Lebanon’s Force for Good
By ADIR GURION WALDMAN
Op-Ed Contributor
The New York Times
August 2, 2006
IN the summer of 1998, I was an infantry soldier in the Israel Defense Forces. Preparing for an operation in southern Lebanon, my platoon received some unusual orders: no one, under any circumstance, was to open fire. This was a significant departure from our standard rules of engagement, which permitted firing upon sight at Hezbollah forces. The apparent reason was that representatives of the United States, France, Israel, Lebanon and Syria were in the area that day for a meeting of the Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group.
Today, Israeli soldiers are again in southern Lebanon. As pundits propose various diplomatic solutions to the crisis embroiling the region, lost in all of these suggestions is the Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group, the one institution that in the past was able to prevent war in the Middle East.
The Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group was born a decade ago when, as today, Israel sought to root out Hezbollah from southern Lebanon. In late April 1996, after two months of intense warfare, Secretary of State Warren Christopher set out for a weeklong session of shuttle diplomacy that culminated in an agreement calling for Israel and Hezbollah to shield civilians from violence. The Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group would oversee compliance with this pledge.
Over the next four years, until Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon, violence did not cease, but the parties were able to keep it from spiraling out of control. Through regular meetings of high-level military and diplomatic officials, the monitoring group resolved disputes, arranged temporary cease-fires and reined in spurts of violence. In December 1999, for example, when Israeli shells mistakenly hit a Lebanese school, a series of phone calls through the monitoring group prevented Hezbollah from retaliating against Israeli civilians. In another instance, the group facilitated an exchange of prisoners between Israel and Hezbollah.
A long-term diplomatic solution to the current crisis should include the resurrection of the monitoring group and the establishment of a parallel Israeli-Palestinian body. These groups would be modeled on the old monitoring group, but with a new mandate: to oversee the full disarmament of Hezbollah and other terrorist organizations. If Western troops won’t take on that mission, the Israeli-Lebanese group could monitor the Lebanese Army’s accomplishment of the task. Routine meetings of both groups would help ensure enduring cease-fires on all fronts.
Most important, the monitoring groups would create a constructive new channel of communication among Israel, Lebanon, Syria and the Palestinian Authority. Away from the spotlight that has doomed past diplomatic efforts, these parties could freely negotiate over outstanding differences, and through those meetings, rising military and diplomatic leaders could build key personal relationships.
The monitoring groups would also provide a confidential forum where the parties could work to restrain violent flare-ups, rather than engaging in escalating tit-for-tat attacks. Thus, for example, an Israeli-Palestinian monitoring group, which might also include Egypt and Jordan, could immediately convene in the event of any spike in Israeli-Palestinian violence.
In 2000, I interviewed Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group delegates, who spoke about their work with enthusiasm. They told me of times when, after particularly egregious episodes of violence, the group was able to initiate immediate back-channel contacts that staved off reprisals, and they recalled how Israeli, Lebanese and Syrian military officers formed personal bonds of trust. When an Israeli general’s term on the monitoring group ended, he told me, his counterparts gave their final farewells with tears in their eyes.
Today, diplomatic leaders must not overlook this extraordinary precedent for calming tensions in the Levant.
Adir Gurion Waldman, a lawyer, is the author of “Arbitrating Armed Conflict: Decisions of the Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group.’’
Op-Ed Contributor
The New York Times
August 2, 2006
IN the summer of 1998, I was an infantry soldier in the Israel Defense Forces. Preparing for an operation in southern Lebanon, my platoon received some unusual orders: no one, under any circumstance, was to open fire. This was a significant departure from our standard rules of engagement, which permitted firing upon sight at Hezbollah forces. The apparent reason was that representatives of the United States, France, Israel, Lebanon and Syria were in the area that day for a meeting of the Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group.
Today, Israeli soldiers are again in southern Lebanon. As pundits propose various diplomatic solutions to the crisis embroiling the region, lost in all of these suggestions is the Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group, the one institution that in the past was able to prevent war in the Middle East.
The Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group was born a decade ago when, as today, Israel sought to root out Hezbollah from southern Lebanon. In late April 1996, after two months of intense warfare, Secretary of State Warren Christopher set out for a weeklong session of shuttle diplomacy that culminated in an agreement calling for Israel and Hezbollah to shield civilians from violence. The Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group would oversee compliance with this pledge.
Over the next four years, until Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon, violence did not cease, but the parties were able to keep it from spiraling out of control. Through regular meetings of high-level military and diplomatic officials, the monitoring group resolved disputes, arranged temporary cease-fires and reined in spurts of violence. In December 1999, for example, when Israeli shells mistakenly hit a Lebanese school, a series of phone calls through the monitoring group prevented Hezbollah from retaliating against Israeli civilians. In another instance, the group facilitated an exchange of prisoners between Israel and Hezbollah.
A long-term diplomatic solution to the current crisis should include the resurrection of the monitoring group and the establishment of a parallel Israeli-Palestinian body. These groups would be modeled on the old monitoring group, but with a new mandate: to oversee the full disarmament of Hezbollah and other terrorist organizations. If Western troops won’t take on that mission, the Israeli-Lebanese group could monitor the Lebanese Army’s accomplishment of the task. Routine meetings of both groups would help ensure enduring cease-fires on all fronts.
Most important, the monitoring groups would create a constructive new channel of communication among Israel, Lebanon, Syria and the Palestinian Authority. Away from the spotlight that has doomed past diplomatic efforts, these parties could freely negotiate over outstanding differences, and through those meetings, rising military and diplomatic leaders could build key personal relationships.
The monitoring groups would also provide a confidential forum where the parties could work to restrain violent flare-ups, rather than engaging in escalating tit-for-tat attacks. Thus, for example, an Israeli-Palestinian monitoring group, which might also include Egypt and Jordan, could immediately convene in the event of any spike in Israeli-Palestinian violence.
In 2000, I interviewed Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group delegates, who spoke about their work with enthusiasm. They told me of times when, after particularly egregious episodes of violence, the group was able to initiate immediate back-channel contacts that staved off reprisals, and they recalled how Israeli, Lebanese and Syrian military officers formed personal bonds of trust. When an Israeli general’s term on the monitoring group ended, he told me, his counterparts gave their final farewells with tears in their eyes.
Today, diplomatic leaders must not overlook this extraordinary precedent for calming tensions in the Levant.
Adir Gurion Waldman, a lawyer, is the author of “Arbitrating Armed Conflict: Decisions of the Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group.’’
posted by Hanan Elbadry at 3:26 PM
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