Sunday, June 28, 2009

Disputed minaret near Olten inaugurated



A controversial minaret has been inaugurated at a mosque in the town of Wangen near Olten.
June 27, 2009
swissinfo.ch with agencies

Organisers said about 1,000 people took part in Saturday's festivities which took place despite a boycott by several official representatives concerned over a rise in Islamic extremism.

The president of the local Turkish culture association, Mustapha Karahan, said the minaret would promote mutual respect between Christians and Muslims.

A Methodist pastor called on Christians and Muslims to join forces to defend freedom of religion, while a centre-left politician described the minaret as a symbol of integration.

However, a senior official from federal and cantonal authorities refused to take part in the ceremony because of a controversial flag displayed at the mosque.

The construction of the minaret at Wangen took more than four years and prompted rightwing political parties to propose a nationwide ban on minarets. But no date has yet been set for the ballot.

There are currently four minarets in Switzerland, including Geneva, Zurich and Winterthur.

Plans for a minaret at Langenthal are still pending.

Iraq Set to Seek Foreign Oil Bids

Critics Say Contracts Will Benefit Giant Firms, Hurt Government Politically

By Ernesto Londoño and K.I. Ibrahim
Washington Post Foreign Service
Sunday, June 28, 2009

BAGHDAD, June 27 -- Iraq is poised to open its coveted oil fields to foreign companies this week for the first time in nearly four decades, a politically risky move in a country eager to shake off the stigma of occupation.

Iraqi politicians and some veteran oil officials have said the deals are unduly beneficial to oil giants, which are viewed warily by many in this deeply nationalistic but cash-strapped country.

Oil executives have been following the matter with apprehension, industry analysts said, but they are eager to get a foothold in Iraq, which has the world's second-largest proven crude reserves and is seen as the only major penetrable market.

"It's something the industry really wants," said Ben Lando, editor of Iraq Oil Report, an Iraq energy news Web site. "The number of reserves around the world that they have access to is declining. And Iraq has so much oil."

Iraq's Oil Ministry is expected to auction eight contracts for six active oil fields and two largely undeveloped gas fields Monday and Tuesday. Thirty-five companies have been selected to submit bids for the 20-year service contracts.

The winners will be required to give the Iraqi government a total of $3 billion in loans. They will be compensated for costs and will earn a per-barrel fee for boosting production at the fields, ravaged by years of war and sanctions.

Although the terms for investors are less than ideal, analysts said, those who get picked in the first round are likely to receive more lucrative contracts in the future. The companies are also preparing bids for a second round of contracts for work at undeveloped fields, which Iraqi officials expect to award in coming months.

Companies that secure the contracts will be wading into a country with a latent insurgency, endemic corruption and deeply divided political leaders who have been unable to enact a hydrocarbons law.

The man leading the effort to bring in foreign investors, Oil Minister Hussain Shahristani, has come under attack in recent days by some lawmakers and oil officials, who argue that Iraq should rebuild its crippled oil sector without substantial help from foreign companies.

Iraq's parliament does not have a formal role in awarding the contracts, whose legality has been questioned by some lawmakers and the autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government in northern Iraq.

Critics say that Saddam Hussein-era laws that stressed nationalization of Iraq's oil industry remain in effect until a new law is passed.

"There is a majority opinion inside parliament that opposes these bids," legislator Alia Nusaif said in an interview, adding that the Oil Ministry should have given lawmakers more time to examine the terms. "We must think ahead and ensure that our future generations are not left empty-handed because of the ill motives of some."

Shahristani, who was questioned by lawmakers last week during a sometimes contentious two-day hearing, argued that Iraq cannot afford to rebuild its oil sector without help. The recent drop in oil prices, which has stymied government initiatives and triggered a freeze on the hiring of security forces, has underscored the urgent need for foreign cash and expertise, he said.

"All experts inside and outside the government agree on the need to repair the oil infrastructure and expand exploration development and production," Shahristani said. "The country depends almost exclusively on its oil reserves."

Iraq expelled foreign oil companies in 1972 amid a regional movement toward nationalization. Its national oil company performed well until the 1991 Persian Gulf War, which was preceded by sanctions imposed by the United Nations.

Violence and the exodus of scores of technocrats after the U.S.-led invasion in 2003 have taken a toll on the industry. Pipelines in northern and southern Iraq are in dire need of repair, and much of the equipment at functioning oil fields is outdated or underperforming.

Iraq pumps an estimated 2.4 million barrels of oil a day. With foreign capital and expertise, oil experts said, the figure could grow to 10 million in a few years.

Iraq has an estimated 115 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, second only to Saudi Arabia. Other attractive markets, such as Venezuela and Russia, have in recent years asserted more state control over the industry.

The government, keenly aware of the potential for controversy and political fallout, has sought to portray the process as transparent. Bidders will submit sealed proposals that will be evaluated using a set formula during televised sessions.

The bidding process and its outcome could have political consequences for Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who is expected to seek reelection in January. Many Iraqis still view Maliki as somewhat beholden to the U.S. government, and his rivals could use the oil issue to portray him as a sellout.

"The nationalization of Iraq's oil sector was extremely popular, but national capacity was hurt by wars during Saddam Hussein's time and his misuse of the oil sector," Lando said. "They had great talent, great coordination. So Iraqis see that and say: Why can't we re-create that rather than rely on foreign companies?"

Former oil minister Ibrahim Bahr Uloom said the government would have been wise to delay the process until after the election.

"What will happen if a new government comes and a new prime minister and a new parliament don't go ahead with these contracts?" he asked.

Israel's settlements are on shaky ground

International law mandates that they must be removed and that the Palestinians should be compensated for their losses.
By Sarah Leah Whitson
Los Angeles Times
June 28, 2009

The debate over Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories is often framed in terms of whether they should be "frozen" or allowed to grow "naturally." But that is akin to asking whether a thief should be allowed merely to keep his ill-gotten gains or steal some more. It misses the most fundamental point: Under international law, all settlements on occupied territory are unlawful. And there is only one remedy: Israel should dismantle them, relocate the settlers within its recognized 1967 borders and compensate Palestinians for the losses the settlements have caused.

Removing the settlements is mandated by the laws of the Geneva Convention, which state that military occupations are to be a temporary state of affairs and prohibit occupying powers from moving their populations into conquered territory. The intent is to foreclose an occupying power from later citing its population as "facts on the ground" to claim the territory, something Israel has done in East Jerusalem and appears to want to do with much of the West Bank.

The legal principles were reaffirmed in 2004 by the International Court of Justice, which cited a U.N. Security Council statement that the settlements were "a flagrant violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention." The International Committee of the Red Cross and an overwhelming number of institutions concerned with the enforcement of international humanitarian law have concurred in that view.

The economic and social cost of Israeli settlements to the Palestinian population, stemming in part from Israel's need to protect them, are enormous. The 634 (at last count) roadblocks, barriers and checkpoints erected to control the movement of lawful residents of the territory make travel an ordeal. Sometimes even getting to work, school or the home of a relative is impossible for Palestinians. Every day, they must wait in line for hours to show their IDs, and some days they are randomly rerouted, told to go home or, worse, detained for questioning.

Similarly, the fact that Israel is building 87% of its projected 450-mile "security barrier" on Palestinian territory has less to do with protecting Israel from suicide bombers -- which could have been accomplished by erecting a wall on the Green Line -- than it does with putting 10% of West Bank territory, including most settlers, on the Israeli side. And while Israeli troops protect the settlers from armed Palestinian groups, there is little protection for Palestinians from the settlers' marauding militias and gangs, which have terrorized the local population, destroying their crops, uprooting their trees and throwing stones at their houses and schools.

Too little attention is given to the pervasive system of government-sponsored discrimination against Palestinians in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, where Israel has constructed roads exclusively for settlers and established vastly unequal access to water, fuel, education, healthcare, transportation, infrastructure and virtually every other social service. Israeli authorities readily grant settlers building permits that they deny to Palestinians, whose "illegal" homes they often demolish at short notice. The glaring discrepancy in Israel's treatment of two populations living on the same land has taken a significant moral toll on Israel, as well as a political one, with wide coverage of humiliation and abuse at the hands of its security forces.

The common refrain of Israeli and even American politicians who recognize that the settlements must go is that it would be politically difficult to dismantle them, in part because it would stir the ire of the settlers and their supporters, an important voting bloc in Israel. Instead, politicians argue that settlements must be a part of future negotiations and a possible land swap.

But this only serves as further incentive to expand settlements and makes a political resolution even more difficult. It also condones in the interim Israel's continuing human rights abuses in the name of settler security, leaving respect for Palestinians' rights a second-tier consideration that must await the conclusion of peace talks that have already gone on for decades.

Israel has a duty to protect its citizens, but not in a way that violates the rights of Palestinians. The lawful, rights-respecting way to protect the security of settlers is to move them back to Israel. That should be the starting point of any discussion on settlements.

Sarah Leah Whitson is Middle East director at Human Rights Watch.

Monday, June 22, 2009

Confidential memo reveals US plan to provoke an invasion of Iraq

Confidential memo reveals US plan to provoke an invasion of Iraq
* Jamie Doward, Gaby Hinsliff and Mark Townsend
* The Observer, Sunday 21 June 2009

A confidential record of a meeting between President Bush and Tony Blair before the invasion of Iraq, outlining their intention to go to war without a second United Nations resolution, will be an explosive issue for the official inquiry into the UK's role in toppling Saddam Hussein.

The memo, written on 31 January 2003, almost two months before the invasion and seen by the Observer, confirms that as the two men became increasingly aware UN inspectors would fail to find weapons of mass destruction (WMD) they had to contemplate alternative scenarios that might trigger a second resolution legitimising military action.

Bush told Blair the US had drawn up a provocative plan "to fly U2 reconnaissance aircraft painted in UN colours over Iraq with fighter cover". Bush said that if Saddam fired at the planes this would put the Iraqi leader in breach of UN resolutions.

The president expressed hopes that an Iraqi defector would be "brought out" to give a public presentation on Saddam's WMD or that someone might assassinate the Iraqi leader. However, Bush confirmed even without a second resolution, the US was prepared for military action. The memo said Blair told Bush he was "solidly with the president".

The five-page document, written by Blair's foreign policy adviser, Sir David Manning, and copied to Sir Jeremy Greenstock, the UK ambassador to the UN, Jonathan Powell, Blair's chief of staff, the chief of the defence staff, Admiral Lord Boyce, and the UK's ambassador to Washington, Sir Christopher Meyer, outlines how Bush told Blair he had decided on a start date for the war.

Paraphrasing Bush's comments at the meeting, Manning, noted: "The start date for the military campaign was now pencilled in for 10 March. This was when the bombing would begin."

Last night an expert on international law who is familar with the memo's contents said it provided vital evidence into the two men's frames of mind as they considered the invasion and its aftermath and must be presented to the Chilcott inquiry established by Gordon Brown to examine the causes, conduct and consequences of the Iraq war.

Philippe Sands, QC, a professor of law at University College London who is expected to give evidence to the inquiry, said confidential material such as the memo was of national importance, making it vital that the inquiry is not held in private, as Brown originally envisioned.

In today's Observer, Sands writes: "Documents like this raise issues of national embarrassment, not national security. The restoration of public confidence requires this new inquiry to be transparent. Contentious matters should not be kept out of the public domain, even in the run-up to an election."

The memo notes there had been a shift in the two men's thinking on Iraq by late January 2003 and that preparing for war was now their priority. "Our diplomatic strategy had to be arranged around the military planning," Manning writes. This was despite the fact Blair that had yet to receive advice on the legality of the war from the Attorney General, Lord Goldsmith, which did not arrive until 7 March 2003 - 13 days before the bombing campaign started.

In his article today, Sands says the memo raises questions about the selection of the chair of the inquiry. Sir John Chilcott sat on the 2004 Butler inquiry, which examined the reliability of intelligence in the run-up to the Iraq war, and would have been privy to the document's contents - and the doubts about WMD running to the highest levels of the US and UK governments.

Many senior legal experts have expressed dismay that Chilcott has been selected to chair the inquiry as he is considered to be close to the security services after his time spent as a civil servant in Northern Ireland.

Brown had believed that allowing the Chilcott inquiry to hold private hearings would allow witnesses to be candid. But after bereaved families and antiwar campaigners expressed outrage, the prime minister wrote to Chilcott to say that if the panel can show witnesses and national security issues will not be compromised by public hearings, he will change his stance.

Lord Guthrie, a former chief of the defence staff under Blair, described the memo as "quite shocking". He said that it underscored why the Chilcott inquiry must be seen to be a robust investigation: "It's important that the inquiry is not a whitewash as these inquiries often are."

This year, the Dutch government launched its own inquiry into its support for the war. Significantly, the inquiry will see all the intelligence shared with the Dutch intelligence services by MI5 and MI6. The inquiry intends to publish its report in November - suggesting that confidential information about the role played by the UK and the US could become public before Chilcott's inquiry reports next year.

Sunday, June 14, 2009

US President Barack Obama


An Ultra Orthodox Jewish man walk past posters, hung by an extremist right wing group, depicting US President Barack Obama wearing a traditional Arab headdress, in Jerusalem, Sunday, June 14, 2009. Senior aides say they don't expect Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to explicitly endorse Palestinian statehood when he delivers an anxiously awaited policy speech Sunday night, a stance that would preserve an uncomfortable impasse with the United States.

T (AP Photo/Sebastian Scheiner)

Obama: returning to the barbed wire until the final solution ("the peace")



An Israeli boy attends a protest held by far right Israeli activists during the speech of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at Bar-Ilan University in Ramat Gan near Tel Aviv June 14, 2009. Netanyahu accepted on Sunday the U.S.-backed goal of a Palestinian state but balked at meeting President Barack Obama's demand to stop Jewish settlement expansion. The placard on the right reads in Hebrew "Obama: returning to the barbed wire until the final solution ("the peace")".

REUTERS/Gil Cohen Magen (ISRAEL POLITICS CONFLICT IMAGES OF THE DAY)

Sunday, May 24, 2009

Yet Another Bogus 'Terror' Plot

By Robert Dreyfuss

May 22, 2009 "The Nation" -- By the now, it's maddeningly familiar. A scary terrorist plot is announced. Then it's revealed that the suspects are a hapless bunch of ne'er-do-wells or run-of-the-mill thugs without the slightest connection to any terrorists at all, never mind to Al Qaeda. Finally, the last piece of the puzzle: the entire plot is revealed to have been cooked up by a scummy government agent-provocateur.

I've seen this movie before.

In this case, the alleged perps -- Onta Williams, James Cromitie, David Williams, and Laguerre Payen -- were losers, ex-cons, drug addicts. Al Qaeda they're not. Without the assistance of the agent who entrapped them, they would never have dreamed of committing political violence, nor would they have had the slightest idea about where to acquire plastic explosives or a Stinger missile. That didn't stop prosecutors from acting as if they'd captured Osama bin Laden himself. Noted the Los Angeles Times:

Prosecutors called it the latest in a string of homegrown terrorism plots hatched after Sept. 11.

"It's hard to envision a more chilling plot," Assistant U.S. Atty. Eric Snyder said in court Thursday. He described all four suspects as "eager to bring death to Jews."

Actually, it's hard to imagine a stupider, less competent, and less important plot. The four losers were ensnared by a creepy FBI agent who hung around the mosque in upstate New York until he found what he was looking for. Here's the New York Times account:

Salahuddin Mustafa Muhammad, the imam at the mosque where the authorities say the confidential informant first encountered the men, said none of the men were active in the mosque. ...

Mr. Cromitie was there last June, and he met a stranger.

He had no way of knowing that the stranger's path to the mosque began in 2002, when he was arrested on federal charges of identity theft. He was sentenced to five years' probation, and became a confidential informant for the F.B.I. He began showing up at the mosque in Newburgh around 2007, Mr. Muhammad said.

The stranger's behavior aroused the imam's suspicions. He invited other worshipers to meals, and spoke of violence and jihad, so the imam said he steered clear of him.

"There was just something fishy about him," Mr. Muhammad said. Members "believed he was a government agent."

Mr. Muhammad said members of his congregation told him the man he believed was the informant offered at least one of them a substantial amount of money to join his "team."

So a creepy thug buttonholes people at a mosque, foaming at the mouth about violence and jihad? This is law enforcement? Just imagine if someone did this at a local church, or some synagogue. And the imam says the people "believed he was a government agent."

Preying on these losers, none of whom were apparently actual Muslims, the "confidential informant" orchestrated the acquisition of a disabled Stinger missile to shoot down military planes and cooked up a wild scheme about attacking a Jewish center in the Bronx.

It gets even more pathetic:

The only one of the four suspects who appears to have aroused any suspicion was Payen, a Haitian native who attended the Newburgh mosque. Assistant imam Hamid Rashada said his dishevelment and odd behavior disturbed some members, said the assistant imam, Hamid Rashada.

When Payen appeared in court, defense attorney Marilyn Reader described him as "intellectually challenged" and on medication for schizophrenia. The Associated Press said that when he was asked if he understood the proceedings, Payen replied: "Sort of."

Despite the pompous statements from Mayor Bloomberg of New York and other politicians, including Representative Peter King, the whole story is bogus. The four losers may have been inclined to violence, and they may have harbored a virulent strain of anti-Semitism. But it seems that the informant whipped up their violent tendencies and their hatred of Jews, cooked up the plot, incited them, arranged their purchase of weapons, and then had them busted. To ensure that it made headlines, the creepy informant claimed to be representing a Pakistani extremist group, Jaish-e Muhammad, a bona fide terrorist organization. He wasn't, of course.

It is disgusting and outrageous that the FBI is sending provocateurs into mosques.

The headlines reinforce the very fear that Dick Cheney is trying to stir up. The story strengthens the narrative that the "homeland" is under attack. It's not. As I've written repeatedly, since 9/11 not a single American has even been punched in the nose by an angry Muslim, as far as I can tell. Plot after plot -- the destruction of the Brooklyn Bridge! bombing the New York Subways! taking down the Sears Tower! bombing the Prudential building in Newark! -- proved to be utter nonsense.

Sunday, May 17, 2009

Saving Israel From Itself

The two-state solution is the only way to guarantee the Jewish state’s long-term security—and our own.

By John J. Mearsheimer

May 15, 2009 "The American Conservative" -- The United States and Israel fundamentally disagree about the need to establish a Palestinian state living side by side with Israel. President Obama is committed to a two-state solution, while Israel’s Prime Minister Netanyahu is opposed and has been for many years. To avoid a direct confrontation with Washington, Netanyahu will probably change his rhetoric and talk favorably about two states. But that will not affect Israel’s actions. The never-ending peace process will go on, Israel will continue building settlements, and the Palestinians will remain locked up in a handful of impoverished enclaves in the West Bank and Gaza. Anticipating this outcome, Obama has told Congress to expect a clash with Israel.

This is not a fight Obama is likely to win, even though the United States is more powerful than Israel and most Americans favor creating a Palestinian state and bringing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to a close.

Look at the historical record. Since 1967, every American president has opposed settlement-building in the Occupied Territories. Yet no president has been able to put meaningful pressure on Israel to stop building settlements, much less dismantle them. Perhaps the best evidence of American impotence is what happened during the Oslo peace process in the 1990s. Israel confiscated 40,000 acres of Palestinian land, constructed 250 miles of connector and bypass roads, doubled the number of settlers, and built 30 new settlements. President Clinton did hardly anything to halt this expansion.

The main reason no president has been able to stop Israel from colonizing the Occupied Territories is the Israel lobby. It is an especially powerful interest group that has pushed the American government to establish a “special relationship” with Israel, which is, as Yitzhak Rabin once said, “beyond compare in modern history.”

The special relationship means Washington gives Israel consistent, almost unconditional diplomatic backing and more foreign aid than any other country. In other words, Israel gets this aid even when it does things that the United States opposes, like building settlements. Furthermore, Israel is rarely criticized by American officials and certainly not by anyone who aspires to high office. Recall what happened earlier this year to Charles Freeman, who was forced to withdraw as head of the National Intelligence Council because he had criticized certain Israeli policies and questioned the merits of the special relationship.

Many hope that Obama will be different from his predecessors and stand up to the lobby. The indications thus far are not encouraging. During the 2008 presidential campaign, Obama responded to charges that he was “soft” on Israel by pandering to the lobby and publicly praising the special relationship. He was silent during the recent Gaza War—when Israel was being criticized around the world for its brutal assault on that densely populated enclave—and he said nothing when Freeman was forced to quit his administration. Like his predecessors, Obama appears to be no match for the lobby.

Israel’s supporters in the United States often claim that the special relationship is not due to the lobby’s influence. The American people, they argue, identify closely with Israel and put significant pressure on their leaders to support it generously and unconditionally. But there is abundant evidence showing that this is not true. Recent polls indicate that over 70 percent of Americans think that the U.S. should not take sides in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and only 47 percent of Americans think that Israel’s influence in the world is “mainly positive.” Moreover, 60 percent of Americans have said that the United States should withhold aid to Israel if it resists pressure to reach a peace agreement with the Palestinians.

In short, a clear majority of Americans do not favor the special relationship and would back Obama if he leaned on Israel to accept a Palestinian state. The lobby, however, would surely side with Israel and pressure the White House to back off. Given the lobby’s track record—as well as Obama’s—it is difficult to imagine him not caving.

Israel’s supporters defend the special relationship because they believe it is an unalloyed good for both countries. In essence, they think that the two countries’ interests are synonymous, and whatever Israel deems good for Israel is good for the United States. From their perspective, there is no need for Israel to change its behavior on any major policy issue, especially on matters relating to the Palestinians.

But they are wrong. Israel’s interests, like any other country’s interests, are not always the same as America’s. Thus it makes little sense for Washington to back Israel no matter what it does because sometimes there will be circumstances in which the two countries’ interests clash. For example, it probably made good sense for Israel to acquire nuclear weapons in the 1960s, since it lives in a dangerous neighborhood and a nuclear arsenal is the ultimate deterrent. But a nuclear-armed Israel was not in the American national interest.

Both countries would be much better off if the Obama administration treated Israel the way it treats other democracies, such as Britain, France, Germany, and India. In practice, this would mean backing Israel when its actions are consistent with American interests. But when they are not, Washington would distance itself from Jerusalem and use its considerable leverage to change Israeli behavior.

The United States is in deep trouble in the Middle East and has a serious terrorism problem in good part because of its unconditional support for Israel’s policies in the Occupied Territories. Backing Israel at almost every turn also makes it harder for Washington to get open support from moderate Arab states, even when dealing with common threats like Iran.

Israel’s backers often maintain that American support for Israel had nothing to do with 9/11, but this claim is simply not true. Consider the motivations of Khalid Sheik Muhammed, whom the 9/11 Commission describes as the “principle architect of the attacks.” According to the commission, “KSM’s animus toward the United States stemmed not from his experiences there as a student, but rather from his violent disagreement with U.S. foreign policy favoring Israel.” Numerous independent accounts have also documented that Osama bin Laden has been deeply concerned about the Palestinian situation since he was young, and the 9/11 Commission reports that he wanted the attackers to strike Congress, which he saw as the most important source of support for Israel in the United States. The commission also tells us that bin Laden twice wanted to move the date of the attacks forward because of events involving Israel—even though doing so would have increased the risk of failure.

In short, there is little hope of ending America’s terrorism problem and improving its standing in the Middle East if the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not resolved. That will only happen if there is a two-state solution, and that will only occur if the United States puts pressure on Israel.

The special relationship has become a liability for Israel as well. No country has ever pursued a flawless foreign policy, yet the lobby makes it impossible for American leaders to criticize Israel when it does something foolish. Think of the 2006 Lebanon War, when Washington backed Israel to the hilt while it employed a strategy that was, as most Israelis now recognize, boneheaded. The United States would have been a better friend had it pressured Israel to come up with a smarter response or pressed for a quick ceasefire. But that is not how the special relationship works. It is hard to see how this situation makes good sense for Israel.

So how should the Obama administration react to Netanyahu’s opposition to a Palestinian state? The key to understanding this vital issue is to consider two questions. First, what does Israel’s future look like in the absence of a two-state solution? In other words, where is Israel headed if Netanyahu gets his way? Second, what are the likely consequences for America, Israel, and the Palestinians?

Given present circumstances, there are three possible alternatives if the Palestinians do not get their own state, all of which involve creating a “greater Israel”—an Israel that effectively controls the West Bank and Gaza, or all of what was once called Mandatory Palestine.

In the first scenario, greater Israel would become a democratic binational state in which Palestinians and Jews enjoy equal political rights. This solution has been suggested by a handful of Jews and a growing number of Palestinians. It means abandoning the original Zionist vision of a Jewish state, however, since the Palestinians would eventually outnumber the Jews in greater Israel. Uri Avnery, a prominent Israeli journalist and peace activist, is surely correct when he says, “There is no chance at all that the Jewish public will agree, in this generation or the next, to live as a minority in a state dominated by an Arab majority.” Israel’s supporters in America would also have virtually no interest in this outcome.

Second, Israel could expel most of the Palestinians from greater Israel, thereby preserving its Jewish character through an overt act of ethnic cleansing. This seems unlikely, not just because it would be a crime against humanity, but also because there are about 5.5 million Palestinians between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea, and they would put up fierce resistance if Israel tried to expel them from their homes.

Still, there are good reasons to worry that Israel might adopt this solution as the demographic balance shifts and concerns about the survival of the Jewish state intensifiy. It is apparent from public-opinion surveys and everyday discourse that many Israelis hold racist views about Palestinians, and the recent Gaza War made clear that they have few qualms about killing Palestinian civilians. A century of conflict and four decades of occupation will do that to a people. Furthermore, a substantial number of Israeli Jews—40 percent or more—believe that the Arab citizens of Israel should be “encouraged” to leave by the government. Indeed, former foreign minister Tzipi Livni recently said that if there were a two-state solution, she expected Israel’s Palestinian citizens to leave and settle in the new Palestinian state.

The final and most likely alternative is some form of apartheid, whereby Israel increases its control over the Occupied Territories, but allows the Palestinians limited autonomy in a set of disconnected and economically crippled enclaves. Israelis and their American supporters invariably bristle at the comparison to white rule in South Africa, but that is their future if they create a greater Israel while denying full political rights to an Arab population that will soon outnumber the Jewish population in the entirety of the land. Former prime minister Ehud Olmert said as much when he proclaimed that if “the two-state solution collapses,” Israel will “face a South-African-style struggle.” He went so far as to argue, “as soon as that happens, the state of Israel is finished.” Other Israelis, as well as Jimmy Carter and Bishop Desmond Tutu, have warned that continuing the occupation will turn Israel into an apartheid state.

These three outcomes are the only alternatives to a two-state solution, and each would be disastrous for the Jewish state. Apartheid is not a viable long-term solution because the Palestinians will continue to resist until they achieve independence. Their resistance will force Israel to escalate the same repressive policies that have already cost significant blood and treasure, encouraged political corruption, and badly tarnished the nation’s global image. More importantly, there would be little support and much opposition to an apartheid state in the West, especially in the United States, where democracy is venerated and segregation is condemned. This is why Olmert said that going down the apartheid road would be suicidal for Israel.

But bringing democracy to greater Israel would also mean the end of the Jewish state because the more numerous Palestinians would dominate its politics. That leaves ethnic cleansing, which would certainly keep Israel Jewish. That murderous strategy, however, would do enormous damage to Israel’s moral fabric, its relationship with Jews in the diaspora, and its international standing. Israel and its supporters would be treated harshly by history. No genuine friend of Israel could support such a heinous course of action.

Given this grim situation, it is not surprising that a significant number of Israelis have moved abroad and many others would leave if they could. There are somewhere between 700,000 and 1 million Israeli Jews living outside the country, many of whom are unlikely to return. Since 2007, emigration has been outpacing immigration in Israel. According to scholars John Mueller and Ian Lustick, “a recent survey indicates that only 69 percent of Jewish Israelis say they want to stay in the country, and a 2007 poll finds that one-quarter of Israelis are considering leaving, including almost half of all young people.” They report, “in another survey, 44 percent of Israelis say they would be ready to leave if they could find a better standard of living elsewhere,” and “over 100,000 Israelis have acquired European passports.” These figures are a bad omen for Israel.

This discussion of where Israel is heading raises the obvious question: would it not be in Israel’s best interests for President Obama to put significant pressure on both Israel and the Palestinians to agree to a two-state solution? In fact, would it not have been better for Israel if the United States had long ago stopped it from building settlements and instead helped create a Palestinian state? One wonders what future the opponents of a two-state solution envision for greater Israel, for it is hard to see a favorable outcome if the Palestinians do not get their own state. This is not to say that two states living side by side represents an ideal outcome for either side; it is simply better than the alternatives.

Finally, denying the Palestinians their own state is not in the lobby’s interest, and not just because of the consequences for Israel. Over the past two decades, the case for backing Israel—no matter what it does—has become a tough sell in the United States, especially on college campuses. Younger Jews appear to be more willing to criticize Israel than their elders. Americans of all persuasions are becoming increasingly aware of what Israel did to the Palestinians in 1948 and what it has been doing in the Occupied Territories since 1967. Consequently, Israel no longer looks like the victim; it looks like the victimizer, and a ruthless one at that. This situation is sure to get worse if Israel turns itself into an apartheid state in full view of the world.

Because Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians will be increasingly hard to defend, the lobby will have to rely more than ever on threats and intimidation. Facts and reason are not effective weapons when trying to justify an apartheid state. Given the growing awareness of the lobby’s activities—thanks mainly to the Internet—its actions are already being scrutinized in ways they were not in the past. In other words, it has become difficult for the lobby to wield its influence without leaving fingerprints, and greater recognition of its role is likely to trigger greater resentment. Its torpedoing of the Freeman appointment, which was widely discussed in the blogosphere and eventually by the mainstream media, is a case in point. The lobby’s behavior will become more heavy-handed and transparent, which runs the risk of angering large numbers of Americans, including many Jews. It would be much easier for the lobby to defend Israel if it lived alongside a Palestinian state.

President Obama would like to change the situation because he understands that a two-state solution would be good for America, good for Israel, and good for the Palestinians. But Netanyahu seems determined to thwart his efforts. Who is likely to win this fight?

As things stand, Obama has little chance of prevailing, mainly because the lobby’s key institutions will side with Israel, and the American president shows little sign of being willing to take on the lobby. Other factors also weigh against him. There are about 480,000 settlers and a huge infrastructure of roads and settlements in the West Bank. Given that the political center of gravity in Israel has shifted sharply to the right over time, it is hard to imagine any Israeli government having the political will, much less the ability, to dismantle a substantial portion of that enormous enterprise. Consider that a February 2009 poll found that 59 percent of Israelis opposed a Palestinian state; only 32 percent supported it.

Nor is there much sympathy for the two-state solution in the American Jewish community. A 2007 survey found that only 46 percent of Jews in this county favored the establishment of a Palestinian state, probably because 82 percent of those surveyed believed that “the goal of the Arabs is not the return of occupied territories but rather the destruction of Israel.” A 2008 J Street poll showed more support for the two-state solution (78 percent) but also revealed substantial opposition to dismantling Israeli settlements and making East Jerusalem part of Palestine. Those reservations, coupled with deep-seated fears of Palestinian motives, will help the lobby’s hardliners make their case. Of course, Christian Zionists will adamantly oppose the two-state solution: they want Israel to control every square millimeter of Palestine because they believe that will facilitate Christ’s Second Coming.

Obama’s only hope—and it is a slim one—is that a substantial part of the American Jewish community will come to understand Olmert’s warning that Israel will become like white-ruled South Africa if there is no two-state solution. More American Jews need to understand that Israel is in serious peril and that the situation is likely to get worse, not better. Obama would be acting as Israel’s friend if he put pressure on both sides to reach a settlement. If there is no agreement, Israel faces a grim future, and it will become very difficult to defend Israel. In short, more Jewish-Americans need to recognize that it is in their interest to champion the two-state solution.

If that does not happen, Obama will be unable to get tough with Israel. There will be even more trouble ahead for Israel, the United States, and especially the Palestinians.

John J. Mearsheimer is a professor of political science at the University of Chicago and coauthor of The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy.

Wednesday, April 22, 2009

Harsh Methods Approved as Early as Summer 2002

Holder Declassifies Timeline of Actions by Top Bush Administration Officials Regarding Interrogation
By R. Jeffrey Smith and Peter Finn
Washington Post Staff Writers
Thursday, April 23, 2009

Condoleezza Rice, John D. Ashcroft and other top Bush administration officials approved as early as the summer of 2002 the CIA's use of harsh interrogation methods on detainees at secret prisons, including waterboarding, that new Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. has described as illegal torture, according to a chronology prepared by the Senate intelligence committee and declassified by Holder.

At a time when the Justice Department is deciding whether former officials who set interrogation policy or formulated the legal justifications for it should be investigated for possible crimes, the new timeline lists at least a dozen members of the Bush administration who were present when the CIA's director or others explained exactly which questioning techniques were to be used and how those sessions proceeded.

Rice gave a key early green light, when, as President George W. Bush's national security adviser, she met on July 17, 2002, with the CIA's then-director, George J. Tenet, and "advised that the CIA could proceed with its proposed interrogation of Abu Zubaida," subject to approval by the Justice Department, according to the timeline. Abu Zubaida, the nom de guerre of Saudi-born Palestinian Zayn al-Abidin Muhammed Hussein, was captured in Pakistan in March 2002. He was the first high-value detainee in CIA custody, and the agency believed the al-Qaeda associate was "withholding imminent threat information," according to the timeline.

Rice and four other administration officials were first briefed in May 2002 on "alternative interrogation methods, including waterboarding," the timeline shows. Waterboarding is a technique that simulates drowning.

A year later, in July 2003, the CIA briefed Rice, Vice President Richard B. Cheney, Attorney General Ashcroft, White House counsel Alberto R. Gonzales and National Security Council legal adviser John B. Bellinger III on the use of waterboarding and other methods, it states. They "reaffirmed that the CIA program was lawful and reflected administration policy."

"This was not an abstract discussion. These were very detailed and specific conversations," said Jameel Jaffer, director of the National Security Project at the American Civil Liberties Union. "And it's further evidence of the role that senior administration officials had."

At that point, the United States had also captured Khalid Sheik Mohammed, the self-proclaimed mastermind of the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, who was waterboarded 183 times in March 2003, according to recently released Justice Department documents.

Secretary of State Colin L. Powell and Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld were not briefed on the program until September 2003, the narrative shows. "Strikingly, unless there is a further story in records not yet shown to us, the secretary of state and the secretary of defense were not involved in the decision-making process, despite the high stakes for U.S. foreign policy and for the treatment of the U.S. military," said Sen. John D. Rockefeller IV (D-W.Va.).

Reached in California, Bellinger declined to comment. Attempts to contact Ashcroft and Tenet through spokespeople were unsuccessful. Rice did not respond to an e-mail, and a spokesman for Gonzales declined to comment. The CIA also declined to comment.

"This chronology is misleading and incomplete and does not reflect the the NSC review process or the information presented to the NSC," said a former White House official involved in the deliberations.

Cheney has said repeatedly that the CIA program was legal and critical in breaking up a series of planned terrorist attacks. He has called on the Obama administration to declassify memos examining the effectiveness of the interrogation policies he supported.

In the fall of 2002, four senior members of Congress, including Rep. Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.), now speaker of the House, were secretly briefed on interrogation techniques, including waterboarding, according to U.S. officials. Pelosi has confirmed that she was then "briefed on interrogation techniques the administration was considering using in the future. The administration advised that legal counsel for both the CIA and the Justice Department had concluded that the techniques were legal."

In early 2004, a comprehensive report by the CIA inspector general raised new questions about the program, including queries about the waterboarding of three detainees. It said that the interrogations were not clearly legal under an international treaty the United States had signed, known as the Convention Against Torture, which bars cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment that falls short of torture.

A fresh legal review by the Justice Department prompted Ashcroft to inform the CIA in writing on July 22, 2004, that its interrogation methods -- except waterboarding -- were legal. The following month, the head of the department's Office of Legal Counsel added that even waterboarding would be legal if it were carried out with a series of safeguards according to CIA plans. By May 2005, the department had completed two more reviews of the program that came to the same conclusion. Those were among the memos President Obama released this week.

After the leak in 2005 of a Justice Department memo that narrowly defined the type of activity that would constitute torture, Rice traveled to Europe in an effort to quell the international uproar. As her trip was getting underway, she said: "The United States government does not authorize or condone torture of detainees. Torture, and conspiracy to commit torture, are crimes under U.S. law, wherever they may occur in the world."

Rice also said at the time that the administration's policy "will be consistent" with the international convention prohibiting "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment." A former aide said that gaining administration approval for Rice to make this statement was "a move forward."

Saturday, April 18, 2009

The Seven Ways to Stop Piracy

And why none of them will work as well as we might hope.
By Ken Menkhaus
FOREIGN POLICY
18 April 2009

Now that the rush of excitement has subsided from the made-for-TV drama of the rescue of Captain Phillips, we are left with the more sobering long-term question of what to do about Somali piracy. Whether piracy constitutes a serious national security threat is a subject of debate. But there is no question that piracy off the Somali coast is now an important symbolic political issue for both the Obama administration and its critics. The Obama administration does not want conservative opponents to portray it as weak on defense or unwilling to use force to protect American interests, and so cannot afford to embrace passive policies on piracy. Yet the piracy issue is replete with traps, a seemingly simple problem with seemingly simple solutions, all of which could easily backfire and make things worse.

Indeed, some of the strategies that have the greatest appeal for the American public and punditry are also the most dangerous. And certainly, none of them offers a quick fix.

Let’s look at the standard menu of options being discussed in Washington:

1. Live with piracy as an unavoidable nuisance. Approaching piracy as a chronic problem to be managed rather than a war to be won is a deeply unsatisfying position, and is easy to attack politically. Yet there is a case to be made that the United States and the international community have overstated the threat of Somali piracy. Somali hijackers earned between $30 and $40 million in ransom in 2008, a handsome sum of cash in one of the world’s most impoverished countries, but a paltry sum for international shipping -- not even enough to appreciably raise insurance premiums for ships passing through the Gulf of Aden. To give this sum some perspective, for example, last week I attended a conference on piracy in Washington D.C., and stayed at a hotel that was proudly announcing a $140 million renovation project -- a price-tag three to four times the pirates’ annual take.

Most shipping companies prefer to live with the current piracy modus vivendi. The risk of any one ship being pirated is still low; their crews, ships, and cargo are returned safely; and the ransom fees are manageable. A military rescue, by comparison, is much riskier to the crew and will raise insurance costs considerably, as insurance companies will have to factor in the possibility of injuries and loss of life to crew and ensuing lawsuits.

There are other compelling reasons to try to eliminate piracy in Somali waters -- such as fear of copycat piracy elsewhere, fear of al Qaeda adopting the practice to capture Western hostages, and commitment to the principle of open seas. But the ransom amounts themselves do not justify a military response.

2. Prevent or deter piracy with naval patrols and convoys. This is the current policy, which has led to an impressive flotilla of naval vessels from more than a dozen countries around the world patrolling the waters. Cargo ships passing through the Gulf of Aden can even avail themselves of naval convoys for some protection.

So far, it hasn’t worked as planned; naval patrols cannot stop, or even slow, piracy off the Somali coast. The waters are too vast, the cargo ships too numerous, and the risk-reward calculation too tempting for Somali pirates. Even in rare instances when naval vessels are close enough to interdict a piracy attack, there are enormous complications associated with firing on suspected pirate ships, especially when pirates use “mother ships” -- captured dhows or fishing vessels with innocent fishermen aboard. There are also continuing complications revolving around the legal dispensation of suspects once captured. Though Kenya has agreed to consider handling trials of captured pirates, the ability of the already strained Kenyan judiciary to handle additional, complex case loads remains a matter of concern.

Virtually everyone agrees that naval interdiction alone cannot stop Somali piracy, and may not even be able to reduce incidents of piracy.

3. Arm the cargo ships. Giving sailors guns seems like an obvious solution. But this would face major resistance from shipping companies, who don’t want to deal with the added security risks, costs, and legal liability that all follow from having armed security on board their cargo ships. There are many legal concerns involved here, not least of which is the prospect of having the ship impounded and the crew arrested and charged for firing on an innocent vessel. Insurance costs would escalate considerably if armed guards were placed on ships. And until shipping companies would rather insure against pirates than pay their ransoms (as is the case now), this option is simply not on the table.

4. Take the war to the pirate lairs on shore. We know where the pirates’ strongholds are -- in several coastal villages in northeastern Somalia. Some are calling for the Obama administration to create “disincentives” for the pirates by bombing their land bases. This is very appealing as an offensive (rather than defensive) approach to the piracy plague, and it is particularly attractive to those who are trying to reshape the low risk, high reward calculus that drives piracy today.

Despite its theoretical appeal, bombing would be a terrible idea in practice. In the first place, airstrikes on the pirates’ lairs are unlikely to succeed; the pirates will simply reorganize, scatter into new locations, and return to work. Second, this tactic puts at severe risk the more than 250 crew members – none of whom are American -- currently held for ransom in Somalia. Any U.S. military action that endangers non-American hostages in such a way will create major diplomatic headaches. Third, land strikes on these villages will almost certainly result in civilian casualties among the many villagers living there. How many Somali lives should be sacrificed in an attempt to end a $30 to $40 million business? No doubt Somalis will come up with a figure different from our own.

But the strongest argument against taking the war on shore is that the United States has more important strategic interests in Somalia than piracy. At present, Washington is backing a unity government, led by moderate Islamists, in a delicate political situation in the Somali capital, Mogadishu. Several years of fierce anti-Americanism and radicalism have subsided in Somalia (for now), precisely because the U.S. government is supporting a political process that privileges compromise, moderation, and an end to fighting. The dangerous jihadi movement, al-Shabaab, has lost its momentum and, for the first time since 2006, is on the defensive.

This is all very good news -- but it could immediately be overturned if the United States starts “plinking” the pirates. Somalis react fiercely to foreigners attacking their own, especially on Somali soil. They do not share the view that the pirates are criminals. In fact, many Somalis see the pirates as a “coast guard” protecting their shores from illegal foreign fishing. A military response on shore risks enflaming anti-Americanism in Somalia again, playing right into the hands of al-Shabaab and its external patron, al Qaeda. Hence an on-shore military approach to piracy runs the strong risk of setting back broader U.S. objectives in Somalia. Combating terrorism and extremism is of much greater importance and needs to be privileged over attempts to halt the pirates.

5. Attack the “commanding heights” of piracy by going after the financiers, not the pirates. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced U.S. intent to track the flow of the pirate ransoms and freeze the accounts of Somali financiers. On paper this is an excellent idea. The pirates are, as Clinton suggested, funded by powerful financial backers who earn a lion’s share of the ransoms, and it would be ideal to squeeze them until they cease their involvement. Unfortunately, tracking the flow much of anything -- let alone money inside Somalia is exceptionally difficult. In a country that depends so heavily on remittances, it also risks criminalizing a good portion of the population. Many Somalis also indirectly or directly see a cut of the ransom money flow through their hands in the residual coastal economy. Somalis are very adept at moving this cash informally and will evade efforts to track them.

6. Stop paying ransom. By depriving pirates of the financial gains accruing from their crime, the criminal behavior will stop. The trouble with this option is that the shipping industry wants its crew, ships, and cargo returned safely. Shipping companies compelled not to pay ransom would face huge losses and possible lawsuits. And who is willing to be responsible for placing all those hostages at risk? That combination of ransom refusal would have to be paired with military rescue in order to have an effect. But talk about risky; if it went awry and many hostages died, the consequences would be considerable. Finally, few of the type of ships in question sail under the stars and stripes; the United States has no real means to influence them.

7. Back a government in Somalia that will eliminate piracy as a matter of on-shore law enforcement. Everyone agrees that this is the only viable long-term solution. Most also concur, however, that it will be a slow, gradual process in a country that has had no functioning central government in 19 years. The U.S. public would surely prefer more immediate results.

The good news is that this option may not be as difficult as it sounds. In two separate instances, local Somali political authorities have put a quick end to piracy. One case is in Somaliland, the secessionist polity in northwest Somalia. There, authorities have been keen to prevent piracy off their shores as a way to demonstrate Somaliland’s utility and capacity to the international community, with the aim of earning international recognition. Likewise, in 2006 in southern Somalia, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) government put an end to piracy during its six month reign, in part to demonstrate to the world that it stood for the revival of law and order in the country and deserved support. In both cases, powerful political motives animated local authorities to move against the pirates. The Transitional Federal Government in Somalia -- currently a very weak government that exists mainly on paper -- has asked for international support to improve its capacity to combat piracy on shore. Whether this reflects a genuine intent to end piracy or merely use of the piracy issue to secure foreign funding remains to be seen.

None of these options offers a sure-fire solution, but some -- such as the call to attack the pirates on shore – risk making things worse and generating unintended consequences. The United States has much bigger strategic concerns than piracy in Somalia, and though the buccaneers are the ones making news, the real threats are elsewhere.

Ken Menkhaus is professor of political science at Davidson College.