988 approved the first official U.S.-PLO dialogue and held the guerrilla organization to strict account on its promises.

"I wouldn't automatically say you won't talk to somebody in this situation," he added. "What is important is what you say: Tell them what you stand for and what you hope will happen. But you sure don't have to fund them."

Bush Says U.S. Would Defend Israel Militarily

By Glenn Kessler, Washington Post Staff Writer
Washington Post
February 2, 2006

President Bush said yesterday the United States would defend Israel militarily if necessary against Iran, a statement that appeared to be his most explicit commitment to Israel's defense.

In an interview with Reuters, Bush said he is concerned about Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's "menacing talk" about Israel, such as his comments denying the Holocaust and saying Israel should be wiped off the map.

"Israel is a solid ally of the United States. We will rise to Israel's defense, if need be. So this kind of menacing talk is disturbing. It's not only disturbing to the United States, it's disturbing for other countries in the world, as well," Bush said.

Asked whether he meant the United States would rise to Israel's defense militarily, Bush said: "You bet, we'll defend Israel."

The Jewish state sought some sort of military alliance with the United States shortly after it was founded in 1948, but was rebuffed by several presidents, partly out of fear of offending Arabs. Since then, Israel has established the principle of securing its own defense, including a nuclear deterrent, backed by large weapons sales by the United States.

Past presidents have spoken elliptically about helping Israel, a close ally, in a conflict. The United States has no military alliance with Israel, though President Bill Clinton dangled the prospect of a military alliance as part of a final peace deal, said Dennis Ross, a senior Clinton adviser on the region.

Ross said he could not recall a president ever saying so clearly the United States would come to Israel's defense. But he said it is a "logical extension" of existing policy, because Israel has never before faced the threat of a foe with a possible nuclear weapon.

"This proves once again the United States is the best friend and ally of Israel," said Israeli Ambassador Daniel Ayalon. "We are very proud of this special relationship, which is the cornerstone of stability in the Middle East, for the mutual benefit of Israel, the U.S. and all peace-loving countries in the region and beyond."

The White House played down Bush's comments, saying they are in line with previous remarks and do not represent new policy. But examples provided by the White House were not as explicit, with Bush publicly saying he was "committed to the security of Israel as a vibrant Jewish state" or "committed to the safety of Israel."

The White House yesterday also provided a partial transcript of an interview in July 2004, in which Bush replied "yes" when asked whether U.S. presidents are obligated to defend Israel. The White House did not identify the newspaper, which apparently did not report the remark.

Last month, in an interview on CNBC, Vice President Cheney was asked whether the United States would provide military assistance if Iran attacked. "I don't think there's any question but what we would support Israel under those circumstances," Cheney said.

Overhaul Eyed For Rumsfeld's Policy Office

By Rowan Scarborough
The Washington Times
February 2, 2006

Senior planners for Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld have presented him with confidential recommendations for the first overhaul of his policy office since the Cold War.

Some officials fear the overhaul will dilute the power of the civilian subordinate office within the policy office that oversees special operations, the lead force in tracking and killing al Qaeda terrorists.

Eric Edelman, undersecretary of defense for policy, and Ryan Henry, his chief deputy, spearheaded the study designed to make the policy-writing shop within Mr. Rumsfeld's office, which had been run by Douglas Feith, more compatible with fighting terrorists and to interact with the increasingly powerful U.S. combatant commanders around the globe. Mr. Feith was a key architect of the Iraq war.

Mr. Rumsfeld takes a keen interest in policy development, choosing an "iterative" process whereby the plan matures and changes through research and discussion.

A senior defense official, who confirmed the study's existence, said it is "very premature" to speculate on specific changes, but he added "the secretary always has a sense of urgency."

The policy bureaucracy under Mr. Feith has played a prominent role in the war on terror. It devised a key objective in the war of denying territory as the best way to stop al Qaeda. It also developed the blueprint for vastly increasing Special Operations Command's power and numbers, and augmented plans for war and post-war operations in Iraq.

But to some, the policy shop's structure has one foot in the Cold War. Principal offices for overseeing policy in Europe and Asia -- International Security Policy and International Security Affairs respectively -- were set up under President Reagan. And some officials complain of poor liaisons between policy and the new undersecretary of defense for intelligence.

"The idea is that a lot of the organization for policy is stuck, despite our best attempts, more or less in the Cold War," the senior defense official said.

The source declined to provide specific options but did say one focus is "a way to align the undersecretary of intelligence and special operations."

The policy shop oversees commandos through the assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low intensity conflict (SOLIC). That post is now held by Thomas O'Connell, a former commando.

The office has limited influence with Mr. Rumsfeld, according to defense officials who say it had little involvement in the soon-to-be released Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The QDR contains significant new programs for special operations, yet most of the initiatives came not from SOLIC, but from U.S. Special Operations Command (SoCom) in Tampa, Fla., the sources said.

Some in the defense establishment fear the Edelman study is a route to abolishing SOLIC altogether and putting policy oversight closer to Mr. Rumsfeld's office.

Mr. Rumsfeld takes a special interest in SoCom, and frequently discusses missions with Gen. Doug Brown, who heads the organization.

Air Force To Weigh Rapid-Strike Options For Global 'No-Warning' Threats

Inside The Pentagon
February 2, 2006

The Air Force in March will launch a two-year review of weapon concepts that could allow the United States to respond to surprise threats by destroying targets halfway around the world within 60 minutes of an order to strike, according to defense officials and documents.

The Pentagon effort to field a new “Prompt Global Strike” capability by 2020 comes as defense officials also prepare a nearer-term project to equip the Navy’s submarine-launched Trident D-5 nuclear missile with a conventional warhead (Inside the Pentagon, Jan. 26, p3). If Congress allows the Defense Department to begin work this year on the $500 million conventional Trident effort, a small number of the interim weapons could be fielded on submarines within four years, according to defense sources.

For the longer term, the Air Force last week asked industry representatives to submit concepts for new weapons that could “strike globally, precisely and rapidly with kinetic effects against high-payoff, time-sensitive targets in a single or multi-theater environment.”

A Jan. 27 “request for information” on Prompt Global Strike technology options describes a desired capability to hit valuable targets quickly from the United States even if the military lacks troops, aircraft or ships in the region, according to service officials.

The top officer at U.S. Strategic Command, Marine Corps Gen. James Cartwright, reportedly sees this ability as vital if the United States receives fleeting intelligence about an important target. For instance, such a weapon might be used if North Korea prepares to launch a nuclear missile or if intelligence surfaces on a terrorist leader’s whereabouts.

The most demanding scenarios under which the president might launch global-strike weapons are in cases of “no warning,” according to defense officials.

The risk posed by such surprise threats has been of concern to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld for years, dating back to a congressionally mandated panel he chaired during the Clinton administration (ITP, June 25, 1998, p1).

In its upcoming analysis of alternatives, the Air Force will study first how effective the proposed technologies might be against no-warning threats, according to Maj. Gen. Mark Shackelford, director of plans and requirements at Air Force Space Command in Colorado Springs, CO.

“This is a situation where national security demands an immediate response, such that we have to be able to respond quickly, potentially in an anti-access environment,” he told ITP in a Jan. 31 telephone interview. “Anti-access” is Pentagon terminology for a U.S. inability to gain rights to use bases, airspace or waterways in a given region.

This is the more “pressing need” because the United States cannot yet launch long-range, conventional weapons on very short notice, he said.

“We don’t have the ability right now to respond in a shorter time line” -- in “hours to days” rather than “days or weeks,” Shackelford said. “So what we would like to do is take a look at this shorter time-line situation, where we have not had an opportunity to forward-deploy forces [and] where we must respond quickly to ward off any potential attack that otherwise we would not be able to deal with.”

That phase of the service’s analysis of alternatives will last one year, he said.

In the study’s second year, the Air Force will consider how such weapons might perform in cases where national leaders have “unambiguous warning,” implying the United States has more time to consider its response, the general said.

Last week’s request for information says unambiguous warning “occurs when the president decides, based on intelligence received, that a hostile government [entity] has decided to initiate hostilities.” The bracketed word appears in the original solicitation.

“In an unambiguous-warning case, given enough time . . . we can preposition forces to satisfy the need,” Shackelford said. “If we have forward-deployed forces, they can react in a days-to-weeks time frame.”

Candidate systems for Prompt Global Strike likely will include conventional variants of existing land- and sea-based strategic ballistic missiles, according to defense and industry officials. They are also expected to include ideas for new conventional ballistic missiles or hypersonic vehicles that require more development, officials say.

Cartwright and other defense leaders are said to be particularly interested in technologies that allow a conventional payload greater accuracy, such as hypersonic weapons that can adjust direction en route to a target.

A Prompt Global Strike weapon is expected to have as much as 7,000- to 8,000-mile range, according to sources.

Although the Pentagon has settled on the Trident modification for the near term, Shackelford says he hopes the longer-term solution for global strike could be fielded even before the 2020 target date.

“We would be more than interested in having the capability sooner than that if we can technologically support it,” Shackelford says. Thus his command may favor a solution “that is more mature” over “something that is less mature,” taking into account “potential life-cycle costs,” as well, he said.

The Air Force is directing the effort to develop this long-term capability as U.S. Strategic Command’s lead on space and global strike.

Democracy Isn't For Our Friends Only

by Robert Fisk
Seattle Post-Intelligencer
January 31, 2006

Oh no, not more democracy again! Didn't we award this to those Algerians in 1990? And didn't they reward us with that nice gift of an Islamist government -- and then they so benevolently canceled the second round of elections? Thank goodness for that!

True, the Afghans elected a round of representatives, albeit they included warlords and murderers. But the Iraqis last year elected the Dawa party in Baghdad, which was responsible -- let us not speak this in Washington, D.C. -- for most of the kidnappings of Westerners in Beirut in the '80s, the car bombing of the (late) emir and the United States and French embassies in Kuwait.

Now, horror of horrors, the Palestinians have elected the wrong party. They were supposed to have given their support to the pro-Western, corrupt, absolutely pro-American Fatah, which had promised to "control" them, rather than to Hamas, which said they would represent them. And, bingo, they have chosen the wrong party again.

Result: 76 of 132 seats. That just about does it. What are we to do with people who don't vote the way they should?

In the 1930s, the British would lock up the Egyptians who turned against the government of King Farouk. Thus they began to set the structure of anti-democratic governance that was to follow. The French imprisoned the Lebanese government, which demanded the same. Then the French left Lebanon.

But we have always expected the Arab governments to do what they were told.

So today, we are expecting the Syrians to behave, the Iranians to kowtow to our nuclear desires (though they have done nothing illegal) and the North Koreans to surrender their weapons (though they actually do have them, and therefore cannot be attacked).

Now let the burdens of power lie heavy on the shoulders of the party. Now let the responsibilities of people lie upon them. We British would never talk to the Irish Republican Army. But in due course, Gerry Adams came to take tea with the queen. The Americans would never speak to their enemies in North Vietnam. But they did. In Paris.

No, al-Qaida will not do that. But the Iraqi leaders of the insurgency in Mesopotamia will. They talked to the British in 1920, and they will talk to the Americans in 2006.

Back in 1983, Hamas talked to the Israelis. They spoke directly to them about the spread of mosques and religious teaching. The Israeli army boasted about this on the front page of the Jerusalem Post. At that time, it looked like the Palestine Liberation Organization was not going to abide by the Oslo resolutions. There seemed nothing wrong, therefore, with continuing talks with Hamas. So how come talks with Hamas now seem so impossible?

Not long after the Hamas leadership had been hurled into southern Lebanon, a leading member of its organization heard me say that I was en route to Israel.

"You'd better call Shimon Peres," he told me. "Here's his home number."

The phone number was correct -- proof members of the hierarchy of the most extremist Palestinian movements were talking to senior Israeli politicians.

The Israelis know well the Hamas leadership. And the Hamas leadership know well the Israelis. There is no point in journalists suggesting otherwise. Our enemies invariably turn out to be our greatest friends, and our friends turn out to be our enemies.

How terrible to speak with those who have killed our sons. How unspeakable to converse with those who have our brothers' blood on their hands. No doubt that is how Americans who believed in independence felt about the Englishmen who fired upon them.

It will be for the Iraqis to deal with al-Qaida. This is their burden. Not ours. Yet throughout history, we have ended up talking to our enemies.

We talked to the representatives of the emperor of Japan. In the end, we had to accept the surrender of the German Reich from the successor to Adolf Hitler. And today, we trade happily with the Japanese, the Germans and the Italians.

The Middle East was never a successor to Nazi Germany or Fascist Italy, despite the rubbish talked by President Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair. How long will it be before we can throw away the burden of this most titanic of wars and see our future, not as our past, but as a reality?

Surely, in an age when our governments no longer contain men or women who have experienced war, we must now lead a people with the understanding of what war means. Not Hollywood. Not documentary films. Democracy means real freedom, not just for the people we choose to have voted into power.

And that is the problem in the Middle East.