Putting Themselves First
The New York Times
Updated March 17, 2011, 02:52 AM
Jon B. Alterman is the director and senior fellow of the Middle East Program at Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Tensions between Muammar el-Qaddafi and his fellow Arab leaders are not new. Time and again, Qaddafi has insisted that he is African and not Arab, only to insist later on his centrality to solving the Arab world's problems. He is outrageously flamboyant in a region of colorless leaders, and pointedly insulting in a region that values courtesy.
He reportedly paid money to assassinate then-Crown Prince (and now King) Abdullah of Saudi Arabia in 2003, solidifying his enmity with Saudi Arabia and its many regional allies. The Arab League's attempt to weaken him with a no-flight zone is surely payback time.
Arab League members will reserve the right to put down unrest within their own borders while hoping that Qaddafi gets his just desserts.
Yet the Arab League has few tools at its disposal. Libya's neighbors will be reluctant to turn decisively against Qaddafi given his apparent ability to remain in power. They have few forces they could deploy, and they have no capacity to sustain a no-flight zone on their own. Arab League members could facilitate the passage of covert support to the rebels across their borders, and they could provide material support to the rebels themselves, but it is hard to imagine their becoming genuine antagonists against a regime that they despise.
Even more importantly, Arab leaders are cautious about legitimizing outside action that protects people from their governments. Indeed, Gulf Cooperation Council military support for the government of Bahrain this week suggests the depth of the links between governments, and caution at signs of public unrest.
The Arab League turned a blind eye to the Jordanian annexation of the West Bank in 1950 and was able to abide the deployment of Syrian troops to Lebanon for almost three decades, but those moves by Arab states were meant to further the interests of Arab states rather than those of their subjects. Non-Arab action against Libya would not meet that test, and would set worrisome precedents.
The Arab League's resolution against Qaddafi is intended more as a sign of members' revulsion with the man than with his actions. Members will reserve the right to put down unrest within their own borders while hoping that Qaddafi gets his just desserts.
Updated March 17, 2011, 02:52 AM
Jon B. Alterman is the director and senior fellow of the Middle East Program at Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Tensions between Muammar el-Qaddafi and his fellow Arab leaders are not new. Time and again, Qaddafi has insisted that he is African and not Arab, only to insist later on his centrality to solving the Arab world's problems. He is outrageously flamboyant in a region of colorless leaders, and pointedly insulting in a region that values courtesy.
He reportedly paid money to assassinate then-Crown Prince (and now King) Abdullah of Saudi Arabia in 2003, solidifying his enmity with Saudi Arabia and its many regional allies. The Arab League's attempt to weaken him with a no-flight zone is surely payback time.
Arab League members will reserve the right to put down unrest within their own borders while hoping that Qaddafi gets his just desserts.
Yet the Arab League has few tools at its disposal. Libya's neighbors will be reluctant to turn decisively against Qaddafi given his apparent ability to remain in power. They have few forces they could deploy, and they have no capacity to sustain a no-flight zone on their own. Arab League members could facilitate the passage of covert support to the rebels across their borders, and they could provide material support to the rebels themselves, but it is hard to imagine their becoming genuine antagonists against a regime that they despise.
Even more importantly, Arab leaders are cautious about legitimizing outside action that protects people from their governments. Indeed, Gulf Cooperation Council military support for the government of Bahrain this week suggests the depth of the links between governments, and caution at signs of public unrest.
The Arab League turned a blind eye to the Jordanian annexation of the West Bank in 1950 and was able to abide the deployment of Syrian troops to Lebanon for almost three decades, but those moves by Arab states were meant to further the interests of Arab states rather than those of their subjects. Non-Arab action against Libya would not meet that test, and would set worrisome precedents.
The Arab League's resolution against Qaddafi is intended more as a sign of members' revulsion with the man than with his actions. Members will reserve the right to put down unrest within their own borders while hoping that Qaddafi gets his just desserts.
posted by Hanan Elbadry at 7:30 AM
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