Why Israel's Plans To Curb Hezbollah Went So Poorly
Nation Misgauged Response; Military, Civilian Leaders Were Sometimes at Odds; Creating a New Hero for Arabs
By Guy Chazan, Karby Leggett and Neil King
Wall Street Journal
August 19, 2006
When its bombs began falling on southern Lebanon 39 days ago, Israel had high hopes that it could severely damage or even destroy Hezbollah, the militant Islamist group rooted there. Crippling it, they and their Washington allies hoped, would rid Israel of an implacable enemy. It would also set back Iran, a longtime supporter of the group, at a crucial time in Iran's nuclear negotiations with the West.
But with the fighting stopped, Hezbollah remains far from defanged. Indeed, in many eyes it is the victor, having faced down the mighty Israeli military and hugely enhanced its standing with the anti-Israeli populations across the Mideast.
Even the scaled-back ambitions that Israel and the U.S. settled on as the conflict unfolded remain in peril. A cease-fire designed to box in Hezbollah militarily appears tenuous, bogged down in disagreements over what a peacekeeping force in part of Lebanon could accomplish and which countries will participate. Lebanon's government, one of the main actors in any plan to disarm Hezbollah, says it can't do so without concessions from Israel that the Israelis appear unlikely to make. Meanwhile, Syria, dealt a big setback last year when it was forced to withdraw from Lebanon, seems to have regained some standing as one of the backers of the tenacious Hezbollah fighters.
What happened? Israel repeatedly underestimated Hezbollah. It miscalculated the political support it would win from Lebanon. Israel's civilian and military leadership divided over how to wage the war. And some Western powers, having seen Hezbollah's might, are wary of taking it on by getting into a peacekeeping venture.
The war and uneasy peace are causing earthquakes across the Middle East. Tremors are rippling through Israel, where an emotional reexamination of what went wrong is under way. Lebanon is groping for a path forward that won't plunge the country into another civil war. Hezbollah is crowing that it has won a victory -- even though the extent of the beating it took is also becoming clearer. President Bush said in his view the militant group is the loser, though it may take some time for the world to see it that way.
The shock waves, meanwhile, have also rattled the balance between two major regional powers: Israel and Iran. Israel and the U.S. remain far from where they wanted to be now, and Iran -- along with fellow Hezbollah-backer Syria -- has gained confidence from Hezbollah's stalwart fight.
The rest of the Middle East now finds itself torn more than ever before between the two poles in a fast-polarizing region. Sunni-Muslim allies of the U.S. such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan quietly express deep concern about Shiite-Muslim Hezbollah and the rising influence of Shiite Iran. Yet populations in the U.S.-ally countries -- hostile to Israel and angry with America -- have been electrified by the upstart Hezbollah and its eloquent leader Hassan Nasrallah. If leaders such as Egypt's Hosni Mubarak and Jordan's King Abdullah are going to introduce democratic reforms, as the Bush administration wants, they could find themselves lacking by comparison with the charismatic new Arab hero Mr. Nasrallah.
In Iraq, where the U.S.-backed government is led by Shiite political parties, some are close to Iran and share a faith with Hezbollah. Militant groups like Iraq's Mahdi Army -- which is modeled on Hezbollah's blend of arms, religion and politics -- will watch to see how strong a Hezbollah emerges. What happens in Lebanon in the coming weeks and months thus will influence a host of issues crucial to the U.S., from oil to terrorism to hopes for a flowering of democracy.
The stakes didn't seem so high on the morning of July 12. But the foundations of a larger crisis were already in place. Israel had ended an 18-year occupation of southern Lebanon in 2000, only to watch as Hezbollah claimed victory and began a major effort to further arm. And there had been clashes before. In late May, Hezbollah fired rockets into Israel, which responded by bombing a stretch of earth-and-rock fortifications inside Lebanon. At least since 2004, the Israeli military had plans in place for possibly attacking Hezbollah.
Defining Features
At 9 a.m. July 12, Hezbollah fighters who had sneaked into Israel fired on an Israeli armored vehicle, killing some soldiers and taking two captive. Quickly, some defining features of the conflict to come emerged. The Israelis immediately sent a tank into Lebanon after the abductors, hoping to cut them off before they reached a nearby town. But a Hezbollah mine crippled the tank a short distance over the border. An Israeli unit sent in to rescue the tank crew was pinned down by Hezbollah for hours. Eight Israeli soldiers were killed that morning, and the two captured ones were hustled away. There's been no word about them since.
Israel was already dealing with another hostage crisis in the Gaza Strip Palestinian territory, and its leadership's next decision shaped the rest of the conflict. At a meeting 11 hours after Hezbollah's attack, the cabinet voted to escalate the violence spectacularly, taking the fight not just to Hezbollah but to Lebanon.
The Israeli leadership made another fateful decision: to do most of the fighting from the air, with bombing strikes. There would be no massive ground assault, largely on the advice of Israeli Chief of Staff Dan Halutz, a former air force commander.
The decision to mount a robust response transformed the border shoot-out into a war and virtually guaranteed it would become a crisis. And the reliance on air power wound up limiting Israel's options, rather than delivering the rapid crippling of Hezbollah that Israeli leaders hoped for. Within hours of the abduction of its soldiers, Israel bombed not only Hezbollah strongholds in Lebanon's south but also major roads and bridges farther north. The next day, it bombed Lebanon's main airport and imposed a naval blockade.
The aim, in part, was to cut Hezbollah off from Iranian and Syrian supplies and hit Hezbollah missiles farther north. But the widespread bombing was also designed with hopes that Lebanese groups opposed to Hezbollah, especially Sunni Muslim and Christian communities would try to rein the group in. And at first, that's what happened.
Lebanon's Prime Minister, Fuad Siniora, was angry at Hezbollah's provocation. Behind closed doors, he and others in his government began developing a plan that they felt, with international help and some Israeli concessions, might eventually bring Hezbollah to disarm.
President Bush was briefed about the rapidly escalating fighting early on the morning of the first day. He and his staff quickly also agreed to try to capitalize on the incident to accomplish the long-pursued goal of getting Hezbollah to give up its weapons. Disarming of the group is something the United Nations had called for two years ago, in Resolution 1559.
For a few days, the Israelis, the U.S. and the Lebanese government were working together off much the same script with regard to disarming Hezbollah. But as Israeli bombing continued fiercely day after day, devastating southern Lebanon and parts of Beirut, Lebanese leaders began aiming their ire at Israel, at times even praising Hezbollah's fight.
At an emotional diplomatic gathering in Rome on July 26, Mr. Siniora, while by now fuming about Israel's widespread bombardment, presented a seven-point Lebanese plan for disarming Hezbollah. He called for an immediate cease-fire, quoting a line from the Roman historian Tacitus: "They created a destruction and called it peace." But U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice avoided any call for an immediate truce and continued work on a wider plan to disarm Hezbollah.
Then an Israeli bomb hit a residential complex in the Hezbollah stronghold of Qana, killing more than a dozen children, and much of world opinion turned sharply in favor of a quick halt to the fighting. Mr. Siniora cancelled a meeting with Ms. Rice. For the first time in the crisis, Israel and the U.S. were alone, viewed by much of the world as joined in their desire to carry on the fight despite the human toll.
Hezbollah, meanwhile, was showing that its fighters' tenacity -- driven in large part by deep religious convictions -- was no fluke. The group fired sometimes more than a hundred missiles a day into Israel, hitting cities such as Haifa. On the evening of July 14, Mr. Nasrallah spoke by telephone on Lebanese television and urged viewers to look out their windows at the sea. There, one of Israel's most formidable warships was ablaze, hit by a laser-guided Hezbollah missile. Israeli and U.S. officials were taken aback at the sorts of weapons Hezbollah had received, apparently from Iran and Syria, although both countries deny this.
Even as it carried out the biggest bombing campaign in its history, Israel delayed a major ground offensive. Politicians worried about taking heavy casualties in territory that Hezbollah knew far better than their troops, and about getting involved in another grueling occupation. Military commanders chafed at the restraint -- the beginning of a rift between Israel's elected leaders and the military leadership.
On the afternoon of July 27, which was two days before the bombing in Qana began to turn diplomatic currents against Israel and the U.S., Lt. Col. Ishai Efroni, a stout 42-year-old deputy commander of a base in northern Israel, complained that his men were eager to fight in Lebanon but couldn't. "We are using only about 15% to 20% of the resources we have now," he said at the time. "We're being held back."
One question sure to be examined, as Israel convenes panels of inquiry on the war, is whether it should have begun a large ground campaign sooner. Another question: whether the Israeli military was over-confident that an air campaign could cripple Hezbollah's ability to bombard Israel with rockets.
As diplomatic pressure built for a cease-fire, French and U.S. officials at the U.N. worked out a compromise. It promised to halt fighting and quickly bring in a force of 15,000 U.N. troops; they would help an equal number from the Lebanese army to replace the Israeli forces as they withdrew. The deal, outlined in Security Council Resolution 1701, repeated a call for Hezbollah to disarm, leaving vague how that would happen.
Cease-Fire Holds for Now
The cease-fire has held so far. But it appears increasingly unlikely its terms will be carried out in full, especially the disarming of Hezbollah. Under the cease-fire plan, which Lebanese government officials say Hezbollah agreed to, the group is supposed to move its fighters north of the Litani River, which is about 18 miles north of Israel. Hezbollah now says it won't do this, and instead has pressured the Lebanese government to accept a compromise: Hezbollah would store its weapons out of public view in return for a pledge that the Lebanese army wouldn't actively hunt for them.
Israel, meantime, says it won't complete its pullout of southern Lebanon before the full arrival of a combined Lebanese and international force. But with Hezbollah still possessing a large arsenal, countries that had pledged to contribute to the international force are starting to balk.
During the fighting, Secretary of State Rice repeatedly said there was no reason to halt it if this meant leaving the situation "status quo ante" -- the same as before. So now the U.N., working with the Lebanese government, needs to come up with a plan to move Hezbollah toward disarming. But the kinds of Israeli concessions Lebanon's government believes it needs to make this happen are ones Israel isn't very likely to make.
One involves a disputed area known as Shebaa Farms, a small piece of land near Israel and Syria that Israel controls. Hezbollah claims the area is Israeli-occupied Lebanese territory. The U.N. says Shebaa Farms actually is part of Syria.
Lebanese government officials say that if Israel were to withdraw from Shebaa Farms, Hezbollah would lose its last solid argument as to why it must remain armed to resist Israeli occupation. Yet Israel has declined to even discuss withdrawing from Shebaa. A senior aide of Lebanon's Mr. Siniora says a best-case scenario is that Lebanon can somehow persuade Israel to relinquish control of the disputed territory.
Without movement on issues like Shebaa Farms, Lebanese say the situation will likely fester, with Hezbollah, at best, keeping its arms but concealing them. But that situation risks a return to fighting at any time. And with the troops of the Lebanese army and the international force positioned between Israel and Hezbollah, a new flare-up would be far more complicated than the war that just ended.
If the procedure outlined in the cease-fire agreement isn't effective in disarming Hezbollah, the U.S. and Israel may feel increasing pressure to consider another policy reversal: making a deal with Syria, one of Hezbollah's biggest supporters and a lifeline for its military wing. Both Israel and the Bush administration have worked hard to isolate Syria in recent years. Some officials relished its humiliation when its army had to end a long occupation of Lebanon last year, amid accusations Syria was involved in the killing of a former Lebanese prime minister. (Syria denied the accusations.)
Yet some prominent Israeli and U.S. experts have argued that a deal with Syria could be the best hope for seeing that Hezbollah is disarmed and the Syrian-Iranian alliance broken up. Such a deal would require more sacrifices from Israel, including perhaps an offer to open negotiations on a possible Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Golan Heights, taken from Syria in 1967. And President Bush would have to explain the policy about-face to hawkish supporters.
Some Israeli officials say the setbacks in Lebanon could, paradoxically, also lead to new thinking about possible diplomatic solutions to long-running conflicts with the Palestinians. They cite the 1973 Yom Kipper War: The aftermath of that conflict, which also raised questions about Israel's ability to defend itself, led to a historic peace deal with Egypt.
Need for New Policy
Certainly, Israel is now badly in need of a new policy on the Palestinians: This week it shelved plans for a unilateral withdrawal from parts of the West Bank, with officials saying that events in Gaza and Lebanon had proved such pullouts don't enhance Israel's security.
Also in the mix is a looming showdown over Tehran's nuclear program. Iran faces an Aug. 31 U.N. deadline to suspend uranium enrichment at its nuclear facilities. If the U.S. and other Security Council members can reach an accommodation with Iran on nuclear and other issues over time, Iran could potentially prompt Hezbollah to drop its weapons, some say. On the other hand, if the nuclear dispute grows to include imposition of economic sanctions or military posturing against Tehran, Hezbollah could become even more belligerent.
U.S. and Israeli officials say Hezbollah has suffered real losses, particularly to its ability to fire the sort of longer-range missiles that could hit Israel's biggest cities. A senior State Department official contends that "Hezbollah has been boxed in militarily."
Yet Hezbollah in some ways is energized by the outcome. It is flush with cash, some of it evidently from Iran, and is now handing out money to Lebanese whose homes Israel destroyed. In addition, Hezbollah is still standing after battling the strongest military in the region -- plus, in the eyes of some Hezbollah supporters, that military's biggest backer. A banner strung across a ruined building in the Hezbollah stronghold of south Beirut reads: "Made in the U.S.A."
By Guy Chazan, Karby Leggett and Neil King
Wall Street Journal
August 19, 2006
When its bombs began falling on southern Lebanon 39 days ago, Israel had high hopes that it could severely damage or even destroy Hezbollah, the militant Islamist group rooted there. Crippling it, they and their Washington allies hoped, would rid Israel of an implacable enemy. It would also set back Iran, a longtime supporter of the group, at a crucial time in Iran's nuclear negotiations with the West.
But with the fighting stopped, Hezbollah remains far from defanged. Indeed, in many eyes it is the victor, having faced down the mighty Israeli military and hugely enhanced its standing with the anti-Israeli populations across the Mideast.
Even the scaled-back ambitions that Israel and the U.S. settled on as the conflict unfolded remain in peril. A cease-fire designed to box in Hezbollah militarily appears tenuous, bogged down in disagreements over what a peacekeeping force in part of Lebanon could accomplish and which countries will participate. Lebanon's government, one of the main actors in any plan to disarm Hezbollah, says it can't do so without concessions from Israel that the Israelis appear unlikely to make. Meanwhile, Syria, dealt a big setback last year when it was forced to withdraw from Lebanon, seems to have regained some standing as one of the backers of the tenacious Hezbollah fighters.
What happened? Israel repeatedly underestimated Hezbollah. It miscalculated the political support it would win from Lebanon. Israel's civilian and military leadership divided over how to wage the war. And some Western powers, having seen Hezbollah's might, are wary of taking it on by getting into a peacekeeping venture.
The war and uneasy peace are causing earthquakes across the Middle East. Tremors are rippling through Israel, where an emotional reexamination of what went wrong is under way. Lebanon is groping for a path forward that won't plunge the country into another civil war. Hezbollah is crowing that it has won a victory -- even though the extent of the beating it took is also becoming clearer. President Bush said in his view the militant group is the loser, though it may take some time for the world to see it that way.
The shock waves, meanwhile, have also rattled the balance between two major regional powers: Israel and Iran. Israel and the U.S. remain far from where they wanted to be now, and Iran -- along with fellow Hezbollah-backer Syria -- has gained confidence from Hezbollah's stalwart fight.
The rest of the Middle East now finds itself torn more than ever before between the two poles in a fast-polarizing region. Sunni-Muslim allies of the U.S. such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan quietly express deep concern about Shiite-Muslim Hezbollah and the rising influence of Shiite Iran. Yet populations in the U.S.-ally countries -- hostile to Israel and angry with America -- have been electrified by the upstart Hezbollah and its eloquent leader Hassan Nasrallah. If leaders such as Egypt's Hosni Mubarak and Jordan's King Abdullah are going to introduce democratic reforms, as the Bush administration wants, they could find themselves lacking by comparison with the charismatic new Arab hero Mr. Nasrallah.
In Iraq, where the U.S.-backed government is led by Shiite political parties, some are close to Iran and share a faith with Hezbollah. Militant groups like Iraq's Mahdi Army -- which is modeled on Hezbollah's blend of arms, religion and politics -- will watch to see how strong a Hezbollah emerges. What happens in Lebanon in the coming weeks and months thus will influence a host of issues crucial to the U.S., from oil to terrorism to hopes for a flowering of democracy.
The stakes didn't seem so high on the morning of July 12. But the foundations of a larger crisis were already in place. Israel had ended an 18-year occupation of southern Lebanon in 2000, only to watch as Hezbollah claimed victory and began a major effort to further arm. And there had been clashes before. In late May, Hezbollah fired rockets into Israel, which responded by bombing a stretch of earth-and-rock fortifications inside Lebanon. At least since 2004, the Israeli military had plans in place for possibly attacking Hezbollah.
Defining Features
At 9 a.m. July 12, Hezbollah fighters who had sneaked into Israel fired on an Israeli armored vehicle, killing some soldiers and taking two captive. Quickly, some defining features of the conflict to come emerged. The Israelis immediately sent a tank into Lebanon after the abductors, hoping to cut them off before they reached a nearby town. But a Hezbollah mine crippled the tank a short distance over the border. An Israeli unit sent in to rescue the tank crew was pinned down by Hezbollah for hours. Eight Israeli soldiers were killed that morning, and the two captured ones were hustled away. There's been no word about them since.
Israel was already dealing with another hostage crisis in the Gaza Strip Palestinian territory, and its leadership's next decision shaped the rest of the conflict. At a meeting 11 hours after Hezbollah's attack, the cabinet voted to escalate the violence spectacularly, taking the fight not just to Hezbollah but to Lebanon.
The Israeli leadership made another fateful decision: to do most of the fighting from the air, with bombing strikes. There would be no massive ground assault, largely on the advice of Israeli Chief of Staff Dan Halutz, a former air force commander.
The decision to mount a robust response transformed the border shoot-out into a war and virtually guaranteed it would become a crisis. And the reliance on air power wound up limiting Israel's options, rather than delivering the rapid crippling of Hezbollah that Israeli leaders hoped for. Within hours of the abduction of its soldiers, Israel bombed not only Hezbollah strongholds in Lebanon's south but also major roads and bridges farther north. The next day, it bombed Lebanon's main airport and imposed a naval blockade.
The aim, in part, was to cut Hezbollah off from Iranian and Syrian supplies and hit Hezbollah missiles farther north. But the widespread bombing was also designed with hopes that Lebanese groups opposed to Hezbollah, especially Sunni Muslim and Christian communities would try to rein the group in. And at first, that's what happened.
Lebanon's Prime Minister, Fuad Siniora, was angry at Hezbollah's provocation. Behind closed doors, he and others in his government began developing a plan that they felt, with international help and some Israeli concessions, might eventually bring Hezbollah to disarm.
President Bush was briefed about the rapidly escalating fighting early on the morning of the first day. He and his staff quickly also agreed to try to capitalize on the incident to accomplish the long-pursued goal of getting Hezbollah to give up its weapons. Disarming of the group is something the United Nations had called for two years ago, in Resolution 1559.
For a few days, the Israelis, the U.S. and the Lebanese government were working together off much the same script with regard to disarming Hezbollah. But as Israeli bombing continued fiercely day after day, devastating southern Lebanon and parts of Beirut, Lebanese leaders began aiming their ire at Israel, at times even praising Hezbollah's fight.
At an emotional diplomatic gathering in Rome on July 26, Mr. Siniora, while by now fuming about Israel's widespread bombardment, presented a seven-point Lebanese plan for disarming Hezbollah. He called for an immediate cease-fire, quoting a line from the Roman historian Tacitus: "They created a destruction and called it peace." But U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice avoided any call for an immediate truce and continued work on a wider plan to disarm Hezbollah.
Then an Israeli bomb hit a residential complex in the Hezbollah stronghold of Qana, killing more than a dozen children, and much of world opinion turned sharply in favor of a quick halt to the fighting. Mr. Siniora cancelled a meeting with Ms. Rice. For the first time in the crisis, Israel and the U.S. were alone, viewed by much of the world as joined in their desire to carry on the fight despite the human toll.
Hezbollah, meanwhile, was showing that its fighters' tenacity -- driven in large part by deep religious convictions -- was no fluke. The group fired sometimes more than a hundred missiles a day into Israel, hitting cities such as Haifa. On the evening of July 14, Mr. Nasrallah spoke by telephone on Lebanese television and urged viewers to look out their windows at the sea. There, one of Israel's most formidable warships was ablaze, hit by a laser-guided Hezbollah missile. Israeli and U.S. officials were taken aback at the sorts of weapons Hezbollah had received, apparently from Iran and Syria, although both countries deny this.
Even as it carried out the biggest bombing campaign in its history, Israel delayed a major ground offensive. Politicians worried about taking heavy casualties in territory that Hezbollah knew far better than their troops, and about getting involved in another grueling occupation. Military commanders chafed at the restraint -- the beginning of a rift between Israel's elected leaders and the military leadership.
On the afternoon of July 27, which was two days before the bombing in Qana began to turn diplomatic currents against Israel and the U.S., Lt. Col. Ishai Efroni, a stout 42-year-old deputy commander of a base in northern Israel, complained that his men were eager to fight in Lebanon but couldn't. "We are using only about 15% to 20% of the resources we have now," he said at the time. "We're being held back."
One question sure to be examined, as Israel convenes panels of inquiry on the war, is whether it should have begun a large ground campaign sooner. Another question: whether the Israeli military was over-confident that an air campaign could cripple Hezbollah's ability to bombard Israel with rockets.
As diplomatic pressure built for a cease-fire, French and U.S. officials at the U.N. worked out a compromise. It promised to halt fighting and quickly bring in a force of 15,000 U.N. troops; they would help an equal number from the Lebanese army to replace the Israeli forces as they withdrew. The deal, outlined in Security Council Resolution 1701, repeated a call for Hezbollah to disarm, leaving vague how that would happen.
Cease-Fire Holds for Now
The cease-fire has held so far. But it appears increasingly unlikely its terms will be carried out in full, especially the disarming of Hezbollah. Under the cease-fire plan, which Lebanese government officials say Hezbollah agreed to, the group is supposed to move its fighters north of the Litani River, which is about 18 miles north of Israel. Hezbollah now says it won't do this, and instead has pressured the Lebanese government to accept a compromise: Hezbollah would store its weapons out of public view in return for a pledge that the Lebanese army wouldn't actively hunt for them.
Israel, meantime, says it won't complete its pullout of southern Lebanon before the full arrival of a combined Lebanese and international force. But with Hezbollah still possessing a large arsenal, countries that had pledged to contribute to the international force are starting to balk.
During the fighting, Secretary of State Rice repeatedly said there was no reason to halt it if this meant leaving the situation "status quo ante" -- the same as before. So now the U.N., working with the Lebanese government, needs to come up with a plan to move Hezbollah toward disarming. But the kinds of Israeli concessions Lebanon's government believes it needs to make this happen are ones Israel isn't very likely to make.
One involves a disputed area known as Shebaa Farms, a small piece of land near Israel and Syria that Israel controls. Hezbollah claims the area is Israeli-occupied Lebanese territory. The U.N. says Shebaa Farms actually is part of Syria.
Lebanese government officials say that if Israel were to withdraw from Shebaa Farms, Hezbollah would lose its last solid argument as to why it must remain armed to resist Israeli occupation. Yet Israel has declined to even discuss withdrawing from Shebaa. A senior aide of Lebanon's Mr. Siniora says a best-case scenario is that Lebanon can somehow persuade Israel to relinquish control of the disputed territory.
Without movement on issues like Shebaa Farms, Lebanese say the situation will likely fester, with Hezbollah, at best, keeping its arms but concealing them. But that situation risks a return to fighting at any time. And with the troops of the Lebanese army and the international force positioned between Israel and Hezbollah, a new flare-up would be far more complicated than the war that just ended.
If the procedure outlined in the cease-fire agreement isn't effective in disarming Hezbollah, the U.S. and Israel may feel increasing pressure to consider another policy reversal: making a deal with Syria, one of Hezbollah's biggest supporters and a lifeline for its military wing. Both Israel and the Bush administration have worked hard to isolate Syria in recent years. Some officials relished its humiliation when its army had to end a long occupation of Lebanon last year, amid accusations Syria was involved in the killing of a former Lebanese prime minister. (Syria denied the accusations.)
Yet some prominent Israeli and U.S. experts have argued that a deal with Syria could be the best hope for seeing that Hezbollah is disarmed and the Syrian-Iranian alliance broken up. Such a deal would require more sacrifices from Israel, including perhaps an offer to open negotiations on a possible Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Golan Heights, taken from Syria in 1967. And President Bush would have to explain the policy about-face to hawkish supporters.
Some Israeli officials say the setbacks in Lebanon could, paradoxically, also lead to new thinking about possible diplomatic solutions to long-running conflicts with the Palestinians. They cite the 1973 Yom Kipper War: The aftermath of that conflict, which also raised questions about Israel's ability to defend itself, led to a historic peace deal with Egypt.
Need for New Policy
Certainly, Israel is now badly in need of a new policy on the Palestinians: This week it shelved plans for a unilateral withdrawal from parts of the West Bank, with officials saying that events in Gaza and Lebanon had proved such pullouts don't enhance Israel's security.
Also in the mix is a looming showdown over Tehran's nuclear program. Iran faces an Aug. 31 U.N. deadline to suspend uranium enrichment at its nuclear facilities. If the U.S. and other Security Council members can reach an accommodation with Iran on nuclear and other issues over time, Iran could potentially prompt Hezbollah to drop its weapons, some say. On the other hand, if the nuclear dispute grows to include imposition of economic sanctions or military posturing against Tehran, Hezbollah could become even more belligerent.
U.S. and Israeli officials say Hezbollah has suffered real losses, particularly to its ability to fire the sort of longer-range missiles that could hit Israel's biggest cities. A senior State Department official contends that "Hezbollah has been boxed in militarily."
Yet Hezbollah in some ways is energized by the outcome. It is flush with cash, some of it evidently from Iran, and is now handing out money to Lebanese whose homes Israel destroyed. In addition, Hezbollah is still standing after battling the strongest military in the region -- plus, in the eyes of some Hezbollah supporters, that military's biggest backer. A banner strung across a ruined building in the Hezbollah stronghold of south Beirut reads: "Made in the U.S.A."
posted by Hanan Elbadry at 10:41 AM
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