A Solution for Lebanon
Behind all the rhetoric, there's a consensus that Hezbollah must be weakened and contained.
The Washington Post
Tuesday, August 1, 2006; A16
DESPITE THE terrible bloodshed in Lebanon and Israel over the weekend, including the tragic death of scores of women and children in the village of Qana, the United States, Israel and the Lebanese government continue to seek the same outcome to the war. That is the removal of Hezbollah's militia from the Lebanese-Israeli border as well as steps toward its disarmament; the deployment of the Lebanese army in the south; and the extension of the Lebanese government's sovereignty to all of the country's territory. Despite all the rhetoric about an immediate cease-fire and the predictable focus by media outlets around the world on Israel's mistakes and excesses, every party in the Middle East other than Hezbollah and its Syrian and Iranian sponsors believes that a resolution to the crisis that fails to achieve those conditions would be a catastrophe.
In other words, it's not just President Bush who believes that a solution in Lebanon must address "the root cause of the problems." The administration's rhetoric about the crisis as "an opportunity" for "a new Middle East" may horrify Washington's self-described realists. But a more hardheaded way of spelling out the same stakes came from Walid Jumblatt, the Lebanese Druze leader who is no friend of the United States or Israel. "Either we will have a state able to establish its control over the country or we will have . . . a reduced weakened state and a strong militia beside the Lebanese army that decides war and peace at any time and has its schedule decided by the Iranians and the Syrians," Mr. Jumblatt told The Post's Anthony Shadid. "I don't see a state of Lebanon surviving with a militia next to an army. That's it."
This quiet consensus explains why Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was vowing yesterday to get a cease-fire resolution through the U.N. Security Council sometime this week, but also saying that it must be accompanied by a mandate for disempowering Hezbollah. All sides -- including Israel -- understand that the movement, which represents many Lebanese Shiites, cannot be destroyed or entirely disarmed by military means. But it can, and must, be weakened, forced to retreat and deprived of the ability to attack across the international border at will.
The trick is determining how much of this should be left to Israel's ongoing military campaign, how much to the international force the United Nations will be asked to authorize for Lebanon, and how much to the political and diplomatic pressure that might be exerted by Lebanese political parties on Hezbollah, or by Western and Arab governments on Iran and Syria. While it would be convenient to conclude that no further military action by Israel is needed, its army's slow progress suggests otherwise. In fact, any Israeli stand-down will depend heavily on whether European governments and other Security Council members are prepared to authorize and supply an international force with sufficient strength and authority to deter Hezbollah.
As for diplomatic leverage, a first step in the right direction was the Security Council's passage yesterday of a resolution ordering Iran to suspend its nuclear enrichment program and reiterating an offer of incentives in the event it does. In the coming weeks both the Iranian and Syrian governments need to hear a consistent message: A decision to cooperate in stabilizing the Middle East, from Iraq to Lebanon and Gaza, will ease their present isolation. But attempts to acquire weapons of mass destruction or wage proxy war through groups such as Hezbollah will be answered with strength, not appeasement.
The Washington Post
Tuesday, August 1, 2006; A16
DESPITE THE terrible bloodshed in Lebanon and Israel over the weekend, including the tragic death of scores of women and children in the village of Qana, the United States, Israel and the Lebanese government continue to seek the same outcome to the war. That is the removal of Hezbollah's militia from the Lebanese-Israeli border as well as steps toward its disarmament; the deployment of the Lebanese army in the south; and the extension of the Lebanese government's sovereignty to all of the country's territory. Despite all the rhetoric about an immediate cease-fire and the predictable focus by media outlets around the world on Israel's mistakes and excesses, every party in the Middle East other than Hezbollah and its Syrian and Iranian sponsors believes that a resolution to the crisis that fails to achieve those conditions would be a catastrophe.
In other words, it's not just President Bush who believes that a solution in Lebanon must address "the root cause of the problems." The administration's rhetoric about the crisis as "an opportunity" for "a new Middle East" may horrify Washington's self-described realists. But a more hardheaded way of spelling out the same stakes came from Walid Jumblatt, the Lebanese Druze leader who is no friend of the United States or Israel. "Either we will have a state able to establish its control over the country or we will have . . . a reduced weakened state and a strong militia beside the Lebanese army that decides war and peace at any time and has its schedule decided by the Iranians and the Syrians," Mr. Jumblatt told The Post's Anthony Shadid. "I don't see a state of Lebanon surviving with a militia next to an army. That's it."
This quiet consensus explains why Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was vowing yesterday to get a cease-fire resolution through the U.N. Security Council sometime this week, but also saying that it must be accompanied by a mandate for disempowering Hezbollah. All sides -- including Israel -- understand that the movement, which represents many Lebanese Shiites, cannot be destroyed or entirely disarmed by military means. But it can, and must, be weakened, forced to retreat and deprived of the ability to attack across the international border at will.
The trick is determining how much of this should be left to Israel's ongoing military campaign, how much to the international force the United Nations will be asked to authorize for Lebanon, and how much to the political and diplomatic pressure that might be exerted by Lebanese political parties on Hezbollah, or by Western and Arab governments on Iran and Syria. While it would be convenient to conclude that no further military action by Israel is needed, its army's slow progress suggests otherwise. In fact, any Israeli stand-down will depend heavily on whether European governments and other Security Council members are prepared to authorize and supply an international force with sufficient strength and authority to deter Hezbollah.
As for diplomatic leverage, a first step in the right direction was the Security Council's passage yesterday of a resolution ordering Iran to suspend its nuclear enrichment program and reiterating an offer of incentives in the event it does. In the coming weeks both the Iranian and Syrian governments need to hear a consistent message: A decision to cooperate in stabilizing the Middle East, from Iraq to Lebanon and Gaza, will ease their present isolation. But attempts to acquire weapons of mass destruction or wage proxy war through groups such as Hezbollah will be answered with strength, not appeasement.
posted by Hanan Elbadry at 9:25 AM
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