Three Tyrants, One Test

By THOMAS CAROTHERS
Op-Ed Contributor
The New York Times
December 25, 2005

PRESIDENT BUSH'S "freedom agenda" rests on the idea that promoting democracy abroad is crucial to fighting terrorism. In his view, if democracy can spread to stagnant authoritarian states in the Middle East and elsewhere, it will undercut the roots of Islamic jihadism and other forms of violent political radicalism.

This is a bold proposition, as appealing as it is unproved. American presidents of the last several decades embraced democracy promotion in principle but usually deferred it in practice when it came to friendly tyrants who supplied America with oil, sites for military bases and other economic and security benefits. President Bush's agenda implies a fundamental change in that pattern. Such relationships will have to change, not for the sake of mushy ideals, but in pursuit of a deeper, post-Sept. 11 security interest.

So, is the Bush administration serious about this? A convergence in recent months of political events in three countries - Azerbaijan, Egypt and Kazakhstan - has presented the administration with a crucial triple test. The presidents of these nations are strong-armed autocrats adept at locking in American support by providing tangible goodies. Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan and Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan provide oil and natural gas, while Hosni Mubarak of Egypt offers help with the Palestinians and security cooperation in the Middle East.

All three men stifle opposition at home, often waving the red (or green) flag of a domestic Islamist threat. All apparently intend to be presidents for life. In short, they are following the precise path of high-level political stagnation that President Bush has warned of. And this sort of stagnation is especially troublesome in countries where the stymied opposition forces accurately see the United States as the regime's best friend.

All three of these leaders faced national elections this fall. Commendably, the Bush administration put all three governments on notice that it wanted them to ensure free and fair elections. In the case of Egypt, for example, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice set out a clear list of expectations on fair procedures and conditions when she visited Cairo in June.

Yet all three leaders reacted to American pressure by behaving according to the familiar friendly-tyrant script. They made some minor improvements in the lead-up to the elections, correcting various procedural bottlenecks, allowing greater freedom for political debate and gravely declaring an unshakeable commitment to democratic elections.

In the crucial later stages of the campaign and during the voting, however, they lowered the boom. Their security forces harassed, intimidated and arrested scores of opposition advocates, stuffed ballot boxes and tampered with vote counts. In all three countries, credible neutral monitors highlighted many serious abuses and concluded that none of the elections were free and fair.

What has been the Bush administration's reaction? So far it, too, has followed the familiar script, accenting the underwhelming positives and playing down the overwhelming negatives. As Egyptian security forces brutalized peaceful opposition groups during the final two rounds of the parliamentary elections, a State Department spokesman blandly stated that "we have not received at this point any indication that the Egyptian government isn't interested in having peaceful, free and fair elections."

After the Kazakh government fell back on the same heavy-handed repressive techniques that it has used to undermine every election since the early 1990's, the State Department, with breathtaking understatement, grudgingly acknowledged that "the system is not yet flawless."

The big question now is this: Will these leaders pay any real price in their relationships with the Bush administration for having defied it on democracy? The administration has a rich selection of tools for expressing serious displeasure: delaying new trade agreements or interrupting existing ones, refusing White House visits and other diplomatic rewards, reducing economic aid, modifying military cooperation and, perhaps of greatest potential weight, issuing frank, critical words from the presidential bully pulpit.

The administration has not yet made clear which way it will go, but as each day passes the sense of business as usual solidifies. Iraq may be the most visible battleground of the President Bush's pro-democracy ambitions. But it is an exceptional case. The many autocratic allies used to getting free passes on democracy are the real proving ground for a policy that must show consistency, seriousness and results.

The administration's next steps on Azerbaijan, Egypt and Kazakhstan will do much to determine whether the "freedom agenda" will achieve genuine credibility in the face of widespread skepticism or simply be jettisoned at the first hard turn in the road.

Thomas Carothers,a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, is the author, most recently, of "Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: The Search for Knowledge."