Airstrikes Stepped Up On Iraqi Insurgents
Strategy to lower need for ground troops cited
By Bryan Bender, Globe Staff
Boston Globe
January 7, 2006
WASHINGTON -- The United States and Britain stepped up the use of airstrikes in Iraq last year to subdue insurgents as they seek to pull back some ground forces and hand off more security missions to Iraqi troops.
US and British forces carried out eight air attacks in January 2005, six in February, and one in March of last year, according to a tally from the Coalition Forces Air Component Command, which oversees all air missions in the region from its headquarters in Qatar. But those numbers increased dramatically throughout the year, culminating with an average of 50 airstrikes per month in the last three months of 2005, the figures indicate.
The greater reliance on air power is part of an evolving military strategy that places greater stock in pounding Iraqi insurgents from the air in order to minimize the presence of American combat troops in population centers. It is also designed to enhance the profile of newly trained Iraqi forces, who can operate more confidently and effectively if backed by allied attack aircraft positioned over the horizon, the officials said.
''This is a shift in tactics," said a military officer in the Pentagon who asked not to be identified by name. ''In the fall, we started to take on a more proactive approach in taking out the bad guys from the air."
Some commanders and military specialists fear that the increased use of air power will increase the number of civilian casualties. US military officials maintain they have strict targeting guidelines to avoid harming civilians, yet they also acknowledge that they are often forced to rely on Iraqis for intelligence or must quickly call in airstrikes before suspected insurgents can escape -- increasing the chances of miscalculation.
The perils of the strategy were illustrated Tuesday when as many as 12 members of an Iraqi family, including women and children, were killed and others seriously injured in a US airstrike north of Baghdad. US officials said the attack from an F-14 fighter jet was aimed at suspected insurgents believed to be taking shelter in a house in Baiji, about 150 miles north of Baghdad, after a pilotless drone spotted three men planting what looked like a bomb along a nearby roadway.
Yesterday, in a statement, the US military expressed regret for the bombing, saying the suspects apparently had fled the house before the strike. Sunni Muslim leaders called the bombing an act of terrorism.
The increased use of air power ''is a potentially effective tool, but it obviously can be misused and produce significant collateral damage," said Anthony Cordesman, a military specialist at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. ''If rules of engagement are not used correctly, things could go very badly."
The invasion to topple Saddam Hussein in March 2003 -- billed as a ''shock and awe" campaign -- relied heavily on air forces to strike at military targets, government facilities, and intelligence headquarters. At the height of the campaign, thousands of sorties were flown every day.
By the beginning of 2004, the number had declined sharply, although bombing raids spiked several months that year before and during large-scale offensives in such cities as Najaf and Fallujah. In general, however, the US and British militaries had come to favor infantry soldiers and face-to-face combat as insurgents increased their guerrilla attacks across the country.
In recent months, with the US military seeking to take a back seat to Iraqi security forces, airstrikes have become more central to the US counterinsurgency campaign, according to military officials and private specialists. Heavy air power was used during US and Iraqi offensives in the western part of the country in the weeks leading up to an October constitutional referendum and December parliamentary elections.
''It takes some of the pressure off of the ground forces, which are increasingly getting overstretched," said retired Air Force Colonel P.J. Crowley, a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, a liberal Washington think tank. ''And as long as the operation comes off as designed, it does reduce the friction between US forces and the Iraqi population." The presence of large numbers of foreign troops in cities and towns angers Iraqis. Cordesman and others also assert that more airstrikes can have a psychological benefit. ''The feeling of helplessness on the part of the insurgents, of never knowing what is going to happen, are important factors," he said.
Greater use of air power ''doesn't directly engage US forces on the ground, which reduces vulnerability and the political irritation involved," Cordesman added. ''It is also an enabler. The Iraqi forces can operate on their own on the ground without having a visible US presence or being dependent on US ground units."
From January-September 2005, the number of US and British airstrikes did not top more than about 30 per month, according to the figures compiled by air commanders in the Middle East and obtained by the Globe. But in October, November, and December, US and British forces launched 61, 62, and 40 strikes, respectively. The strategy brings with it new challenges and concerns, including the need for near-perfect intelligence to make sure pilots are striking the right targets, specialists said.
''If your enemy is out in the open, air power can strike them precisely and quickly," said retired Army General Wesley K. Clark, who as commander of NATO led the 78-day air war over Kosovo in 1999 and was critical of the Bush administration's handling of the Iraq war when he made his failed bid for the Democratic nomination for president in 2004.
''The problem is that when you are not fighting a conventional force, the bombs can't tell the difference between friend or foe, and it's easy to make a mistake," he said. Such mistakes have often been made ''not because the bomb hit the wrong target but because the target wasn't appropriately selected. As you have more of those, you create more enemies." Indeed, the track record of intelligence on insurgents is not great, specialists point out.
''You need to have targets to shoot at and need high confidence," added Michael O'Hanlon, a military specialist at the centrist Brookings Institution. ''I am a little worried we are not establishing high enough confidence."
He pointed out that President Bush, in unveiling new details last month about his Iraq strategy, asserted that the number of Iraqis coming forward with information about insurgent activities has dramatically improved recently.
But O'Hanlon remains doubtful about the reliability of such intelligence. ''If that were really changing in such a radical way, we would probably see less lethality on the part of the insurgents," O'Hanlon said, ''and we don't."
By Bryan Bender, Globe Staff
Boston Globe
January 7, 2006
WASHINGTON -- The United States and Britain stepped up the use of airstrikes in Iraq last year to subdue insurgents as they seek to pull back some ground forces and hand off more security missions to Iraqi troops.
US and British forces carried out eight air attacks in January 2005, six in February, and one in March of last year, according to a tally from the Coalition Forces Air Component Command, which oversees all air missions in the region from its headquarters in Qatar. But those numbers increased dramatically throughout the year, culminating with an average of 50 airstrikes per month in the last three months of 2005, the figures indicate.
The greater reliance on air power is part of an evolving military strategy that places greater stock in pounding Iraqi insurgents from the air in order to minimize the presence of American combat troops in population centers. It is also designed to enhance the profile of newly trained Iraqi forces, who can operate more confidently and effectively if backed by allied attack aircraft positioned over the horizon, the officials said.
''This is a shift in tactics," said a military officer in the Pentagon who asked not to be identified by name. ''In the fall, we started to take on a more proactive approach in taking out the bad guys from the air."
Some commanders and military specialists fear that the increased use of air power will increase the number of civilian casualties. US military officials maintain they have strict targeting guidelines to avoid harming civilians, yet they also acknowledge that they are often forced to rely on Iraqis for intelligence or must quickly call in airstrikes before suspected insurgents can escape -- increasing the chances of miscalculation.
The perils of the strategy were illustrated Tuesday when as many as 12 members of an Iraqi family, including women and children, were killed and others seriously injured in a US airstrike north of Baghdad. US officials said the attack from an F-14 fighter jet was aimed at suspected insurgents believed to be taking shelter in a house in Baiji, about 150 miles north of Baghdad, after a pilotless drone spotted three men planting what looked like a bomb along a nearby roadway.
Yesterday, in a statement, the US military expressed regret for the bombing, saying the suspects apparently had fled the house before the strike. Sunni Muslim leaders called the bombing an act of terrorism.
The increased use of air power ''is a potentially effective tool, but it obviously can be misused and produce significant collateral damage," said Anthony Cordesman, a military specialist at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. ''If rules of engagement are not used correctly, things could go very badly."
The invasion to topple Saddam Hussein in March 2003 -- billed as a ''shock and awe" campaign -- relied heavily on air forces to strike at military targets, government facilities, and intelligence headquarters. At the height of the campaign, thousands of sorties were flown every day.
By the beginning of 2004, the number had declined sharply, although bombing raids spiked several months that year before and during large-scale offensives in such cities as Najaf and Fallujah. In general, however, the US and British militaries had come to favor infantry soldiers and face-to-face combat as insurgents increased their guerrilla attacks across the country.
In recent months, with the US military seeking to take a back seat to Iraqi security forces, airstrikes have become more central to the US counterinsurgency campaign, according to military officials and private specialists. Heavy air power was used during US and Iraqi offensives in the western part of the country in the weeks leading up to an October constitutional referendum and December parliamentary elections.
''It takes some of the pressure off of the ground forces, which are increasingly getting overstretched," said retired Air Force Colonel P.J. Crowley, a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, a liberal Washington think tank. ''And as long as the operation comes off as designed, it does reduce the friction between US forces and the Iraqi population." The presence of large numbers of foreign troops in cities and towns angers Iraqis. Cordesman and others also assert that more airstrikes can have a psychological benefit. ''The feeling of helplessness on the part of the insurgents, of never knowing what is going to happen, are important factors," he said.
Greater use of air power ''doesn't directly engage US forces on the ground, which reduces vulnerability and the political irritation involved," Cordesman added. ''It is also an enabler. The Iraqi forces can operate on their own on the ground without having a visible US presence or being dependent on US ground units."
From January-September 2005, the number of US and British airstrikes did not top more than about 30 per month, according to the figures compiled by air commanders in the Middle East and obtained by the Globe. But in October, November, and December, US and British forces launched 61, 62, and 40 strikes, respectively. The strategy brings with it new challenges and concerns, including the need for near-perfect intelligence to make sure pilots are striking the right targets, specialists said.
''If your enemy is out in the open, air power can strike them precisely and quickly," said retired Army General Wesley K. Clark, who as commander of NATO led the 78-day air war over Kosovo in 1999 and was critical of the Bush administration's handling of the Iraq war when he made his failed bid for the Democratic nomination for president in 2004.
''The problem is that when you are not fighting a conventional force, the bombs can't tell the difference between friend or foe, and it's easy to make a mistake," he said. Such mistakes have often been made ''not because the bomb hit the wrong target but because the target wasn't appropriately selected. As you have more of those, you create more enemies." Indeed, the track record of intelligence on insurgents is not great, specialists point out.
''You need to have targets to shoot at and need high confidence," added Michael O'Hanlon, a military specialist at the centrist Brookings Institution. ''I am a little worried we are not establishing high enough confidence."
He pointed out that President Bush, in unveiling new details last month about his Iraq strategy, asserted that the number of Iraqis coming forward with information about insurgent activities has dramatically improved recently.
But O'Hanlon remains doubtful about the reliability of such intelligence. ''If that were really changing in such a radical way, we would probably see less lethality on the part of the insurgents," O'Hanlon said, ''and we don't."
posted by Hanan Elbadry at 10:57 AM
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